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Preface and Acknowledgements  
One hundred years ago, William H. Allen—of the then-newly founded Bureau of 
Municipal Research—issued a call in the Journal of Accountancy for “1,000 accountants for 
municipal research.”  Reflecting the Progressive Era’s focus on domestic reform after the 
closing of the American frontier, Allen wrote: 
Only a pessimist will believe that the day is past for the pioneer.  It is true that 
America has been discovered and that the law of diminishing returns long 
since began to operate in the gold fields of California, the wheat fields of the 
Northwest and the oil wells of Pennsylvania.  It is also true that there is less 
opportunity today than ever before for adventure of the story book type.  But 
to young men [sic] capable of thrilling with excitement when confronted with 
new problems to solve and new ideas to work out, I wish seriously to 
recommend a substitute for the North Pole—the unexploited field of municipal 
accounting and municipal business.1 
Allen’s call followed the Bureau’s early and remarkable successes, both in exposing 
waste and corruption in New York City’s government and in devising and installing 
managerial systems for increased efficiency and transparency: 
[T]he mayor, comptroller, commissioner of street cleaning, president of 
Bellevue and allied hospitals, commissioner of parks and the commissioners 
of accounts have requested cooperation, and used departmental facilities and 
men [sic] for research and reorganization.  We believe that similar 
cooperation will be obtained wherever private bodies or especially trained 
accountants approach the problem of municipal business with the sole motive 
of advancing the interests of the general public, and not with a desire to do 
sharpshooting, to turn up a scandal or to turn out the rascals.2 
History has not recorded the extent to which Allen’s call for 1,000 accountants was 
answered.  History has recorded, however, the very clear and significant contributions of his 
Bureau’s work—particularly its research agenda—to the formation of the field of American 
Public Administration.3  Thus, while Allen certainly perceived the potential contributions of 
administrative research, it’s highly doubtful he could have imagined the development and 
maturation over the next century of this entirely new field of study in the US.  Public 
Administration today includes hundreds of graduate degree programs, dozens of academic 
journals and conferences, and thousands of scholars. The objects of its study have 
expanded from municipal administration to include federal, state, international, and, more 
recently, not-for-profit administration.   
 
                                                
1 Allen, W.H. (1908, July).  Wanted—One thousand efficient accountants for municipal research. 
Journal of Accountancy, 6, 187. 
2 Allen, 1908, pp. 192-193. 
3 Waldo, D. (1984). The administrative state (2nd ed.). New York: Holmes & Meier, p. 31. 
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Today, we issue a call for “1,000 scholars for defense acquisition research.”  As 
Allen believed in the possibilities for municipal research, we also believe in the possibilities 
for melioration of acquisition’s seemingly intractable problems through systematic study.  
While Allen saw the skills of accountants as sufficient for the tasks he had in mind, we 
instead call for a truly interdisciplinary mix of scholars suitable for engaging the diverse 
facets of acquisition’s many technical, managerial, and political issues. 
Obviously, such an ambitious call cannot be answered by a single or even a dozen 
institutions.  Accordingly, the NPS Acquisition Research Program has among its principal 
objectives the cultivation of an interdisciplinary community of acquisition scholars from many 
institutions around the world.  This Symposium is merely a single step toward achieving that 
objective.  Other recent steps include new research partnerships that NPS has forged with 
several other universities and the new International Journal of Defense Acquisition 
Management (http://www.acquisitionjournal.org), a scholarly journal jointly published and 
supported by the Acquisition Research Program and Cranfield University at the Defence 
College of Management of Technology.   
From our limited perspective, such steps may seem woefully inadequate for the task 
of achieving meaningful and lasting acquisition reform.  If so, we may do well to look forward 
into the next century and imagine our intellectual descendents who will study in a fully 
mature field of defense acquisition management and who will commend us for our efforts. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer (Ships) 
• Program Executive Officer (Integrated Warfare Systems) 
• Program Executive Officer (Littoral and Mine Warfare) 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Logistics Management) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology 
• Director, Strategic Systems Program 
• Project Manager Modular Brigade Enhancements 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Air Force (Management Policy & Program Integration) 
• Dean of Research, Naval Postgraduate School 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
James B. Greene, Jr.      Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)    Associate Professor 
Karey L. Shaffer, MBA 
Program Manager, Acquisition Research Program 
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The NPS A Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, coordinates graduate student projects 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management in 
the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management.  
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Academic Associate for resident NPS acquisition curricula.   
Professor Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point.  He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  He is a former member of 
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the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.   
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.   
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager for General Dynamics Information Technology 
in support of the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and secured a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the Operations 
Manager, she also designed MWTC’s Conference site, managed various marketing 
conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors Jeri Larsen, Breanne Grover and Jessica Moon for 
all that they have done to make this publication a success, to David Wood, Tera Yoder and 
Ian White for production and graphic support and to the staff at the Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy for their administrative support. Our program success is directly 
related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 6th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 13-14, 2009 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and the 
exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We seek a 
diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry who are 
well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers from 
academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of acquisition.  
The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research areas of 
interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 7, 2008.  The Program Committee will make 
notifications of accepted proposals by December 5, 2008.  Final papers must be submitted 
by   April 3, 2009 to be included in the Symposium Proceedings. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, and 
contact information for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 minute 
presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the same 
information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along with 
participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will make 
to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org . 
^`nrfpfqflk=obpb^o`eW==
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May 14, 2008 Keynote Speaker 
8:00 a.m. – 
9:15 a.m.  
Keynote Speaker 
The Honorable Sue C. Payton, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition 
 
The Honorable Sue C. Payton is the Assistant Secretary 
of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, DC. She is the Air 
Force's service acquisition executive, responsible for all Air Force 
research, development and non-space acquisition activities. She 
provides direction, guidance and supervision of all matters 
pertaining to the formulation, review, approval and execution of 
acquisition plans, policies and programs. Payton directs $30 billion 
annual investments that include major programs like the KC-45A,  
F-22A, F-35, C-17 and munitions, as well as capability areas such 
as information technology and command and control, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance systems. She formulates and 
executes the $210 billion Air Force investment strategy to acquire 
systems and support services to provide combat capability to joint 
warfighting commanders. 
Payton has previously worked with the military services, 
defense agencies, industry, coalition partners and combatant 
commands, and has had oversight responsibilities for technology transition programs. These 
programs include Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, Joint Warfighting Program, 
Foreign Comparative Test, Defense Acquisition Challenge, Technology Transition Initiative, 
ManTech, Defense Production Act Title III and TechLink. While working for ImageLinks, Inc., and the 
National Center for Applied Technology, she was responsible for the assessment, prototype 
development and insertion of commercial technology for Department of Defense agencies and 
worldwide field users. During her tenure with Lockheed Martin and Martin Marietta, Payton was 
responsible for leveraging the latest information systems technology needs of the DoD and the 
intelligence community, and she resolved complex acquisition and technical issues. Payton has 
extensive experience leading government and industry partnerships focused on maturing and 
applying technology, operations concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures to solve national 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 3 - 
=
=




May 14, 2008 
Panel 1 - Plenary Panel - Maintaining Competition in Defense 
Acquisition 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m.  
Chair:  
Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, Director, Center for Public Policy & Private 
Enterprise, University of Maryland, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics 
Discussants:  
Dr. James I. Finley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & 
Technology) 
Louis A. Kratz, Vice President and Managing Director, Focused 
Logistics, Lockheed Martin Corporation 
Kenneth E. Miller, Special Assistant for Acquisition Governance & 
Transparency to the Secretary of the Air Force  
 
Chair: The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler is the Director of the Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise and the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise. From 1997 to 2001, 
he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As the third-
ranking civilian at the Pentagon, Gansler was responsible for all research and development, 
acquisition reform, logistics, advanced technology, environmental security, defense industry, and 
numerous other security programs. Gansler has held a variety of positions in government and the 
private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics), Senior Vice President, TASC, Vice 
President of ITT, and engineering and management positions with Singer and Raytheon 
Corporations. Gansler is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the 
National Academy of Public Administration. In addition to giving frequent congressional testimonies, 
he is the author of many articles and has written several books on the topic of defense. 
Discussant: Dr. James I. Finley was confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology (A&T) by the US Senate in March 2006. In this role, he presides over 
policies that govern acquisition and procurement in the Department of Defense (DoD). He also 
advises the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics on acquisition matters and technology integration and protection. 
Finley came to the DoD in his current role after 30 years in the private sector, where he held various 
positions of increasing responsibility for General Electric, Singer, Lear Siegler, United Technologies 
and General Dynamics. He served in key positions on General Dynamics' leadership team, including 
Corporate Officer, President of Information Systems and Chair of the Business Development Council, 
before founding his own business-consulting company, The Finley Group, LLC, in 2002. 
Finley's private-sector experience spans air, land, sea and space programs for the DoD, in addition to 
contributions to the Federal Aviation Administration's Automatic Surface Detection Radar System and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Space Shuttle Program. He also performed a 
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variety of functions on systems and subsystems, including: mission analysis; design, development 
and deployment of weapon delivery; flight control; navigation; information management; command, 
control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR); battle 
space management; and chemical/biological defense systems. Additionally, Finley has extensive 
private-sector experience working on Joint programs—for example, the Joint Tactical Information 
Distribution System and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System. 
Finley holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the Milwaukee School of 
Engineering, and he earned a Master’s of Business Administration from California State University, 
Fresno. The Milwaukee School of Engineering also awarded him an Honorary Doctorate in 
Engineering. 
In addition to his academic achievements, Finley is the recipient of numerous professional 
performance awards, including the Boeing Gold Certification Award, the Honeywell Preferred Supplier 
Award, Northrop Grumman Blue Achievement, Lockheed Martin Best in Class Rating, the Defense 
Security Service "Outstanding Achievement" Award, the George Westinghouse Award and the 
California State University "2007 Top Dog Alumni Award."  
Finley resides in Virginia with his wife, Sharon. They have six children and four grandchildren.  
Discussant: Louis A. Kratz is the Vice President and Managing Director, Focused Logistics, 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, responsible for coordinating Lockheed Martin's logistics and weapon 
system sustainment efforts. Kratz leads Lockheed Martin's logistics strategic planning, performance-
based logistics efforts, logistics technology development, logistics human capital development, and 
cross-corporate logistics business initiatives.  
Previously, Kratz served as the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics Plans and 
Programs) within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness). As such, he was responsible for guiding the DoD's logistics transformation to meet the 
operational requirements of the 21st Century. Kratz oversaw the DoD's long-range logistics planning 
to meet the requirements of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Joint Vision 2020. He led 
the core analytic team on supply chain logistics for the QDR and prepared the DoD's inaugural 
Focused Logistics Roadmap. Kratz led the DoD's implementation of Total Life Cycle Systems 
Management and Performance-based Logistics, including acquisition logistics policy development, 
career development, and oversight of major weapon systems. Kratz was the Defense Standardization 
Executive and co-chair of the Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Board and the Joint Logistics 
Group.  
Prior to that, Kratz was the Director of Life Cycle Integration at TASC. Focused on weapon systems 
acquisition, acquisition reform and information resource management. Kratz led TASC's horizontal 
integration effort on weapon system support and directed TASC's support to the OSD Acquisition 
Reform Office and the FAA Acquisition Policy Office, including policy development, metrics, 
cost/benefit analyses, and best practices assessments. Kratz directed detailed acquisition strategy 
analyses for numerous weapon system programs.  
Kratz is a member of several organizations, including the National Defense Industries Association 
(NDIA) and Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), and serves as chair of the Logistics Education 
Board of Advisors for SOLE—The International Society of Logistics. He was the inaugural recipient of 
the 2005 Von Braun Award for Leadership from SOLE, and has received the 2004 Presidential Rank 
Award and the AIA Outstanding Award.  
Discussant: Kenneth E. Miller, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is Special Assistant for 
Acquisition Governance and Transparency to the Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC. Miller 
assists in discharging the responsibilities in the direction, guidance and supervision of Air Force 
programs for research, development and acquisition of systems, supplies and services. This includes 
the formulation of acquisition and contracting policies and the management oversight of specific 
acquisition programs.  
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Miller, a native of Columbus, MS, began his professional career in 1975 as an aerospace engineer 
with the Naval Air Systems Command. He advanced to weapons systems acquisition management 
as the Assistant Deputy Program Manager for the H-3 antisubmarine helicopter, later serving as 
Deputy Program Manager for the E-6A and Principal Deputy Program Manager for the A-6/EA-6 
Weapons Systems Program Office. In April 1989, the Navy established the new Program Executive 
Offices within the acquisition system. Miller was selected to be the first Deputy for Acquisition for the 
Program Executive Office (Tactical Aircraft), providing policy and execution advice to the Program 
Executive Officer on assigned programs.  
Miller was appointed to the Senior Executive Service as the second Deputy Program Executive 
Officer for Tactical Aircraft Programs, providing advice on acquisition-related issues for a variety of 
aircraft and weapons programs. In 1994, he was selected as the Assistant Commander for Corporate 
Operations, where his responsibilities included the strategic planning and corporate business 
functions of the Naval Air Systems Command. Additional duties included Chief Information Officer.  In 
1998, he was appointed Principal Assistant for Acquisition, Programming and Budgeting for the 
Director of Air Warfare within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.  Miller was later selected as 
the Assistant Deputy, Chief of Naval Operations, Warfare Requirements and Programs, defining and 
developing a variety of warfare requirements for the Department of the Navy. He is a frequent 
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Panel 2 - Acquisition Portfolio Management 
 
Wednesday, 
May 14, 2008 Panel 2 - Acquisition Portfolio Management 




Dr. Nancy Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis, Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) 
Papers:  
GAO Best Practices: Portfolio Management 
Mr. Michael P. Sullivan, Director, Dayton Ohio Office, US Government 
Accountability Office 
Portfolio Management Best Practices for the DoD, R&D and Acquisition 
Communities 
Mr. Robert Edson, Principal Analyst and Technical Manager, 
Innovation Analysis Division and Nicole Long, Associate Analyst, 
ANSER 
GAP Analysis: Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations 
Mr. Gary O. Langford, Lecturer, Dr. Thomas V. Huynh, Associate 
Professor, Dr. Raymond (Chip) Franck, Senior Lecturer and Dr. Ira A. 
Lewis, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
Chair: Dr. Nancy Spruill is a native of Takoma Park, MD. After receiving a Bachelor of Science 
Degree in Mathematics from the University of Maryland in 1971, she joined the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA). From 1971 to 1983, she held a variety of positions on the CNA staff, including 
Technical Staff Analyst, Professional Staff Analyst and Project Director. In 1975, she earned her 
Master of Arts in Mathematical Statistics from George Washington University, followed by her 
Doctorate in 1980.  
Spruill served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to 1993. Initially, she 
was the Senior Planning, Programming, and Budget Analyst in the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and 
Logistics Secretariat. Later, she served as the Director for Support and Liaison for the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. Then, she served as the Senior 
Operations Research Analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis 
and Evaluation.  
In 1993, she joined the staff of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), serving as the Chief of 
Programs and Analysis Division for the DMA Comptroller. Subsequently, she served as Acting 
Deputy Comptroller and was a member of the Reinvention Task Force for the Vice President's 
National Performance Review.  
In March 1995, she was selected as the Deputy Director for Acquisition Resources for the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In February 1999, she was appointed Director, 
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Acquisition Resources & Analysis (ARA) for Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). In this capacity, she is responsible for all aspects of AT&L’s participation 
in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); the Congressional process; and the 
Defense Acquisition System. She serves as the Executive Secretary to the Defense Acquisition 
Board and is responsible for the timely and accurate submission to Congress of Selected Acquisition 
Reports and Unit Cost Reports for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. She manages the Defense 
Acquisition Execution Summary monthly review of programs; monitors cost and schedule status of 
high interest programs; and conducts analyses of contract and program cost performance, including 
analysis of the effective use of Integrated Program Management principles through the use of Earned 
Value Management. Spruill performs systemic analysis to improve acquisition policy and education, 
and conducts special analyses for the Under Secretary. She leads the Department in developing 
plans to manage Property, Plant and Equipment, Inventory, Operating Materials and 
Supplies/Deferred Maintenance and Environmental Liabilities. She proposes modifications to (or 
acquisition of) new DoD feeder systems, in support of achieving an unqualified audit opinion on DoD 
Financial Statements as mandated by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. She also manages the 
studies program for OSD, oversees USD(AT&L)’s office automation system, manages its information 
system network, and conducts special analyses for the Under Secretary.  
Spruill has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1995. She is a certified Acquisition 
Professional and an active member of the American Statistical Association. Her many honors and 
awards include the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service, the Secretary of 
Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious 
Civilian Service, the Hammer Award, the Acker Skill in Communications Award and the Presidential 
Rank Award. She has contributed papers in publications of the statistics and defense analyses 
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Abstract 
Gap Analysis is widely regarded as a useful tool to facilitate commercial and defense 
system acquisitions. This paper is a rethinking of the theoretical foundations and 
systematics of Gap Analysis with practical extensions to illustrate its utility and limitations. It 
also provides a new perspective on those theoretical foundations from the perspectives of 
systems and value engineering. 
The growing sophistication and complexity of new systems or system-of-systems 
have resulted in a dramatic increase in time and money to reach operational capability. Gap 
Analysis, properly defined and enacted, clarifies goals, appropriate investment and the end-
use.  
Introduction    
The challenge of successfully acquiring and operating a new system is to ensure that 
the mission will be accomplished within an acceptable level of loss. To that end, there have 
been numerous attempts to develop and field systems that are intended to prevail in the 
event of conflict. How should these future systems be defined? Who is responsible? What 
processes guide the system requirements? If “we” perceive a deficiency or a desired goal 
that is different from that which we are intending, then there could exist a basis for gap in 
capability and, therefore, a desire to close the capability gap.  
What one desires versus what one has is, in essence, a Gap. The Gap is as much 
the relationship between what is perceived to be important and the derived difference 
between performance and expectations. The methodology and analysis of that difference is 
the descriptive foundation for Gap Analysis. From a mission-capability perspective, a Gap 
may consist of deficiencies in operational concepts, current or projected operational 
disadvantages, technologies, and understood future needs. To be specific, a Gap must be 
founded on the starting and ending points as well as the difference between these points. 
Quantifying these metrics typically involves evaluating a number of situations and mission 
scenarios in concert with actions or, more generally stated, guidance from policy and goals. 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) have long formed the set of standards from which to 
determine how well a capability satisfies a requirement (Sproles, 2002). MOEs are 
distinguishable from Measures of Performance (MOPs) in that MOEs offer the external view, 
while MOPs are more consistent with the internal view. The external view captures the 
system’s beginning and ending points, and the MOE of the candidate programs to fill the 
gap. The internal view involves measures of how well one fills the gap through the MOPs. 
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Therefore, one must formulate both MOEs and MOPs to fully define a Gap. However, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (2004, March 12) focuses on MOEs, yet does not 
mention MOPs. There is an implied admixture of MOEs and MOPs defined as MOEs, but 
the essential qualities of performance-based metrics are missing for carrying out activities 
and actions, for measuring functions, and from which to determine economic and numeric 
losses. 
Gap Analysis is deeply embedded and fully institutionalized as a cornerstone of the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition strategy, particularly in the critical 
process called Valuation of Alternative (VoA), formerly Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). It is 
the purpose of Gap Analysis within the DoD VoA process to report on the evaluation of the 
performance, operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs of the 
alternative systems to meet a desired mission capability. In this context, the VoA assesses 
the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives under consideration.  
The goal of Department of Defense (DoD) Gap Analysis is to compare current 
capability to a set of requirements. Where differences arise, gaps are identified and 
quantified, and mitigations are prioritized and planned. This paper addresses the theoretical 
foundations and systematics of Gap Analysis with extensions to illustrate its utility as a 
useful management tool for both defense and commercial acquisition purposes. Without a 
considered theoretical foundation from which to conduct Gap Analysis, an inadequate level 
of guidance regarding appropriate methodology and analytical methods may well result. The 
metrics of Gap Analysis are defined on the basis of system value (Langford, 2006; Langford 
& Huynh, 2007) and assessed risks. 
Discussion 
For the US Department of Defense (DoD), the acquisition of goods and services 
follows the policies outlined in Directives, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook DoD 5000 (the structure and 
operation of the defense acquisition system). In this context, Gap Analysis is a method for 
identifying the degree to which a current system satisfies a set of requirements. The goal of 
Gap Analysis is to align an anticipated future outcome with a future reality that can be 
formulated, definitized, and established or constructed. However, Gap Analysis is not 
intended to close the space between the most distant extremes or the rarest occurrences. 
Rather, Gap Analysis is centered on the larger, more general aspects that are by and large 
not part of the present reality (referred to as the current reference frame). For the DoD, Gap 
Analysis grew out of the realization that relying solely on a threat-based approach (used as 
a primary driver of requirements until 2000) or a technology approach to determining future 
needs is both costly and largely ineffective. One of the concerns with threat-based methods 
lies with the notion of being guided by the will and intentions of others (e.g., adversaries) (as 
exemplified through an analysis of threats, their efficacy and robustness), rather than relying 
on our competitive advantages to define and frame future engagements.  
Alternatively, a technology-centered approach is open-ended, with little constraint for 
what can be postulated. Acquisitions based on a technology approach may not result in a 
continuous presentation of appropriate military hardware that is consistent with lifecycle cost 
issues or the necessary capabilities in time of conflict. With only theoretical physics as the 
constraint, technology developments can extend twenty years or longer (e.g., ground-based, 
airborne, and space-based laser weapon systems). Even with an incremental approach to 
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delivering products, usable incarnations of systems may be distanced by inadequacies in 
the phases of development and levels of integration. At issue is the availability of weapons 
systems and doctrine that can prevail in hostilities without: (1) spending an enormous 
amount of money to sustain existing systems until new systems are delivered, and (2) 
having to develop a needed technology engineered and made available for use. Acquisitions 
based on a threat-based approach are always plagued by the credibility of the threat—the 
absolute measure of what an adversary will have available in the future.  
Accordingly, neither the technology nor the threat-based approaches address some 
of the persistent, perennial issues that fundamentally impact the implementations of Gap 
Analysis. 
Since the turn of the century, the DoD has concentrated on a capabilities-based 
approach, in which capabilities are defined and identified using a top-down approach 
infused with characteristics of measures of effectiveness, supportability, time, distance, 
effect (including scale) and obstacles to overcome. Capability is defined by an operational 
user as the ability to execute a specified course of action (CJCS, 2004). 
Gap Analysis Background 
The first reference to Gap Analysis was in the 1938 publication on the disjuncture 
between cultural goals and institutional norms (Merton, 1938). The notion was adapted to 
psychotic behavior (1950s), preferred biodiversity (1980s), personnel planning (1989), and 
more recently, competitive analysis and interest rates of financial instruments.  Gap Analysis 
was referred to in a series of instructions from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
throughout the 1990s with reference to defining gaps in capabilities requiring a material 
solution. In the late 1990s, the DoD infused a form of Gap Analysis into the acquisition 
process—comparing future threat-based assessments to current capability. Meanwhile, 
program costs seemed out of control; major projects were cancelled, and functionality was 
not being delivered as desired. A memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld asked for ideas to fix the DoD process of determining system requirements 
(Rumsfeld, 2001). Gap Analysis had come into being and was thriving within the structure of 
the JCIDS process. The determinant factor for acquisition had moved from a threat-based 
premise to a capabilities-based identification of needs. While the threat continues to be a 
part of the acquisition process, part of the initial capabilities document (ICD)—the document 
that initiates the acquisition system management process—Gap Analysis is performed on 
the basis of desired capability.   
While Gap Analysis should be neither technology-driven nor threat-driven, it is an 
approach that largely uses technology and threats as inputs to a vision-driven future. Gap 
Analysis is based on the high-level collective vision of what we need. This vision is 
discussed at the top levels of government within the context of the national security strategy: 
the strategic concepts postured for defense, the joint operations concepts, and the 
integrated architectures of US forces. The vision is then stated as a goal, one that is to be 
achieved methodically through a step-wise process. The problems with the existing 
formulation of Gap Analysis are determining: (1) what constitutes the foundation data, (2) 
which data are relevant to a future competitive analysis, (3) how should the relevant data be 
structured to deal with the future issues within the proper context, (4) what are the 
assumptions and scaling rules used to extend the current state of industrial output, 
technology advances, and engineering developments, and (5) what process or methodology 
enforces consistency of performing Gap Analysis. 
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The process of identifying needs and unsatisfied desires, or gaps in capability—in 
essence, the goal—is sometimes enacted through a set of ad-hoc processes and actions 
accompanied by an analysis of alternatives. Closing the capability gap between what exists 
and what is wanted includes the aptitude required to develop something new and the 
reference point from which one starts. This is an Omni-dimensional problem that 
encompasses strategy, operations, systems engineering processes, and the compositional 
elements of the system. Technology readiness and maturity are integral parts of Gap 
Analysis.  
The first step in improving Gap Analysis is to determine the underlying premises and 
fundamental metrics of such an Analysis. This paper investigates the theoretical issues of 
Gap Analysis and proposes seven metrics based on quantifiable worth, value, and risk. By 
developing the theory of Gap Analysis into a form that can be applied in a clear and 
consistent manner to the DoD acquisition process, we can directly apply the process of 
defining requirements. Specifically, Worth metrics can be applied to a critical examination of 
foundation data; Risk metrics can be used to interpret the relevancy of data; an Enterprise 
Framework (which displays Worth and Risk metrics) can illustrate context at a given time; 
and assumptions can be definitively scrutinized. To further understand and determine the 
applicability of Gap Analysis for DoD acquisition, a final step in this work is to identify the 
general limitations of Gap Analysis and the general impositions that Gap Analysis places on 
the success of the acquisition process. 
Theory 
Gaps have to do with mechanical causal histories—the telelogic argument that gaps 
exist and can be ameliorated by goal-directed actions. Aristotle was the first philosopher to 
formulate an accountable theory of telelogy founded on four causal properties: material, 
formal, efficient, and final. He argued that these four causes are required to give a complete 
account of any event. The cause of material involves being made of matter (e.g., the 
product); the cause of formal involves relations between entities (e.g., the network); the 
cause of efficient involves acting in certain ways (e.g., the procedures); and the cause of 
final involves having specific goals towards which actions are directed (e.g., the use) 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.).  
For the Department of Defense, Gaps are defined in terms of functional areas, 
relevant span and domain of military operations, intended effects, temporal matters, policy 
implications and constraints. Further, all gaps are defined in terms of capability. The Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS—the formal US DoD procedure which 
defines acquisition requirements and develops the criteria to evaluate weapon systems) was 
implemented to specifically address capability gaps. But not all capability gaps require a 
material solution set. Changes or enactments of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) are also considered to 
close Gaps. Such considerations are formally evaluated before recommending the start of a 
new acquisition effort (CJCS, 2004; CJCS, 2005). In essence, functional capabilities are 
assessed to identify gaps.  
It is relevant to mention the pioneering work by Lawrence Miles (1972) to formally 
recognize and focus attention on functions of a product. Product functions create (or cause) 
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performances relative to investment.  The ratio of performance to investment is a measure 
of relevancy and effectiveness. 
Yet Gap Analysis is concerned with the difference between the present and the 
future, the reality and the expected, but not with the time or discrete time-steps between 
these disparities. While the DoD typically formulates its development interests in a temporal 
domain (e.g., a timeline of activities), the development activities are construed and managed 
as a discrete set of events. The Systems Engineering Process Models reinforce the notion 
of when to move from one stage of product development to the next stage, as well as what 
tasks need to be completed within each stage. Consequently, the notion of a temporal 
juxtaposition of activities is less relevant to the event-driven outcomes that characterize a 
future competitive space. In other words, Gap Analysis does not reflect when something will 
actually happen, only that it will happen. This defining of a Gap (in a different way than 
found in US acquisition policy, DoD 5000 series) lends itself naturally to a display of 
intentions that accurately reflect the constraints of event-based competition founded on the 
product, operations, and strategy of the various competitors.  
In total, this redacting of Gap Analysis into events rather than timelines eliminates 
the actual propositional attributes of the competition, but retains the notional attributes. 
Propositional attributes iterate the validity of belief attitudes (i.e., I know what I know; I know 
what I want). Notional attributes include intentions and wishes (i.e., the end result is not 
influenced by the proposer’s illative skills) (Duzi, 2002). Temporal considerations (e.g., I 
know when I want it) can be added as an attribute of the Enterprise Framework after the 
researcher gains an understanding of the situational awareness in event-space (a structure 
and analysis formed without temporal constraints). There are alternative interpretations of 
Enterprise Frameworks, most notably for software applications (Hafedh, Fayad, Brugali, 
Hamu & Dori, 2002). This study maintains that such theories can be used to surmise a 
means to enforce consistency in process, application, and interpretation of Gaps. 
Value 
The prime distinguishing characteristic of Value Engineering is the use of functional 
(or function) analysis (Miles, 1972, first published 1961). Value Engineering (VE) was 
developed by Miles and Erlicher at General Electric in 1947 as a means recognize and 
explore what an element of the system does rather than what it is. Value Engineering is an 
organized process to optimize a system’s functionality versus cost. Alternatively, VE 
provides the necessary functions at the lowest cost, or determines which alternative design 
will provide the most reliable performance for a given cost. In essence, analyzing Value is 
the way and manner of analyzing productivity, selecting alternatives, and otherwise 
manipulating the ratio of Performance to Cost. For the purpose of this report, the authors will 
not distinguish between Value Engineering and Value Analysis. Value Analysis (VA) is 
typically concerned with productivity, the use of labor, materials and profitability.  
The term Value has many colloquial definitions, including the term’s use and misuse 
often disguised as promoting various marketing and sales concepts. But in the main, 
constructs of Value are without merit and meaning unless there is a relationship to functions, 
and therefore by reference, to system objective(s) or use(s). Value is not synonymous with 
cost or investment. Value is the functionality and performance of a system divided by the 
investment to deliver or sustain that system (Langford, 2006; 2007). Further, Value is not 
Worth, which is a measure of Value given risk (discussed in next section). There are 
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different types of Value (use, esteem, cost, exchange, scrap, and so forth). For the purposes 
of this report, the authors do distinguish between the types of Value. 
Value compares the functionality and use one receives versus what one invested 
(Langford, 2006). This notion of Value explicitly requires a buyer and seller model to 
determine Value. This presupposes that there is always a “source and a sink,” an “input and 
an output,” a pre-condition and a post-condition that is the determinant of Value. Therefore, 
Value is the ratio of the defining characteristics of the product (Functions and Performances) 
divided by the investment to achieve that functionality and performance. Value is measured 
in absolute terms. For example, the product shall provide a function with a specified 
performance. That function does 0.5 of what was paid for (as perceived from the point of 
view of the developer). Or perhaps, the performance was measured at 90% of the 
requirement. The investment expended to achieve that functionality and performance was 
as planned. Therefore, the value was less than desired (developer’s perspective). The Value 
Function (Equation 1) relates the System Value to the System Use(s) or to the System 
function(s) and performances related to the functions, divided by the investment. 
Equation 1.   
{ ( )* ( )}
( )
( )
F t P t
V t
I t
= ∑  
where )t(F is a function performed by the system; )t(P is the performance measure of the 
function )t(F ; )t(I  is the investment (e.g., dollars or other equivalent convenience of at-
risk assets); and the time, t, is measured relative to the onset of initial investment in the 
project.  The unit of V(t) is that of )t(P divided by Investment (which could be quantified in 
terms of dollars or another meaningful measure an investment), since )t(F  is 
dimensionless. 
The importance of functions was underscored in 1954 by Lawrence Miles when he 
conceived Value Analysis (and the subsequent development of the fields of Value 
Engineering and Systems Engineering) away from the parochial focus of simply providing 
system components. He based his functional analysis on the component parts of the 
product, the totality of which provided the desired functions. The purpose of functional 
analysis was to establish why an element exists so that alternative solutions could be 
generated (Green, 1996). Value Engineering is the activity which identifies and analyzes the 
function of products and services to achieve an overall effectiveness in providing system 
functionality. Systems Engineering is the activity which identifies and analyzes functions of 
products and services to specify the requirements that need to be built and sustained.  
When applied to Gap Analysis, the metrics used for analyzing requirements are 
Value and Risk. Value is captured by the cost of Functions and their Performances, and 
Investment (measured in cost or investment). In common-sense fashion, Value is a measure 
of appreciation. It may be objective or subjective. Objective value relates to the idea that 
there is independence of assessments viewed from various perspectives—a consensus 
opinion of truth. Subjective value is based on what is expected (the sum of all corporal and 
abstract happenings from which you benefit and expect from a situation if you participate in 
a certain fashion). Value is simply the matter of minimizing cost or its time equivalency to 
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develop a product. Value is the use that users expect (e.g., the functions and performance) 
for the investment they are willing to make. Further, Value is exemplified in the formulation 
of lifecycle costs and lifecycle time that express the transformation of company assets into 
profitably sold products that have a set of functions, performances, and quality. Each 
function is an activity that the product does with certain performance attributes. For each 
function, there can be several performance requirements. But there is never a function 
without a performance (Miles, 1954; Langford, 2006; 2007).  
Worth 
The notion of Worth extends the concept of value to include the intangibles of an 
indefinite quantity or other uncertainties. We define Worth as an indefinite quantification of 
something having a specified value. For example, “I have $20. Please give me $20 worth of 
gasoline.” I have already determined that gasoline has sufficient value to warrant my 
purchasing it, and I have a limited budget of $20. I am willing to purchase more gasoline at a 
later time, when I either have more than $20, have more time to pump the gasoline, or have 
a current additional constraint removed. But, is it worth it to purchase from this vendor or 
another vendor at another location? Perhaps $20 purchases more gasoline at a different 
location from a different vendor. The $20 will purchase either Quantity X from Vendor A or 
Quantity Y from Vendor B, where Quantity Y > Quantity X. The difference in distance 
between Vendor A and Vendor B is 5 miles, so I must drive an additional 5 miles to transact 
and receive more gas than I could receive from Vendor A. This presumes I know with a high 
degree of certainty that Vendor B offers the gasoline appropriate for my use and provides 
similar performance at a price sufficiently lower than I can get from Vendor A so as to 
warrant travel to Vendor B.  If my level of knowledge was lower about the price of Vendor B, 
then I must consider the worth issue in light of the uncertainty that Vendor B’s price would 
be sufficiently less than Vendor A’s price. In other words, is it worth the risk to drive farther 
and “shop” for gasoline? The loss may be quantifiable in the case in which Vendor B’s price 
is known. Either the price is sufficiently lower to justify driving to Vendor B’s location or it is 
not. If both the price and the distance are unknown, then there is less sufficiency and 
greater unknowns with which to deal. These unknowns can be incorporated into the Worth 
function as a determination of losses. If I do not locate a gasoline vendor before I “run out of 
gas,” I will incur additional costs of purchasing a gas can and the cost of my time converted 
on a cash basis. Further, if I locate a gasoline vendor whose price is higher than Vendor A, 
then I have paid more than I could have paid.  
By including the effects of high, sufficient, and low measures of quality, a decision 
based on Worth can be structured and evaluated in a methodical fashion. Obtaining 
sufficient information is typified by the trade-off between when one has paid too much or too 
little for either a given number of defects (1) as measured by a degradation or improvement 
in performance, or (2) which result in defects that are caused by certain levels of 
performance.  
Worth as simply the ratio of the Value V(t) multiplied by the Quality Q(t) (Langford, 
2006; 2007).  Performance indicates how well a function is executed by the system.  In this 
work, quality refers to the consistency of performance (or tolerance that signifies how good 
the performance is) in reference to the amount of pain or loss that results from the 
inconsistency as described by Taguchi (1990).  In essence, functions result in capabilities; 
performances differentiate competing products; and quality affects the lifecycle cost of the 
product.  For each function, there is at least one pair of requirements—performance and 
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quality. The quality requirement indicates the variation and impact of the variation of the 
performance requirement of a function.  A system function may thus have different values of 
performance, and the quality of a performance may have different values.  The summation 
in Equation 1 is, thus, over all values of the functions, performance, and quality, for all time, 
and incorporating all uncertainties. Equation 2 indicates the Worth of system, as it 
references Value. 
Equation 2.   
( )* ( )* ( )
( ) ( )* ( )
( )
F t P t Q t
W t V t Q t
I t
= = ∑  
where )t(Q is quality (the tolerance assigned to the performance measures), and the time, 
t, is measured relative to the onset of initial investment in the project.  We refer to the 
delineation of a function in terms of its performance and the quality of the performance as 
the triadic decomposition of the function.  If the unit of )t(Q  can be converted to the unit 
of )t(I (Equation 1), then the unit of W(t) is that of )t(P , since )t(F  is dimensionless.  
)t(Q  can be thought of as a loss that is incurred.  
Several schemes have been proposed to define and structure requirements, such as 
functions, performance, and tolerances/physical synthesis by Wymore (1993), hierarchical 
task analysis by Kruchten (2000), decomposition coordination method of multidisciplinary 
design optimization by Jianjiang, Zhong, Xiao, and Sun (2005), functional descriptions by 
Browning, Deyst, Eppinger and Whitney (2003) and Cantor (2003), and non-functional 
descriptions by Poort and Peter (2004).  The functional triadic decomposition proposed in 
this work forms a basis for a management tool that provides a structure to control the 
project.  Again, triadic decomposition prescribes that every function is imbued with the 
necessary and sufficient attributes of performance and quality.  It forms a basis for a 
management tool that provides a structure to control the project. 
Control centers on three functions (again, each with associated performance and 
quality): Regulate (monitor and adjust), govern (define limits, allocate resources, determine 
requirements, and report), and direct (lead, organize, and communicate).  
Traditional functional analysis, supplemented with the triadic decomposition, is 
conjectured to result in a complete and comprehensive set of requirements.  The resulting 
functional decomposition, together with commensurate system specifications and the 
mechanisms of action or activity (e.g., creation, destruction, modulation, translation, 
transduction), should form a basis upon which a system can be designed and built using the 
classical set of system development models—such as the spiral, “Vee,” and waterfall model. 
The Value of a product is thus quantified according to Equation 1, and the Worth of a 
product is quantified according to Equation 2.  From the manufacturer’s point-of-view, a 
“product’s worth” is one that has met some investment criteria for the desired set of 
functionality, performance, and quality requirements.  From the purchaser’s (consumer’s) 
point-of-view, the expression in Equation 2 aids in the trade between the applicability of a 
purchased product (in terms of the item’s functionality, performance, and quality) and the 
total cost and time invested in the purchase and use of the product (Langford, 2006; 2007).  
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Value and Worth are calculated at the moment of the agreed exchange of 
product/services for a given amount or recompense.  Worth reflects the uncertainties based 
on losses that are associated with the exchange. These exchanges (or interactions between 
elements) are quantifiable and may have a net impact on the Value and Worth of the 
system, or in the exchange between two or more systems through their respective elements, 
a system(s)-of-systems interaction.  We are interested in the interactions that have 
consequences that are measurable in the lifecycle of the product or service. To incorporate 
this level of minimum interest, we introduce the concept of a Net Impact—defined as a 
consequence that exceeds a threshold that is determined to be of interest (Langford, 2006; 
2007). 
Worth Transfer Function 
In control theory, a transfer function is a mathematical representation of the relation 
between the input and output of a system.  A Worth transfer function (WTF) between two 
elements of a system is defined to be the exchange of Worth between the two elements.  
Worth is what is received (in terms of usefulness) for an investment.  This exchange 
necessarily assumes some measure of risk. Given risk, a WTF can thus be either a 
manifestation of the state (or a change in the state of a system), or a tool to evaluate 
differences between the state of a system and the state of another system, or between the 
states of two systems in a system-of-systems.  In essence, the WTF represents various 
impact(s) on the state(s) of a system. The WTF can be a nested hierarchy of WTFs, all 
related through functional decomposition.  Depending on the worth ascribed to each of the 
WTFs, the state(s) of the system(s) may be impacted to varying degrees.  The result is that 
a small number of WTFs may be equivalent to a large number of irreducible WTFs. 
A system is a set of elements that are either dependent or independent but 
interacting pairwise―temporally or physically―to achieve a purpose.  The elements form 
the boundary of the system.   This definition takes into account both the permanent and 
episodic interactions among elements of a system or systems of a system-of-systems.  It 
thus includes the lasting and occasional interactions, as well as emergent properties and 
behaviors, of a system.   These interactions effect transfer of energy, materiel, data, 
information, and services.  They can be cooperative or competitive in nature, and they can 
enhance or degrade the system Worth, which is defined below.  The pairwise interaction 
transfers a measure of Worth from one element of a pair to the other element.   We term the 
measure of the transferred worth the Worth Transfer Function (WTF). 
Complexity 
Complexity of a system is often characterized by the total quantity of units that make 
up the system.  As described by Homer and Selman (2001) and Li and Vitanyi (2006), it is 
both the number of and interactions among the units that, in general, are used to imply and 
define complexity.  The system complexity thus augments the management challenge 
because of the large number and various types of system elements and stakeholders.  In 
this work, complexity is reflected by the number and significance of WTFs among the 
elements of a system or among the systems of a system-of-systems.  Since an element of a 
system may also be a stakeholder of the system, an increase in the number of stakeholders 
increases the complexity. Managing complexity or managing stakeholders thus 
amounts to managing the WTFs.  It must be noted that a stakeholder with a large WTF 
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(i.e., a funding source with many requirements) may add no more complexity than does a 
large number of stakeholders with a few requirements. 
Risk 
Using the logic in Lowrance (1976), Lewis (2006) defines simple risk as a function of 
three variables: threat, vulnerability, and damage.  By replacing damage with Worth, 
Langford and Huynh (2007) capture risk through threat, vulnerability, and Worth.  An 
element e  of a system is associated with a risk, eR , defined by  
Equation 3.   (1 )e e e e e e eR X U W X a W= ∗ ∗ = ∗ − ∗   
where, * indicates the convolution that expresses the overlap and blending of factors; 
and where, threat, eX , is a set of harmful events that could impact the element; 
vulnerability, eU , is the probability that element e  is degraded or fails in some specific 
way if attacked; Worth,  [1 ]eeW V L= − , where Le is the loss that results from a 
successful attack on element e ; and susceptibility, ea , is the likelihood that an asset will 
survive an attack. eW  is given by Equation 2.  It may be a loss of productivity, casualties, 
loss of capital equipment, loss of time, or loss of dollars.  Susceptibility is the complement of 
vulnerability. Equation 3 reflects these tentative affinities. One finds vulnerabilities in a 
worthy system from the threats to that system. 
Since an element in a system (or network) may be connected to more than one 
element, the number of WTFs associated with the element is the degree of the element.  
Subscribing to Almannai and Lewis (2007), we obtain the system risk, R , as 




i i i i
i
R X a g W
+
=
= ∗ − ∗∑  
in which  n  denotes the number of elements; m  denotes the number of links or WTFs, and 
ig denotes the degree of connectedness (i.e., the number of connections) to the thi  element.   
As a result of the WTF between two elements, 1e  and 2e , at the moment of their 
interaction, we have 








It is the expression in Equation 4 that forms the basis for complexity management 
and acquisition. 
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The approach extends the published and private works of Langford to identify and 
apply measurable objectives to characterizing and analyzing Gap Analysis. The two basic 
metrics are competitive Worth and a Cost-to-risk ratio. Both are displayable in an Enterprise 
Framework.  
Gap Analysis fits into the overall scheme of acquisition by providing decision-makers 
with a structured and objective VoA from which to procure systems that satisfy defined 
needs. The desired results of Gap Analysis are to: (1) predict what we need for a postulated 
event, (2) compare what we need to what we have, (3) identify those items that need to be 
changed or added—along with the amount of investment in time and money required, and 
(4) enumerate the potential limitation of future capabilities. Recognizing there may be no 
means to maintain an optimal relation between the two limits—what we need and a potential 
limitation in capabilities—we assume the principles and practices of engineering are 
evolutionary and that the fundamental laws of physics prevail.  
Further, we use generally accepted economics terminology, extended to encompass 
the notion that the price one pays for a product assumes and accounts for the loss realized 
to make the purchase (Taguchi, Chowdhury & Wu, 2005). That is, the purchase price of a 
product includes the cost of procurement—for example, the $1 purchase of a pen must be 
increased to $5 to include $0.50 of gasoline, plus amortized cost of maintenance, plus 
insurance, plus depreciation, and plus labor rate times travel time to drive to/from and make 
the purchase, etc. This notion states a willingness to spend (lose) $x to purchase a $1 item. 
Following the accepted systems engineering process, product requirements are 
defined hierarchically, with each successive level offering greater detail via decomposition. 
However, unlike the different types of requirements that attach to various process models 
(e.g., functional and non-functional requirements), we define all processes and products by 
three measures—their functions, performances, and qualities (Langford, 2006; 2007). 
Relative to the Investment (Cost or its equivalent) to bring a product to operational 
capability, the product has determinable Worth. That Worth is expressed as a ratio of total 
value (i.e., operational capability or use as measured in terms of a unit of performance (e.g., 
work, throughput…) multiplied by Quality (effectively divided by the potential losses that 
could be incurred) and then divided by total lifecycle investment (i.e., expected cost for the 
use). As an example, if this ratio is less than 1, then the product has lower-than-expected 
worth. 
Worth is related to both the vulnerabilities of the system and to the outputs of the 
system. The risks are a function of the threats and vulnerabilities, where threats are typed 
by magnitudes and frequencies, and vulnerabilities are determined by the likelihoods of 
success (DoD, 2006). The outputs of the system are related to the vulnerabilities through the 
price-demand elasticity curves (Lemarechal, 2001).  The competition and the marketplace 
determine the threats; the operational strategy determines the vulnerabilities; and the triad 
of requirements determines the Worth (Langford, 2007). 
To investigate the multivariate probability-density functions of the Risk Equation 
(Equation 3), a step-wise, two-variable analysis reveals both the boundary conditions and 
the relationships between Worth, Vulnerability, Threat, and Risk. Table 1 shows these 
boundary conditions. When any of the three variables (Worth, Vulnerability, or Threat) is 
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zero, Risk is zero. And conversely, when Risk is zero, one or more of the three variables 
(Worth, Vulnerability, or Threat) is zero. 
Table 1. Multivariate Boundary Conditions for Risk Equation 
Worth = 0 Risk = 0 
Worth = 0 Threat = ∞  
Vulnerability = 0 Risk = 0 
Threat = 0 Risk = 0 
Risk = 0  Threat = 0 
Risk = 0  Vulnerability = 0
Risk = 0  Worth = 0 
 
A product that has Worth (quantified by the Worth Equation, Equation 2) from the 
developer’s point-of-view is one that has met the investment criteria for the desired set of 
functionality, performance, and quality requirements. From the user’s point-of-view, the 
Worth Function Equation emphasizes the trade that is made between the applicability of the 
purchased item (in terms of the item’s functionality, performance, and quality) and the total 
cost and time invested to purchase, use and sustain the product. This total cost and time 
(accumulated over the product’s lifecycle) is incurred not only during acquisition of the 
product, but also during the operation of the product and, finally, its disposal. This lifetime 
cost and time investment can also be viewed as a total loss to society (Taguichi, 1990), or 
as a specified loss as defined by a set of conditions. 
Within the constraints of the boundary conditions indicated in Table 1, the relative 
ratios of Worth/Risk for an activity, a process, or a product or service may be displayed as 
probability density functions, and then summarized for display purposes as single data 
points. Figure 1 indicates two product lines—each drawn with designated points on curves 
depicting desirability, acceptability, and unacceptability. Product A (indicated on the upper 
right) has a higher market worth-to-risk ratio than Product B (lower left).  The increasing 
worth-to-risk ratio moves generally upward.  Product A can be compared to Product B on a 
one-to-one basis. Product parameters that indicate movement vertically upward reflect a 
decreasing threat but no change in vulnerability. Products that indicate movement 
horizontally to the left reflect decreasing vulnerability but no change in threat. Products that 
compete on price, such as the lower-priced Product B in Figure 1, have Event-space Strings 
(Langford, 2007) that are displaced upwards relative to their higher-priced competitors. 
Event-Space Strings are made up of sequences of causal events. These events are 
separated by probabilistic transitions rather than by either temporal or spatial (in the sense 
of being an adjacent event in a series) idealizations.  
Consequently, Product B has a ”Desired” position, which is higher than that of 
Product A’s “Acceptable” position in the competitive Enterprise Framework. The higher 
position is indicative of the lower price (the lifetime cost to the consumer). If the lower price 
was offset by reduced functionality, performance, or quality, then the Worth would not 
increase. Product B is also located to the left of Product A, which indicates a reduction in 
vulnerability. This implies reduced risk and reduced threats. Therefore, as a competitive 
strategy, offering the lowest price with the highest utility is an efficacious strategy for 
competitors who are unable to match utility and pricing. 
 =




Figure 1. Enterprise Framework Illustrating the Worth-to-risk Assessment  
for Competing Products 
The metrics for evaluating the Value-to-risk ratio or the Worth-to-risk ratio and their 
associated examples that describe contextual relationships are indicated in Table 2. These 
metrics are the rules which govern movement in the Enterprise Framework. Each rule 
corresponds to the impacts of business operations, competitive strategy, and the means or 
type of product offering. Event-space Strings are unique to a company’s operations, 
strategy, and product offering. These rules describe the order of relative motions that have 
meaning appropriate to the context of a competitive space. Further, these rules are 
applicable to commercial products and services, the DoD battlespace, the procurement and 
acquisition landscapes, and the business environment considerations of business models 
and strategies.  
In general, the Enterprise Framework is a visualization of decision-making processes 
in which the factors of value engineering, systems engineering, economics, acquisition, and 
operations research are involved. From such rules, the DoD Gap Analysis progresses in an 
orderly and logical fashion. Traditional statistical analysis, probability theory, and modeling 
are readily represented in proper context with conventional interpretation. As such, an error 
analysis results in confidence intervals for each point on the Event-space Strings. The 
scales of threat-1 and vulnerability-1 are determined by the probability of occurrence (0 to 1) 
multiplied by the frequency of occurrence (rate), and the odds of successfully inflicting loss 
(0 to 1), respectively.  The vulnerability scale can be normalized in terms of dollars or 
numbers of items. Threats can be similarly normalized, as the situation warrants. Worth can 
be stated in either dollars or by numbers of items. Risk is a number between zero and one.  
Of the possible rules (Table 2) for interpreting the Enterprise Framework, 31 have 
been identified; and thus far, 17 have been investigated. For example, Rule 1 implies a 
higher product utility (higher functionality, performance, and/or quality).  
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Table 2. Rules for Risk Equation in Enterprise Framework 
Vulnerability  Worth Risk Threat Rule   1 
Vulnerability  Threat     Risk  Worth  Rule   2 
Vulnerability  Risk  Threat  Worth  Rule   3 
Vulnerability Risk Threat Vulnerability Rule   4 
Vulnerability   Threat Value Risk Rule   5 
Vulnerability Worth Risk Threat Rule   6 
Threat Risk  Vul.  Worth  Rule   7 
Threat Risk  Unless vulnerability and/or worth    Rule   8 
Threat Risk           or Worth  Rule   8 
Threat Risk  Worth     and vulnerability   Rule   9 
Threat Risk  Unless vulnerability and/or Worth    Rule 10 
Value  Threat     Risk Vulnerability Rule 11 
Value  Vul.  Risk Threat Rule 12 
Value  Risk  Threat  Vulnerability Rule 13 
Value  Threat Risk Vulnerability Rule 14 
Value  Risk  Risk Vulnerability Rule 15 
Value  Vul.  Risk Threat Rule 16 
Vulnerability  Threat Worth  Risk Rule 17 
 
For a decrease in vulnerability (e.g., opening a new channel of distribution) due to a 
new competitive entrant in the marketplace (increase in threat), Rule 2 requires an increase 
in Worth commensurate with an increase in the Risk the enterprise is willing to accept. If the 
competitive landscape does not change and the enterprise’s product remains the same, 
then opening up a new channel of distribution both decreases the product’s vulnerability to 
competitive factors as well as reduces the enterprise risk with that product. Rule 4 indicates 
that an increase in vulnerability results in an equivalent increase in risk—if there are no 
changes in threat, and the product remains the same. Rule 5 indicates that a decrease in 
threat directly results in a decrease in risk if the enterprise’s product and vulnerability are 
unchanged. Rule 6 implies that an increase in vulnerability decreases Worth (e.g., cost paid 
by a consumer increases due to a reduction in channel distribution) and increases the 
enterprise’s risk if the threat landscape remains constant. Rule 7 indicates a reduction in the 
threat (e.g., competitors leave competitive space) results in commensurate reduction in risk, 
and the Worth and vulnerability stay the same. Rule 8 indicates a reduction in the threat 
(e.g., competitors leave competitive space) results in commensurate reduction in risk, unless 
either the product value or vulnerability increase—in which case, the overall risk would 
increase. Rule 9 indicates that as the threat increases, the risk increases, assuming the 
Worth and vulnerability remain constant. Rule 10 indicates that as the threat increases, the 
risk increases, unless either or both the value and vulnerability decrease. Rule 11 implies a 
greater investment in time and, therefore, a lower value and, hence, a higher risk. Rules 6, 
12, and 16 each imply a lower product utility (insufficient functionality, performance, and/or 
quality). Rule 13 implies the product utility is worthless. Rule 14 implies a lower investment 
(time x money) and, therefore, a higher product Worth. Rule 15 implies the product has both 
higher utility and higher risk and is, therefore, worth more given that the threat and 
vulnerability remains unchanged. Rule 17 implies a disruptive technology or discontinuous 
innovation (Langford & Lim, 2007). 
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Following-up on this last rule that drives the display and interpretation of data in the 
Enterprise Framework, the discovery and analysis of potentially disruptive events and 
technologies (Rule 17) poses particularly incongruent issues for Gap Analysis. At issue is 
the degree of uncertainty that influences the choices and selection of alternatives in 
acquisition. The dangers of underestimating or not recognizing a disruptive technology or 
disruptive innovation result in a miscalculation of: (1) a sound operational vision, (2) the 
importance of planning and implementing an appropriate operational model, (3) the 
understanding of the relationships between current paradigms and a disruptive technology 
or innovation, and (4) the requisite acquisition strategy. 
Finally, the graphical display of the competitive space (Enterprise Framework) found 
in Figure 1 portrays the results of Gap Analysis. From the view of the Enterprise Framework, 
the gaps reveal the needed capabilities, the prioritization of the capabilities, and the efficacy 
of the proposed alternatives. In the case of weapon systems, the Enterprise Framework is 
the geographical battlespace. It has physical structure, command structure, information 
structure, and engagement structure. Each structure is depicted in temporal- and event-
driven layers. Truth is established through scenarios that illustrate capabilities that are 
enacted through these structures. Additionally, the Enterprise Framework illustrates 
opportunity shifts, allows evaluation of potential adversaries, and guides decision-makers’ 
choices of what should be developed, indicates the system requirements that are satisfied 
by various strategies, illustrates potential target segmentations, and describes geographical 
arenas in the context of system capabilities. 
General Formulation of Results 
This work defines an Enterprise Framework in which to display the results of a Gap 
Analysis. For the purposes of this paper, an Enterprise Framework is a marriage of business 
parameters (reflecting operations and strategy) and product parameters (functions, 
performance, and qualities). The marriage is bonded through the structure of an expression 
of Risk (Equation 2).  
In essence, the Enterprise Framework is an application framework that includes a 
multivariant view of a competitor’s objectives, structure, and behavior. It is an adaptation of 
human activities into an abstraction that models the differences between these objectives, 
structures, and behaviors. Further, the framework is constrained by only two factors: 
geographical boundaries (for contextual structure) and a common event (to bring specificity 
to the nature of the competition).  
Unlike the products of the domain analysis process, which processes imply a 
reference model for the semantics of the application domain, the Enterprise Framework 
described in this paper does not distinguish between such reference models, reference 
architectures, and the results of mapping a reference model (domain model) into an 
architecture style. Further, our Enterprise Framework is also not an analysis-only enterprise 
framework (Hafedh et al., 2002). It generally investigates the interfaces between a subject or 
action (e.g., issues, process or activity and other issues, processes or activities) and other 
subjects or actions.  
However, in the case of Gap Analysis, our Framework has provided additional insight 
into its nature to examine its territory—the makeup of and changes in its surrounds, 
environs, relationships, and key drivers. There are different types of Gap Analysis 
“domains.” Sometimes these domains are constrained by organizational demands, 
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sometimes by personality issues, and sometimes by other circumstances. The internal 
structure of the Gap Analysis domains are arranged in particular patterns within an 
organization.  Continuous functions (or patterns) are built and sustained by authoritative 
proclamation. Over time, such structures evolve to a mature environment that supports 
decision fitness and reliability in process planning. However, when the Gap Analysis territory 
is invoked, organized, structured, and enacted in response to stimuli, the outcomes of the 
work are predictably inconsistent and generally low in efficacy (Langford et al., 2006, 
December).  
Additional questions arise when we formulate an overall strategy to analyze Gap 
Analysis: Do all organizations have Gap Analysis policies, strategy, procedures, processes, 
and rules? Are the enactments the same? How does Gap Analysis differ within and across 
organizations? What are the priority and process necessities that are observed? How and 
why does the position of Gap Analysis within an organization matter? Do the organization’s 
position and priorities affect how Gap Analysis is performed, how it is interpreted, why it is 
done, how it is done, who does it, what is done, or when it is done? Are there general (or 
simple) rules that apply to all Gap Analyses?  
These questions focus on the crux of the rules, roles (responsibilities), and 
mechanisms that determine how Gap Analysis is organized, and how host organizations 
change during the Gap Analysis process. It is one of the purposes of this research to move 
beyond the descriptive and correlative aspects of investigating Gap Analysis. While such an 
early mapping activity provides decision-makers the necessary framework to begin to 
understand and to identify areas for additional investigation, it must also identify the 
mechanisms responsible for the dynamics of Gap Analysis, and then determine how these 
mechanisms respond and contribute to the psychological cues, such as stimulation through 
signaling pathways. 
The Enterprise Framework is a tool—a means to comprehend competitive business 
and operational models and product offerings, structured in forms that compare and 
definitively rate each. Additionally, market segmentations, niches, products, and upgrade 
strategies are readily apparent when coupled with a backward-looking series of event-space 
framings. An example of a generic Enterprise Framework is shown in Figure 1.  
In the Framework, threat to the competitive offering is plotted versus its vulnerability. 
Risk is held constant, and Worth (Function, Performance, Quality divided by Investment) 
increases to the upper right. If a product is upgraded, the data point moves along the curve 
from the left to the right. The range of acceptability is indicated as Unacceptable (on the left) 
to Desirable (on the right). A Gap represents the space between data points. Moving from 
one curve to the next also indicates a Gap, but not an upgrade of an existing product. 
Rather, this Gap represents a form of Disruptive Technology in the competitive landscape. 
An increase in Worth is indicated as the points move “up” the curves to the top and to the 
left. A decrease in Worth is indicated as the points move “down” the curves to the bottom 
and to the right. The rules indicated in Table 2 illustrate the meanings and visualizations of 
Gaps. The scales of Threat-1 and Vulnerability-1 are relative scales for local normalization of 
the competitive parameters. In a more global summarization of Worth across multiple 
competitive domains, there are other issues, such as localized determination of value versus 
universal principles of value. For example, is it more valuable to go to a restaurant or to 
invest in a set of cooking utensils? Is it worth more to make such an investment? Some of 
the factors that need to be considered are the opportunities from “networking” at the 
restaurant versus the long-term investment in lowering the cost of eating. For the purpose of 
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this paper, the authors relate only the localized competitive factors when comparing 
products. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Gap Analysis is fundamental to the US DoD acquisition system. The dismal results of 
time and cost overruns, ineffective use of constrained resources, and missed opportunities 
to make improvements without jeopardizing schedule and cost drive a critical evaluation of 
DoD acquisition (Rumsfeld, 2001). Since the cost and the success of acquisition are 
constrained by initial conditions, it is prudent to develop and apply tools that can help 
improve both the evaluation and the processes of acquisition. Gap Analysis, one of the key 
early-phase drivers of the acquisition process, has significant room for improvement.  
This paper discusses the Systems Engineering Value Equation (Value Engineering) 
and the Worth Function in the context of the ratio of triadic decomposition of requirements 
based on functions, performance, and quality to the investment in time and cost. Investors 
and stakeholders have expectations about products they support. These expectations 
necessarily need to be met with a rigorous analysis of gaps. This notion has general 
adaptability and applicability to commercial and DoD acquisition. In the commercial sense, 
Gap Analysis tools can be used to better position products in the competitive market space. 
In the DoD sense, Gap Analysis tools provide a more effective use of constrained resources 
to support development activities.   
The application of Gap Analysis to the general problem of satisfying requirements 
involves more than simply improving the methodology. Methodology that is encumbered 
with time-consuming steps and overburdened processes does not improve Gap Analysis. It 
is only through a streamlining of Gap Analysis that is efficacious, effective, and efficient that 
the forces and consequences of acquisition are better served. Thus, it is much more 
important and to the point to determine how to improve the outcomes of Gap Analysis 
(including the time to complete the Gap Analysis process) than to determine merely what 
can be improved with Gap Analysis. To that end, the actions of Gap Analysis should not be 
obstructed by insistence on unnecessary procedures and folderol. Straightforward 
application of the formulations laid out in this report result in the application of the sound 
value engineering and systems engineering processes that have generally become widely 
accepted as standard practices.  
At least some future research on Gap Analysis should concentrate on the further 
expansion of the standards of earned value management as well as on the integration of 
new management practices to exploit fully the prowess of value engineering and systems 
engineering. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide a case study of the competition 
between Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS for the Air Force refueling tankers 
contract and to discuss the role of many of these considerations in the controversy. This 
is an important case study because it highlights: (a) the concerns of the American 
people that they are continuing to lose manufacturing jobs overseas and the solutions 
that they are considering to lessen that problem; (b) the conflict between the concept of 
the US and European defense companies as partners against common threats to 
provide the best systems possible and the concept of them as competitors; (c) the 
concerns of an incumbent that it is losing its traditional edge; and (d) the desire to have 
an open and fair government procurement process in which all parties are able to accept 
the outcome that the process produces. This case study explores the background 
behind the contract, the reactions to the awarding of the contract, the reasons for the 
awarding of the contract, and the likely implications of the Boeing/Northrop Grumman-
EADS competition for the competing firms, the government contracting process, and the 
global market. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, following the end of the Cold War, the defense 
industrial base in the US has witnessed many changes. First, reductions in defense 
budgets during the 1990’s contributed to consolidation among US defense contractors. 
Many defense industry sub-sectors manifested a 2/3 reduction in the number of prime 
contractors and came to be dominated by larger defense giants formed from the 
consolidations: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General 
Dynamics. Second, the overall US economy witnessed an acceleration of the already 
apparent shift toward the services sector and away from the overall US industrial base in 
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key manufacturing industries, such as steel and automobiles. As US manufacturing 
wages became globally uncompetitive, the corporate giants of an earlier era, burdened 
with generous pension plans and wage/benefit contracts with unions, went bankrupt. 
Third, the post 9/11 period has witnessed a broad range of security threats, including the 
emergence of a new type of threat in the form of terrorist groups. Many of these threats 
transcend the boundaries of nation-states and pose significant risks to all the members 
of the global community. Fourth, the new millennium has encouraged greater 
transparency and fairness in processes, ranging from corporate practices in the post-
Enron world, to more up-to-date and open government procurement practices. These 
trends have resulted in the coalescence of the military forces of nation-states around the 
globe against these various security threats, including the threat of terrorism. Innovation 
continues to be important for the large US defense contractors as they compete with 
smaller entrants in a more open government procurement process, as they struggle 
against the concern that the US industrial base is shrinking overall and being replaced 
by overseas manufacturing, and as they handle the dual role of foreign companies as 
allies and as competitors.  
The purpose of this analysis is to provide a case study of the competition 
between Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS for the Air Force refueling tankers 
contract and to discuss the role of many of these considerations in the controversy. This 
is an important case study because it highlights: (a) the concerns of the American 
people that they are continuing to lose manufacturing jobs overseas and the solutions 
that they are considering to lessen that problem; (b) the conflict between the concept of 
the US and European defense companies as partners against common threats to 
provide the best systems possible and the concept of them as competitors; (c) the 
concerns of an incumbent that it is losing its traditional edge; and (d) the desire to have 
an open and fair government procurement process in which all parties are able to accept 
the outcome that the process produces. This case study will explore the background 
behind the contract, the reactions to the awarding of the contract, the reasons for the 
awarding of the contract, and the likely implications of the Boeing/Northrop Grumman-
EADS competition for the competing firms, the government contracting process, and the 
global market. 
2. Prelude to the Announcement 
During the past several years, recapitalization of the US Air Force has become 
an increasingly high priority. An important example of this imperative is the USAF’s need 
to upgrade its aerial refueling tankers. The average age of the existing KC-135 tankers  
is 47 years (Wolf & Shalai-Esa, 2008) and the planes were first put into service in 1957 
(“Analysts,” 2008). The Air Force has 531 tankers from the Eisenhower period and 59 
tankers built by McDonnell Douglas in the 1980’s (“Northrop group,” 2008), prior to its 
merger with Boeing (1997). Seeking to replace its ageing tanker fleet, the Air Force 
conducted a competition to award the initial $35 billion contract. Some have referred to 
the contract as “one of the largest military contracts in history” (Hinton, 2008b, March 
11). This award was to constitute the first of three awards that could ultimately be worth 
$100 million (“Northrop group,” 2008; “Boeing to protest,” 2008), as the Air Force 
gradually replaces its existing 600-tanker fleet.  The contract may involve the most 
expensive purchase in defense history, with the exception of the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter made by Lockheed Martin (Wolf & Shalai-Esa, 2008).  
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While there was some uncertainty over who the winner of the contract would be, 
many analysts thought that it would be Boeing because it had been providing refueling 
tankers to the USAF for almost 50 years and had, what was often referred to as a 
“monopoly.” (“Northrop group,” 2008). In an Associated Press article on February 22, 
2008, it was reported, ‘“The incumbent is considered the favorite to win—an assumption 
already reflected in its stock price’” (Tessler, 2008, February 22). Indeed, the office of 
Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison actually issued a statement on the morning of the 
announcement, February 29, 2008, (which it later retracted) that Boeing was the winner 
(Drawbaugh, 2008, February 29), while a poll of 10 industry analysts indicated that all of 
them were predicting a win by Boeing (Wolf & Shalai-Esa, 2008). Nevertheless, the Air 
Force did not release any hint of its decision prior to its announcement. Indeed, as of 
February 28, the day before the announcement, General Michael Moseley (Chief of 
Staff, USAF) noted that ‘“he himself did not know whether Boeing or Northrop Grumman 
would be awarded a potential $40 billion deal.”’ He stated, ‘“As you know by policy and 
law, I’m not in the acquisition business and have no idea which airplane I’m going to 
get”’ (Wolf, 2008, February 28).  
There was, however, some indication prior to the announcement, that the Air 
Force was concerned about a protest from the losing competitor. This could have been 
because the contract was so lucrative and important, and it felt that the loser would be 
disappointed. In addition, some officials may have anticipated that if Boeing, the 
incumbent tanker manufacturer, lost the contract, it would be more likely than Northrop 
Grumman or EADS to launch a protest. As early as February 22, it was reported that 
“the Air Force has said it expects a protest and has been extra careful in documenting its 
decision-making process.” Lieutenant General Raymond Johns, the Air Force Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, noted, ‘“We will not let politics dictate 
the best tanker for the Air Force’” (Hinton, 2008, February 22). Gen. Mosely continued, 
in his February 28 statement, that he hoped that whomever lost the contest would not 
challenge the result by lodging a protest with the GAO, which then has 100 days to 
make a recommendation as to whether the contract competition should be re-opened. 
His observation reflected concern about delaying the time line for the delivery of the 
tankers to the USAF (Wolf, 2008, February 28).  
3. The Announcement 
On February 29, 2008, after the markets closed, the Air Force announced that 
the Northrop Grumman/EADS bid for the aerial refueling tanker had won the contract 
(Wolf, 2008, February 29). As mentioned earlier, this comprised the first of three awards 
that could ultimately be worth $100 billion (“Northrop group,” 2008; “Boeing to protest,” 
2008), although the winner of this competition would not necessarily be the winner of the 
subsequent competitions (Wolf & Shalai-Esa, 2008). The contract awarded was actually 
worth $1.5 billion, covering 4 test aircraft. The intent was then to buy 175 more planes, 
for a total value of $35 billion. The Air Force hoped to operate the new tankers in 2013 
(Wolf & Shalai-Esa, 2008). While the $35 billion amount would stretch over 10-15 years, 
an additional $60 billion in revenue could come from maintenance and parts (Hinton, 
2008b, March 11).  
The tanker in the winning bid, the KC-45, was a modification of the Airbus A330 
(Hepher, 2008, March 3). Air Force General Arthur Lichte noted that the KC-45A, 
provided “More passengers, more cargo, more fuel to offload” and that the bigger 
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capacity of that tanker had been an important consideration in awarding the contract 
(“Northrop group,” 2008). The Northrop tanker carried more fuel—250,000 pounds—than 
the Boeing tanker at 202,000 pounds (“Tanker Deal,” 2008). Finally, Loren Thompson at 
Lexington Institute, was quoted as observing that, “With Northrop, the military could have 
’49 superior tankers operating by 2013’ […] while Boeing’s proposal would give it ‘only 
19 considerably less capable planes’” (“Tanker Deal,” 2008). 
4. Reaction to the Announcement and the Differences in the 
Two Bids 
Almost immediately following the announcement that its bid had not been 
selected, Boeing indicated that it was upset at the decision. On Friday, February 29, 
following the award of the contract, Boeing released an announcement stating, “We 
believe that we offered the Air Force the best value and the lowest risk tanker for its 
mission. Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Air Force” (“Analysts,” 
2008). Boeing noted that it would not decide on whether to formally appeal the contract 
decision until after the Air Force had briefed them on why the contract had been 
awarded to the Northrop/EADS team (“Northrop group,” 2008). On Tuesday, March 4, 
the Air Force agreed to provide a briefing sooner to Boeing after Boeing had alleged that 
delaying a briefing until March 12 would be ‘“inconsistent with procurement practices.”’  
In its public press release requesting an immediate briefing on the tanker, Boeing 
argued: 
“based on values disclosed in the Air Force press conference and press release, 
the Boeing bid, comprising development and all production airplane costs, would 
appear less than the competitor. In addition, because of the lower fuel burn of the 
767, we can only assume our offering was more cost effective from a life cycle 
standpoint. […] Initial reports have also indicated that we were judged the higher 
risk offering […] Northrop and EADS are two companies that will be working 
together for the first time on a tanker, on an airplane they’ve never built before, 
under multiple management structures, across cultural, language, and 
geographic divides […] Initial reports also indicate there may well have been 
factors beyond those stated in the RFP, or weighted differently than we 
understood they would be, used to make the decision” (“Boeing Requests,” 
2008).  
On March 5, Jim Albaugh, CEO of Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems, argued 
that Boeing had provided the Air Force exactly what was requested in its RFP and for a 
lower amount than the $35 billion price indicated (Carpenter, 2008). In response to 
General Lichte’s comment that the greater size of the Northrop-EADS tanker was 
important in the decision-making process, Albaugh argued that, ‘“In our reading of the 
RFP, it wasn’t about a big airplane. If they’d wanted a big airplane, obviously we could 
have offered the 777. And we were discouraged from offering the 777”’ (Carpenter, 
2008).    
On Friday, March 7, Boeing met with the Air Force to receive its briefing on why it 
lost the contract (Palmer, 2008). After the meeting, Boeing stated that it was “’seriously 
considering’” launching a protest (“Boeing: Far,” 2008). While the Air Force had said that 
the Northrop Grumman/EADS bid did better than the Boeing bid on four of the five 
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criteria, Boeing claimed that it scored marks which were identical to those of 
Northrop/EADS on the five main criteria (Rigby, 2008, March 11). John Young from the 
Pentagon reiterated that there were “substantial capability and cost differences” between 
the two proposals (Rigby, 2008, March 11). Following the briefing, Boeing had 10 days 
to file a protest with the GAO. Then, the GAO would have 100 days to determine if the 
contract had been awarded fairly or if a new competition would be needed (Wolf, 2008, 
March 7). 
On Monday, March 10, Boeing announced that it would challenge the decision 
(“Boeing to challenge,” 2008). Boeing argued that the Air Force had changed its 
requirements on the amount of ramp space and how closely the tankers could be parked 
to each other and that ‘“the changes were designed to keep them [Northrop] in the 
competition”’ (Hinton, 2008a, March 11). Boeing felt that the process was ‘“replete with 
irregularities,”’ which ‘“placed Boeing at a competitive disadvantage”’ and that ‘“the 
original mission for these tankers—that is a medium-sized tanker where cargo and 
passenger transport was a secondary consideration—became lost in the process, and 
the Air Force ended up with an oversized tanker.”’ Mark McGraw, manager of Boeing’s 
tanker programs, stated, ‘“As the requirements were changed to accommodate the 
bigger, less capable Airbus plane, evaluators arbitrarily discounted the significant 
strengths of the KC-767, compromising operational capabilities, including the ability to 
refuel a more versatile array of aircraft such as the V-22 and even the survivability of the 
tanker during the most dangerous missions it would encounter”’ (“Boeing Protests,” 
2008). McGraw did not think that Boeing had made a mistake in this competition and 
stated, ‘“Last year we won nine out of 11 major competitions we went after. I think we 
know how to win competitions’” (Wingfield, 2008). 
On March 11, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynn stated that the Air Force 
did not steer Boeing from proposing a larger plane and that ‘“these are competent 
suppliers. They can read a proposal’” (Rigby, 2008, March 11). Late on Tuesday, March 
11, the Air Force stated that this decision gave ‘“the best value to the American taxpayer 
and to the warfighter’” and that it had continually provided the bidders with feedback on 
their proposals to ‘“provide transparency, maintain integrity, and promote fair 
competition,”’ while suggesting that the larger size of the Northrop/ EADS tanker was 
very much a deciding factor (Tessler, 2008, March 11). Nevertheless, the 767 model had 
some advantages over the Airbus 330-200 model. The Boeing tanker could land on 
narrower, shorter airstrips, such as those in developing countries in Africa, or in 
Afghanistan (Hinton, 2008, February 22).  
One of the concerns cited by critics of the Northrop/EADS proposed tanker 
design is that they are larger and will require more fuel (Shalal-Esa, 2008), which will be 
problematic with increases in fuel prices. On March 17, Boeing released a report stating 
that, over the next 40 years, it would cost the Air Force an extra $30 billion in fuel costs 
to operate the 179 Airbus A330-200 refueling tankers relative to a similar number of 
Boeing tankers. The A330-200 requires 24% more fuel than the 767-200ER.  At $100 
per barrel for oil, the Airbus fleet would cost the Air Force $25 billion more in fuel costs 
over 40 years, while at $125 per barrel, it would be $29.8 billion more. At Boeing’s 
briefing, the Air Force did note “that they placed little value on fuel and maintenance 
lifecycle costs” (“Boeing Study,” 2008). 
Will Boeing’s protest succeed? As of this writing (late March, 2008), the evidence 
suggests that it may not, but that the protest itself may delay the Air Force’s timeline for 
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obtaining the new tankers. Analysts, such as George Shapiro at Citigroup, have argued 
that Northrop/EADS will end up keeping the contract, but that the dispute will take 6-9 
months to resolve (Hinton, 2008a, March 11). Myles Walton, an analyst at Oppenheimer 
& Co., stated, ‘“given the initial judgment by the Air Force combined with the Northrop 
team’s better score on four out of five criteria, we anticipate Boeing’s protest will be 
denied”’ (Rigby, 2008, March 11). On March 18, Mark McGraw, the tanker manager for 
Boeing, stated ‘“We know its an uphill battle”’ and that ‘“I think the best we can hope for 
is another shot’”—perhaps a portion of the competition being re-run”’ (Wolf, 2008, March 
18).  Northrop’s tanker manager, Paul Meyer rated the chance of the GAO upholding 
Boeing’s protest as ‘“low”’ (2008, March 18).  
Complaints are often unsuccessful with the GAO. Only 249 of the 1327 bid 
complaints lodged with the GAO in 2006 received an official decision; in 71% of those, 
the GAO denied the complaint and supported the government’s earlier decision (“Boeing 
to protest,” 2008).  In fiscal year 2007, of the 1393 cases filed and closed, 16% of them 
were ruled to have merit by the GAO (Crown & Epstein, 2008). Boeing has, however, 
been involved as the losing party in some of the GAO decisions recently. In 2007, 
Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky Aircraft (part of United Technologies) successfully 
protested the awarding of a contract to Boeing for a $15 billion helicopter. In February, 
2008, the GAO recommended that the award of a $1.2 billion contract for airplane 
maintenance to Boeing should be re-examined by the Air Force, which, in turn, has 
agreed to reevaluate it (Rigby, 2008, March 3). 
Boeing is, in many ways, behaving like a traditional, incumbent corporate giant 
who is upset that its traditional turf is being encroached upon. Many of its arguments, 
discussed previously, have focused on the fact that they did not understand the Air 
Force’s preferences, and that, consequently, they did not provide a more innovative 
model of tanker. Last year, Boeing only sold 36 Boeing 767’s—a variation of which was 
proposed by Boeing for the tanker competition last year—and, having sold 1000 over the 
past 30 years, only has 51 left to deliver. This suggests that, in the absence of additional 
orders, the 767 assembly lines near Seattle may close down. The 787 Dreamliner, on 
the other hand, which is a successor to the 767, received 369 orders last year (Rigby, 
2008, March 3). Boeing argued that, ‘“To some extent, the requirements [of the Air 
Force] steered us to the 767”’ (Vorman & Wolf, 2008). EADS, on the other hand, read 
the same RFP as Boeing, yet proposed a more innovative model of tanker, particularly in 
designing a new boom. Indeed, on March 4, EADS confirmed that it had completed the 
first test of the Air Refueling Boom System for the aircraft (“EADS confirms,” 2008). 
Boeing has had a previously difficult history with Air Force tankers. In 2004, 
Congress voted to overturn of the USAF plan to lease and buy 100 modified KC-767 
tankers from Boeing for $23.5 billion following a Pentagon procurement scandal, in 
which one of the key Air Force procurement officials, Darleen Druyen, and the CFO of 
Boeing, Michael Sears, went to jail. The scandal was brought to light partially with the 
assistance of Senator McCain’s office (Wolf & Shalal-Esa, 2008). It is unclear whether 
this in any way impacted the decision, other than that the prior history of scandal 
encouraged the Air Force to make this procurement decision very transparent and well-
documented and that the scandal delayed the Air Force’s strategy of replacing its aging 
tanker fleet.  
Boeing has had a history of tardiness and delays, which reduces its argument 
that it is a reliable supplier. For example, it delivered its first tanker to Japan in late 
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February, 2008, when the original target date had been in 2005. It is two years behind 
schedule with Italy, and hopes to deliver the first of four tankers to it this year (Rigby, 
2008, March 3). Furthermore, Boeing has experienced delays on the 787 Dreamliner, 
which has led to a decline in its stock price since the summer of 2007 (2008, March 3). 
Indeed, before the contract results were announced, on February 21, Japan Air Lines, 
one of Boeing’s best customers, announced that it was considering buying some Airbus 
A350 XWR planes due to the production delays for the Boeing 787’s. Indeed, due to the 
lateness of the planes, some airlines, such as Air India and Qantas, have stated that 
they are likely to seek financial compensation from Boeing (Tessler, 2008, February 22). 
News on delays continued to be announced after the awarding of the contract—on 
March 12, it was reported that Boeing may not complete more than 45 of its 787’s by 
next year, which is a change from its previous plan, which had involved the delivery of 
109 planes next year (Hinton, 2008, March 12). 
5. Should the Contract be Awarded to a Foreign Contractor?  
One of the central concerns surrounding the awarding of the contract was that 
Boeing, an American firm, had lost its bid to a contracting team which involved a foreign 
contractor. This concern embodied several issues: (a) the possibility that US defense 
jobs were being lost to the European defense sector; (b) concerns that systems key to 
national security would be made by a foreign contractor; and (c) an overall fear that the 
US manufacturing industry is shrinking and the economy is shifting toward services. 
Indeed, in the official press releases, Northrop Grumman was referred to as the winner 
of the contract, while the role of EADS was downplayed (Morgan, 2008). 
The Congressional representatives from the regions in Washington, Kansas, and 
Connecticut that would have benefited if Boeing had received the contract have strongly 
protested the decision. The Congressmen from the Seattle area claimed to be 
“outraged,” while Kansas Representative Todd Tiahrt stated that he would seek a review 
of the contract decision (Drawbaugh, 2008, February 29). On Monday, March 3, a group 
of lawmakers from Kansas and Washington wrote to Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
and asked that the Air Force explain to Boeing why it lost the contract rather than wait 
until mid-March to do so (Drawbaugh, 2008, March 3). On March 5, members of the 
congressional delegation from Connecticut formally requested a briefing on why Boeing 
had lost the contract. Their concern was linked to the fact that the engines for the Boeing 
tanker would have been made by Pratt & Whitney, based in East Hartford, Connecticut 
and the electrical systems would have been made by Hamilton Sundstrand in Windsor 
Locks, Connecticut (“Conn,” 2008). On March 7, the Kansas Senate adopted a 
resolution with a unanimous vote asking the President and Congress to block the 
contract (“Kan. Senate,” 2008). On March 11, Representative Todd Tiahrt of Kansas 
announced that he was developing a bill to block funding for the Northrop tanker 
(Drawbaugh, 2008, March 11). 
On the other hand, the Northrop Grumman/EADS tanker would create jobs in the 
US, especially in Alabama, and the Alabama Congressional delegation was very 
supportive of the results. Senator Richard Shelby (Alabama) noted that the contract 
would bring 7,000 jobs to Alabama (Drawbaugh, 2008, February 29) and that ‘“Any 
assertion that this award outsources jobs to France is simply false”’ (Drawbaugh, 2008, 
March 3). Senator Jeff Sessions (Alabama) noted, ‘“In reality, what we’re talking about is 
the insourcing, into America, of an aircraft production center that would bring 2500 jobs 
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to our area and 5,000 to our state”’ (2008, March 3). Kansas Representative Tiahrt, on 
the other hand, stated, ‘“I cannot believe we would create French jobs in place of 
Kansas jobs,”’ while a joint statement of lawmakers protesting the decision noted, ‘“We 
are outraged that this decision taps European Airbus and its foreign workers to provide a 
tanker to our American military”’ (2008, March 3). 
Actually, both the Boeing tanker and the Northrop/EADS tanker would create 
jobs domestically and overseas. About 85% of Boeing’s  tanker would have been made 
in the US. Boeing argued that 44,000 new and existing jobs would have been assisted 
by the contract, across 40 states and 300 suppliers. Wichita, Kansas and Everett, 
Washington would have been major locations for tanker production, and the engines in 
the tanker, made by Pratt & Whitney, would have been made in Connecticut. 
Nevertheless, some portions of its tanker would have been made overseas—the tail in 
Italy and the fuselage in Japan (Tessler, 2008, March 6).  
About 60% of the Northrop/EADS tanker would be made in the United States. 
This tanker was originally projected to create 25,000 jobs nationwide, including several 
thousand jobs in Mobile, Alabama, where the final assembly work was to take place 
(Vorman & Wolf, 2008). On March 10, however, Northrop’s estimate of jobs created 
doubled to 48,000 jobs because it used more recent data and a formula from the Dept. 
of Labor in forecasting jobs in the aerospace industry (Crawley, McSherry, Rigby & 
Vorman, 2008). This estimate topped Boeing’s 44,000 jobs. General Electric would build 
the engines for the Northrop/EADS tankers in North Carolina and Ohio (“Northrop 
group,” 2008) and expected to make $5 billion from the contract (Witkowski, 2008). The 
contract would, however, also assist the European defense industry. The wings would 
be manufactured in the UK, such that 9,000 jobs would be created. GE Aerospace’s 
British arm would also be involved (Lagorce, 2008, March 3). The Airbus-330, of which 
the KC-45 is a modification would have parts made in Germany, France, Spain, and 
Great Britain, but assembly of the KC-45 would occur in Mobile, AL (Wolf & Shalal-Esa, 
2008). While Northrop argued that the contract would result in 2,000 jobs shifting to the 
US from Europe, EADS argued that the assembly plants in Mobile would result in the 
creation of new jobs in the US, not in jobs moving from Europe to the US (“Northrop 
Grumman,” 2008). 
Labor unions in the US were concerned that the Air Force did not consider US 
jobs when it awarded the contract, and that EADS received subsidies from European 
governments for years, creating a playing field which is not level. On March 3, the 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers requested Congress enact legislation 
to prevent the US from awarding contracts to overseas companies receiving government 
subsidies, since, in a complaint filed by the US Trade Representative, the EU had been 
accused of providing subsidies to Airbus which are anticompetitive (Vandore, 2008, 
March 3).  Airbus CEO Tom Enders, in response to criticism that Airbus was destroying 
more American jobs due to its subsidies than it could create by building tankers in the 
US, noted that it sourced $11 billion from the US for Airbus and has been the largest 
single customer outside the US for the aerospace industry (Hepher, 2008, March 7). 
The AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers Union also echoed concerns about 
sourcing the contract to a foreign manufacturer (Shalal-Esa, 2008). In a statement 
reported on March 3, the General Vice President of the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Rich Michalski, said, ‘“President Bush and his 
administration have today denied real economic stimulus to the American people and 
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chosen instead to create jobs in Toulouse, France”’ (“Boeing calls,” 2008). Senator 
Hillary Clinton from New York stated that “she found it ‘troubling the government would 
decide to award the contract to a team including a European firm it is simultaneously 
suing at the World Trade Organization for receiving illegal subsidies”’ (Lagorce, 2008, 
March 3). Senator Barak Obama from Illinois was also concerned that Boeing, based in 
Chicago, had lost the contract (Daly, 2008). Similarly, French unions protested the loss 
of assembly jobs to the US, since the tankers would be assembled in Mobile, AL (“EADS 
confirms,” 2008). 
Debates concerning job creation and destruction, similar to those in the tanker 
controversy, have occurred in a variety of different US manufacturing industries over the 
past twenty years and have focused on the broader issue of whether the US should get 
the best product at the lowest cost or artificially try to prop up uncompetitive industries. 
Senator McCain noted, ‘“I’ve never believed that defense programs should be—that the 
major reason for them should be to create jobs. I’ve always felt that the best thing to do 
is to create the best weapon system we can at cost to taxpayers’” (Drawbaugh, 2008, 
March 3). These thoughts were echoed in the comments of Pentagon acquisition chief 
John Young, who noted, ‘“I don’t think anybody wants to run the department as a jobs 
program,”’ further arguing that lawmakers usually focused on asking him to reduce the 
costs of weapons systems, and that a decision by Congress to ban sourcing of contracts 
to foreign companies could lead to reciprocal retaliation on the part of the Europeans 
(Shalal-Esa, 2008). Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that ‘“defense 
manufacturing was a global business”’ and that ‘“we sell aircraft and ships and weapons 
systems all over the world. The four countries that I just visited in Asia and in the Middle 
East—Australia, Indonesia, India, and Turkey—all have an interest in acquiring 
American aircraft, as an example”’ (“Northrop Grumman,” 2008). 
The preceding comments reflect an awareness of the defense industry as a 
global industry in which the US, Europe, and other countries need to unite to combat 
global threats at various levels, including the terrorist threat. The growing 
interconnectedness between various countries is evident across a variety of other 
industries in our global economy. Furthermore, Boeing itself is an example of a global 
firm in that it makes weapons systems for other countries, so its hard for it to argue that 
it is unfair for a government to outsource a contract to a foreign supplier. Boeing sells C-
17 planes to the UK, Australia, and Canada; F-15 jets to Japan, Korea, and Singapore; 
and aerial refueling tankers to Italy and Japan. Of the $66.4 billion comprising Boeing’s 
2007 revenue, about $27.1 billion came from overseas sales (commercial and military). 
Sales to Europe comprised $6.3 billion, of which 16% of that came from sales to the 
military (Tessler, 2008, March 6). Overall, about 13% of Boeing’s total revenues from 
defense production came from overseas and included contracts to produce rockets in 
France, “early-warning” systems in South Korea and Turkey, and helicopters in Saudi 
Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. About 5% of Northrop Grumman’s revenues in the defense 
arena came from contracts with other countries (Wingfield, 2008). 
6. Implications of the Contract Award 
6.1  Toward Greater Global Cooperation?  
The award of the tanker contract to a team which includes a foreign contractor is 
indicative of the recognition of the importance of forming a global effort with the most 
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innovative products against a variety of immediate and long-term actual and potential 
threats. Hopefully, the protests against the awarding of the contract will not disrupt the 
overall message of global cooperation. French President Nicholas Sarkozy stated on 
March 3, ‘“If Germany and France had not shown from the beginning that we were 
friends and allies of the United States, would it have been possible to have such a 
commercial victory?”’(Hepher, 2008, March 3). Significantly, EADS failed in a similar 
competition in 2003, at the time when the then-President of France, Jacques Chirac, 
was opposing the involvement in Iraq. Sarkozy, on the other hand, has established 
closer ties with the US, as evidenced by France’s support of the US position on Iran’s 
nuclear activities (Hepher, 2008, March 5). Consequently, while the victory of the 
Northrop/EADS team was based on the perception that their product was better, it may 
have been assisted by greater US-French cooperation, and the award of the tanker 
contract will reinforce and enhance that cooperation.  
Although the popular press has noted that concerns about national security could 
be key in involving a foreign contractor in manufacturing US weapons systems, there 
have been other instances in which foreign contractors have worked on key US defense 
projects. For example, EADS has been working on a $2 billion Army contract for two 
years to replace 345 “Huey” helicopters, in addition to providing the Coast Guard with 
radar systems and search and rescue aircraft (Wingfield, 2008). The presidential 
helicopter was partially built by Italy’s Finmeccanica, while Britain’s BAE systems has 
been involved in a number of US DoD projects, since it purchased United Defense 
Industries in 2005 (Lagorce, 2008, March 3). Significantly, Boeing did not discuss 
national security issues in its formal protest (Wingfield, 2008), possibly for this reason. 
Moreover, all classified military technology on the KC-45a would be installed by Northrop 
after the aircraft was assembled, so that EADS would not be handling it (Hinton, 2008, 
March 10). 
Furthermore, to alleviate national security concerns about having EADS as a 
partner on the contract, Germany and France are legislating changes to EADS’ 
corporate charter preventing foreign investors, such as Russian or Middle Eastern 
shareholders, from obtaining large stakes in the company. The plan will give the 
Germans and the French a golden share, so that they can block stakes over 15%, or 
they can provide EADS with a poison pill (Lagorce, 2008, March 7). 
Although Boeing has painted the conflict as a competition between a US 
company and a European one, much of its concern is that of a traditional incumbent 
watching its competitor and arch-rival, Airbus, encroach on one of its key contracts. This 
is not the first time that Boeing and EADS have competed over a tanker contract, and 
that EADS has won. Since 2001, Boeing and EADS have faced each other in 
competitions for tankers in six countries, of which EADS has won four of the 
competitions to supply a total of 25 planes (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Australia, and Britain), 
while Boeing has won in Italy and Japan to supply 8 planes (“Boeing’s trouble,” 2008). 
The reasons why EADS has triumphed in some of the other competitions is that, 
in recognition of a global marketplace, the contract was awarded to the bidder which 
seemed the most sensitive to the needs of the client, the most flexible, and the most 
willing to make investments in the relationship. EADS, as a newcomer in the tanker 
business, has manifested the traditional behavior of a successful entrant in terms of 
being innovative and absorbing risk, while Boeing has played the role of the traditional 
incumbent. For example, Boeing and BAE Systems in the UK competed against EADS 
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for a $26 billion contract to replace the UK’s fleet of military refueling tankers in 2004, 
and lost the contract to EADS, which had not built a tanker before, and which had 
proposed a modification of the commercial Airbus A330. The UK felt that EADS was 
more willing to make concessions and assume the financial risk in constructing the 
planes and then leasing them to the government, whereas Boeing did not offer such 
terms. Although Boeing’s C-17 transport plane had been successful there, the tanker 
business had been handled by a different division of Boeing than the C-17. The 
competition in Australia provides another illustrative example in that the Australian 
government was impressed by EADS’ willingness to use its own R&D money to develop 
and test a boom, whereas Boeing used an older boom in its proposal, and suggested 
that it would build a newer type of boom only if it won the large US contract (“Boeing’s 
trouble,” 2008). 
6.2  Impact on Boeing 
Analysts have suggested Boeing’s loss of the contract to the Northrop 
Grumman/EADS team “is part of a gradual erosion in Boeing’s defense operations” and 
that this loss, combined with the reputational loss from the earlier tanker procurement 
debacle in 2004, is not helpful to its image (Rigby, 2008, March 3). Some analysts, such 
as John Kutler, have noted that, ‘“I thought, for a number of reasons, it would be difficult 
for the Air Force to pick Boeing,’” arguing that when Rumsfeld in 2006 jettisoned the 
plans to lease Boeing 767’s, change might be in the wind (“Analysts,” 2008).  
Furthermore, Boeing’s delays on the 787’s have not provided it with the aura of a reliable 
supplier. On the other hand, EADS may face delays, and only time will tell if that will 
occur, since its contracts with UAE and Saudi Arabia were signed last year; the 
Australian tankers aren’t due until 2009, and the British tankers aren’t due until 2011 
(“Boeing’s Trouble,” 2008). 
Recently, several of Boeing’s contracts have run into problems. The “virtual 
fence” project along the border between US and Mexico has been pushed back three 
years to 2011 due to technical problems, and the company has spent twice the amount 
of the $20 million contract to fix these problems. The GAO, in February, found that three 
contracts with Boeing cost the government $3 billion more, with cost overruns of as 
much as 30% coming from higher expenses in labor and materials (Caterinicchia & 
Tessler, 2008). 
Will Boeing’s loss of its traditional role in building USAF tankers put it at a 
disadvantage in other competitions for tankers domestically and abroad? This is 
possible, given that EADS’ tankers, as discussed previously, have been chosen over 
Boeing’s tanker in several other competitions. If this trend continues, and if Japan and 
Italy may end up with “orphan fleets”—i.e., they are the only countries with Boeing 
tankers—then these fleets may cost more to maintain than if Boeing had developed the 
scale economies in costs to maintain the parts through obtaining other contracts, 
especially the US contract. As a result, other potential customers may be less likely to 
choose Boeing in the competition when they see these higher maintenance costs, and 
the cycle will become self-reinforcing (“Boeing’s Trouble,” 2008).  
The loss of the tanker contract in itself should not affect Boeing on an annual 
basis, in that it only would have led to 12-18 additional tankers per year, which is a small 
number in comparison to the 450 commercial aircraft that it makes each year (Tessler, 
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2008, March 6). But, since it is a very large contract in the long-run, at a time when 
defense expenditures could plateau, it could have long-range significance.  
On the other hand, even while the tanker contract announcement and protests 
were at their peak in late February through mid-March, 2008, Boeing was still 
announcing new orders and the award of new contracts. For example, on February 25, 
2008, before the contract decision on the tankers became public, Boeing won a $77 
million contract with the Air Force to install 37 infrared, anti-missile systems (“Boeing 
Wins $77M,” 2008). On March 5, it was reported that Boeing and Bell Helicopter (part of 
Textron) had won the contract to provide the V-22 Osprey with spare parts—a $204.5 
million Navy contract (“Boeing, Bell,” 2008). On March 13, Boeing won a $32.8 million 
contract to provide the Air Force with Combat Survivor Evader Locator radio systems 
(“Boeing wins $32.8M,” 2008). On March 14, Boeing won a $28.2 million contract to 
provide the Navy with parts for the Growler attack aircraft (“Boeing wins $28.2M,” 2008). 
Over the preceding week, Boeing also listed orders for 85 new planes (“Boeing shares,” 
2008). Finally, on March 17, Raytheon and Boeing won $89.5 million worth of contracts 
to provide radar systems to the Air National Guard and to the Air Force (“Raytheon,” 
2008).  
The key to Boeing’s long-run success is its ability to innovate and to be willing to 
modify its products to the needs of the customer. Merely satisfying the stated 
requirements of the customer is not always the best strategy in an increasingly 
competitive global marketplace, with many new entrants. Moreover, Boeing needs to 
continue to invest in assets specific to its relationship with customers. Hopefully, its 
protest on the awarding of the tanker contract to Northrop/EADS and the resulting delay 
in the Air Force’s time trajectory in obtaining new tankers will not reflect negatively on its 
long-standing relationship with the Air Force. Nevertheless, Boeing needs to focus on 
the lessons from its loss in this competition and other competitions, rather than 
expending significant energy combating the outcome of those earlier decisions.  
6.3  Impact on EADS 
The award of the highly publicized tanker contract to the Northrop Grumman 
/EADS team will provide EADS with a much-needed boost. Financially, it has been 
struggling for several reasons: (a) the weak dollar—EADS airliners sell in dollars, but 
often pays its suppliers in euros (Hepher, 2008, March 3); (b) the financial impact of its 
delays with the A-380 and, recently, with the A400M (Lagorce, 2008, March 3), which 
was supposed to debut in July and which has been delayed until October (Hepher, 2008, 
March 7); and (c) some flattening in customer expenditures relative to previous years. 
On March 11, 2008, the reported losses for 2007 were worse than expected. Its net loss 
was 446 million euros in 2007 (the net loss was forecast at 329 million euros) and 
represents a deterioration from its 99 million euro profit in 2006. The rise of the euro 
reduced the revenue at Airbus by $1 billion (Hepher, 2008, March 11).  
EADS has been delighted at the award of the contract, partially because the 
contract will provide it with a greater capability to penetrate the US defense market and 
possibly to position it better to win future contracts. The existing EADS aerial refueling 
tanker has already won competitions in Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Britain 
(Hepher, 2008, March 3), and its success in the US marketplace against an established 
competitor will help it to gain greater traction. Indeed, on March 27, 2008, a consortium 
led by EADS (and also including Rolls Royce, Cobham and Thales, and the VT Group) 
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won a $26 billion contract in the UK over 27 years to provide 14 Airbus 330-200 tankers 
to replace the RAF’s ageing fleet of VC-10 and Tristar refueling tankers. This contract 
had been under negotiation since 2004, and the success of the Northrop/EADS bid in 
the US may have helped to generate positive momentum (Pfeifer, 2008). EADS’ success 
in both  the US contest and the UK contest vindicates its strategy to increase its defense 
capabilities and not to depend entirely on commercial programs. Moreover, this KC-45a 
contract, combined with the weak dollar, may lead to EADS making an acquisition in the 
US (Vandore, 2008, March 10), to obtain an even greater foothold in the US market.   
6.4  Implications for the Government Procurement Process 
The award of the tanker to the Northrop/EADS consortium suggests that the 
government procurement process does not always favor incumbents and that there is an 
increasing emphasis on obtaining the most appropriate product at the best cost. 
Furthermore, it continues the precedent of transparent, open processes—which are 
often open to the global marketplace, especially when the range of national security 
threats, such as the terrorist threat, is more globally focused.  
One concern is the potential impact on the government procurement process if 
the tanker’s funding is successfully blocked by Congressional representatives who did 
not support the decision to award the contract to Northrop/EADS. If this occurs, it will 
send a signal that the political landscape—factors such as which states benefit from the 
award of a given contract and which Congressional representatives have greater 
power—can overturn a decision made by defense procurement experts who are 
weighing cost and quality issues between competitors with deliberation over a period of 
months. This may lead to greater reluctance on the part of contractors to make the 
necessary investments to create the best product at the lowest cost to the government. 
Rather, the contractors may focus on locating production in states which have powerful 
Congressional representatives, rather than the states which have the lowest cost or 
which are otherwise more appropriate for production. If this, indeed, occurs, it could lead 
to a reduction in innovation, since the focus will have shifted from the quality of the 
product to the importance of political considerations within Congress. Indeed, it reduces 
the importance of having a transparent and well-documented government procurement 
process if Congress can ultimately block the funding for the winning proposal anyway.    
7. Conclusion 
As of this writing, the outcome of the tanker contract has not been settled. Boeing 
has lodged a protest, and the GAO is reviewing the case. While the work on the tankers 
has temporarily been halted, the outcome of Boeing’s appeal will likely become clear in 
the next few months.  
The award of the contract to the Northrop/EADS team was significant for several 
reasons. First, it indicated that the Air Force was anxious to get the best product at the 
lowest cost. EADS’ willingness to innovate was seen in other competitions and in its 
R&D to create a new boom. Both its innovative tendencies and its flexibility are 
hallmarks of a successful entrant into a new industry, while Boeing’s focus on its pre-
existing tanker models and the degree to which they met the specifications stated by the 
Air Force is indicative of the behavior of a traditional incumbent. Second, the Air Force’s 
willingness to award the contract to a team involving a foreign contractor suggests the 
recognition that the defense industry has become a global industry that is sufficiently 
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robust to be able to respond to a range of threats to the security of the global 
community. Third, it indicated the Air Force’s willingness to defend its position and 
describe its criteria emphasizes the transparent and well-documented nature of the 
process.  
The protests against the award, however, have emphasized the fact that the 
Northrop/EADS team includes a foreign competitor. The discussions and statements of 
many of the opposing Congressional representatives have focused on the need to 
prevent American jobs from going overseas, despite the fact that the Northrop/EADS 
contract would create some jobs in the US, especially in the port of Mobile, AL. This type 
of argument is often made to protect a declining industry or a failing incumbent against 
lower-cost, more innovative products made by industries overseas. It encourages the 
placement of temporary bandages on the problem, rather than an exploration into the 
heart of why the industry or firm in question is uncompetitive or the development of 
strategies to make the industry or firm successful. Boeing’s own arguments in its official 
protest, however, have focused more on the differences between the two products and 
the guidance that it received from the Air Force than on the issue of US jobs going 
overseas—this latter argument has been made more by Congressional representatives 
in the affected areas.  
In conclusion, the tanker competition embodies many of the key debates across 
industries in the US economy. Changes in the overall US industrial base, rising fuel 
prices, the weakness of the dollar, and the range of threats confronting the global 
community, including the threat posed by terrorism, are important forces in making a 
procurement decision. Hopefully, the outcome which best serves the American people 
and the US military will emerge from the dialogue between Boeing, Northrop 
Grumman/EADS, the Air Force, the GAO, and Congress and will reinforce the move 
towards more transparent processes, the best product at the lower cost, and the 
recognition of a more global defense environment.  
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Abstract 
In the mid-1990s, the US defense industry experienced a dramatic wave of 
consolidation. This paper seeks to establish the statistical facts of defense industry 
consolidation, including the ways in which it reshaped the industry in the 1990s; the 
ways in which it may continue to reshape the industry; and the forces that promote or 
discourage it.  It also seeks to consider the implications of consolidation for defense 
acquisitions and policy.  The paper places the events of the 1990s in the broad context 
of economic and industrial activity spanning almost five decades: 1958-2006.  It draws 
                                                
1 This paper, prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School’s 5th Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium, Monterrey, CA, May 13-15, draws on research presented at the 82nd meeting of the 
Western Economic Association International, June 29-July 3, 2007 (Greenfield, 2007). The 
authors wish to thank their colleagues for useful comments on this paper and the earlier draft; 
however, they take full responsibility for any errors or omissions and for the views expressed in 
this paper, which are theirs alone. 
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primarily—and in new ways—from a contracting data set known as the DD350 and 
applies standard economic models and tools.  The paper finds that consolidation has 
had its most pronounced effects at the highest levels of the industry; that the process of 
consolidation has abated, if not reversed itself, in recent years; and that larger domestic 
and international economic force have been at least as important as DoD budget 
decisions and policy in promoting consolidation.  The DoD has a significant say in what 
happens in the defense industry but cannot control it.
Introduction 
In the mid-1990s, the US defense industry experienced a dramatic wave of 
consolidation. This paper seeks to establish the statistical facts of defense industry 
consolidation, including the ways in which it re-shaped the industry in the 1990s; the 
ways in which it may continue to re-shape the industry; and the forces that promote or 
discourage it.  It also seeks to consider the implications of consolidation for defense 
acquisitions and policy.  The paper does not isolate the events of the 1990s; rather, it 
places them in the broad context of economic and industrial activity spanning a period of 
almost five decades, 1958-2006.  It draws primarily—and in new ways—from a 
contracting data set known colloquially as the DD350 and makes use of standard 
economic models and tools.  Though taking a US perspective, this paper also considers 
the contributing role of economic globalization. 
The issue of defense industry consolidation took on particular importance in the 
last decade of the 20th century, a period in which the post-Cold War defense budget 
shrank and US Department of Defense (DoD) suppliers—especially aerospace-defense 
firms, but also shipbuilding and other defense-related firms—faced the prospect of 
declining orders, excess capacity, and rising costs.  In theory, consolidation could have 
resulted in a smaller number of leaner and healthier firms, better able to contain or 
reduce cost through economies of scale and, with deeper financial pockets, better able 
to bear risk.1  However, whether the DoD would have benefited from consolidation would 
have depended, in part, on how the process of consolidation unfolded, how the DoD 
wrote and executed its contracts, and how much bargaining leverage it maintained. 
In 1993, at a dinner now referred to as the “Last Supper,” the DoD asserted its 
support for industry-wide consolidation, possibly codifying the inevitable—not enough 
business to go around then or anytime soon—but also suggesting that, in its view, the 
effects of consolidation would be positive.2  The DoD backed its assertion by taking a 
                                                
1 Consolidation can occur in at least three dimensions: “physical,” involving the combination or 
elimination of physical assets; “managerial,” involving the combination or elimination of 
managerial assets; and “corporate,” involving the combination or elimination of corporate entities.  
Corporate consolidation, which is the main focus of this paper, may or may not be accompanied 
by physical or managerial consolidation, though some amount of both, especially managerial, is 
likely.  When physical or managerial consolidation occurs, an industry may shed unneeded 
infrastructure and overhead and reap economies of scales; corporate consolidation may yield 
financially stronger firms but less competition. 
2 At least implicitly, DoD’s position suggested that some amount of physical and managerial 
consolidation would accompany corporate consolidation and that the gains from economies of 
scale and risk-bearing capabilities would dominate any ill-effects of a reduction in competition.  
For a recent look back at the dinner event, see Augustine (2006). 
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more pro-active role in anti-trust policy, (i.e., consulting and advising the lead anti-trust 
agencies: the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission), and by 
reimbursing firms for some consolidation-related costs. The DoD is still involved in the 
anti-trust policy process, but it discontinued the reimbursements in 1998.3 
Questions remain as to what happened after 1993 and also what happened 
before.  How consolidated has the defense industry become and is it becoming more or 
less consolidated over time?  Questions also remain as to the causes and ultimate 
effects of consolidation and whether the DoD should—or can—do anything about it.4 
A chart, sometimes referred to as the “eye chart” provides one perspective on the 
course of events (see Figure 1).  The chart has become a popular fixture in defense 
community briefings, sometimes serving as a summary statement for all that has 
happened in the industry in recent decades.5  It shows corporate consolidation among 
aerospace-defense firms from the point of dozens in the 1980s to the point of only a 
handful, literally, 25 years later.  But the chart tells only part of the story.  For example, it 
disregards new entrants; the changing composition of defense spending, including the 
increased importance of spending on war-related and other services; and the role of 
globalization.  Moreover, it alludes to a potential consequence of consolidation (i.e., less 
competition) but does not speak to such consequences directly. 
                                                
3 The reimbursements, sometimes referred to as “payoffs for layoffs,” and most other visible signs 
of DoD support for consolidation ended in 1998, when the anti-trust agencies with DoD backing, 
denied the Lockheed-Martin-Northrop-Grumman merger. 
4 For early assessments of the effects of consolidation on excess capacity, cost savings, and 
other economic parameters, see GAO (1997), GAO (1998), and Gholz & Sapolsky (1999-2000); 
Hensel (2007) relates consolidation patterns to cost. 
5 Though completely unscientific as a measure of popularity, the author notes that she has seen 
this chart or charts like it in nearly every defense industry conference she has attended. 
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Figure 1. Five Big Players Emerge from Consolidation 
(Chao, 2005, p. 13, citing others) 
This paper lays a foundation for a more thorough investigation of consolidation, 
by establishing a broad but tractable definition of “defense industry” and by exploiting a 
rich but, for these purposes, largely untapped data set. 
Defense industry analysts have long debated the meaning of “defense industry,” 
offering wide-ranging, but plausible definitions that generate very different lists of 
defense or defense-related firms.6  Chu and Waxman (1998) review several possible 
definitions and conclude that “the approach we choose must reflect a reasoned choice 
about the attributes which concern us most” (pp. 35-39).  On that basis, this paper takes 
a DoD-centric approach and defines the industry as those firms that supply goods and 
services to the DoD or, more generally, those firms that could supply goods and services 
to the DoD either now or in the future. 
This paper draws data from several governmental sources, most notably, a DoD 
contracting database, commonly known as the DD350, so named for a form completed 
for each DoD contract action over a certain dollar threshold; an annual DoD publication 
reporting the awards to the top 100 contractors; various DoD budget documents, 
including the annual National Defense Budget Estimates; the US Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, for estimates of labor productivity; and the US Department of 
                                                
6 For example, Dunn (1995, pp. 402-403) suggests classifying defense firms on the basis of their 
products: lethal large or small weapons systems; non-lethal but strategic products (vehicles and 
fuel); and other products consumed by the military (food and clothing).  He also suggests 
constructing a matrix of dependencies, one that compares the dependency of the firm on 
defense-related contracts and the importance of the firm to the military.  The greater the mutual 
dependence, the more readily a firm can be considered a defense firm.  One such matrix plots 
the share of each firm’s revenue coming from defense contracts against the share of defense 
contracts going to each firm (Chu & Waxman, 1998, p. 37). 
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Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the US Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau) for other economic parameters.  It also uses 
data from two non-governmental sources: FactSet Mergerstat, LLC (hereafter, 
Mergerstat), a firm that specializes in tracking the value and number of mergers and 
acquisitions, and the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA).  The DD350 has known 
limitations both in terms of coverage and reliability, but it is the best available means of 
identifying “firms that supply goods and services to DoD,” calculating their market 
shares, and evaluating the extent to which they compete for DoD contracts (see Dixon, 
Baldwin, Ausink & Campbell, 2005, for a discussion of some of the shortcomings of the 
DD350). 
Trends in Consolidation 
Figure 2 shows the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among 
aerospace-defense firms from 1992 to 2007 and in the overall economy from 1962 to 
2007.7,8  For purposes of scaling, the total value of the economy-wide M&As was an 
estimated $1,124 billion in 2007, in year-2000 dollars, and about $175 billion in 1968—
the first year for which value data are available, also in year-2000 dollars. 
                                                
7 Mergerstat defines the aerospace-defense firms as “Aerospace, Aircraft & Defense,” consisting 
of SICs 3721-3728; 3761-3769; and 3795.  The data include M&As that involve a US firm as 
either a buyer or seller.  Mergerstat provided the aerospace-defense data for 1992-2006 to the 
author on February 13, 2007; the economy-wide data and 2007 aerospace-defense data are 
available online at, https://www.mergerstat.com/newsite/freereport_log.asp . 
8 Mergerstat reports on the number of M&As in each year and their total value, based on the 
equity prices offered; it assigns M&As to the years in which they are announced. The data on the 
quantity and value of economy-wide M&As reach back to 1962 and 1968, respectively; the data 
on the quantity and value of aerospace-defense M&As reach back to 1992. 
Mergerstat does not report any values that could reveal proprietary information and, in the smaller 
aerospace-defense sample, the gaps matter (just over half the 523 aerospace-defense deals 
reported for the 1992-2006 period had no information on value). The quantity and value series 
track closely for the overall economy but diverge for the aerospace-defense firms.  For this 
reason, Figure 2 reports only the number of aerospace-defense and economy-wide M&As. For 
the aerospace-defense firms, the correlation between the value and quantity series was only 
0.144 in the 1992-2007 period; for the overall economy, the correlation between the two series 
was 0.844 in the 1992-2007 period and 0.872 in the 1968-2007 period.  The correlations were 
calculated using year-2000 dollars to eliminate the effects of inflation. 
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Figure 2. M&As Economy Wide and in Aerospace Defense 
(Based on data from FactSet Mergerstat, LLC (a) and (b)) 
Note that the increases in M&A activity among aerospace-defense firms in the 
1990s and 2000s were not unlike those in the overall economy.  The later discussion of 
possible reasons for consolidation addresses this point in statistical detail. 
The M&A data in Figure 2 account for the corporate activity that, as a practical 
matter, would give rise to consolidation, but they say little about the ways in which it 
unfolds and reshapes an industry (i.e., the defense industry).  A simple tally, or even a 
dollar count, cannot provide this insight; however, the DD350 data and figures from 
DoD’s annual top 100 reports can fill in some of the detail. 
The actual DD350 form collects information on DoD contracting actions, which is 
posted in large text files, by fiscal year, on a central website; the data are currently 
available from 1966 to 2006.9  The reporting threshold was $10,000 for actions occurring 
prior to 1982; $25,000 for actions occurring from 1983-2004; and $2,500 for actions 
occurring from 2005 to the present.  The recent threshold reduction has had a 
noteworthy effect on the coverage of the data set.  In 2004, the data set included filings 
for just under 700,000 actions; in 2005, it included well over 1.3 million. 
Historically, the DD350 has collected information on the timing of the action 
(month, day, and year), the contractor’s name and location, the dollar value of the action, 
the type of contract, and as many as 70-80 other variables relating to the award process, 
product, and nature of the business entity, (e.g., small or minority owned).  Starting in 
                                                
9 Information is available at the following website: 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/Procurement.html. 
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1984, the DoD also began assigning an “Ultimate Parent Code” to each contractor, 
making it possible to track how much business the DoD was doing with each 
overarching corporate entity in any given fiscal year.10  On that basis, it is possible to 
calculate each entity’s annual share of the DoD market, defined here as the dollar value 
of all DD350 actions (“awards”), and to produce lists of top DoD contractors over time.11  
The DoD has been publishing annual lists of top 100 contractors and their market shares 
since the 1950s, initially only in hard copy and later only electronically, but the 
secondary-source data do not contain the full range of information available in the 
DD350 text files nor can they be manipulated readily.12 To the extent possible, this 
analysis draws from the primary data found in the DD350 text files. 
Drawing from traditional concepts of both industry and aggregate concentration, 
this section constructs 4-firm, 8-firm, 20-firm, 50-firm, and 100-firm concentration ratios 
for the defense industry (i.e., the firms that supply goods and services to the DoD market 
by fiscal year, for 1958-2006).  The concept of “industry concentration” applies insomuch 
as the analysis focuses on a particular industry; the concept of “aggregate 
concentration” applies insomuch as it groups firms that, albeit serving a common 
consumer (DoD), do not necessarily produce like goods or services.13  The concentration 
ratio is the market share of each group of firms, in this case the top 4, top 8, top 20, top 
50, and top 100, calculated as the group’s share of the net dollar value of all DoD 
contract awards.14  The concentration ratio serves as a proxy for consolidation: if, for 
                                                
10 Note: The code can—and does—change from year to year so that the data for each year must 
be handled separately before it can be combined with others in a single time series. 
11 The DD350 reports on actions with prime contractors, thus it does not capture an entity’s 
indirect market share, via its subcontracts with other contractors.  A company that is a prime on a 
large number of contracts may also be a subcontractor on many others and vice versa. 
12 See DoD, SIAD (2008a), “100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime 
Contract Awards,” for fiscal years 1996-2006, at 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/procurement/historical_reports/statistics/procstat.html and available 
in hard copy through the Defense Technical Information Center for 1958-1997. 
13 For a non-exhaustive glimpse into the uses and drawbacks of these types of measures, see 
Bain (1951), Curry & George (1983), Kwoka (1981), O’Neill (1996), and White (2002). 
14 Why choose 4-, 8-, 20-, 50-, and 100-firm concentration ratios?  The choice of the “K-Firm” ratio 
is inherently arbitrary (Curry and George, 1983, p. 207).  The 4-firm and 8-firm ratios are widely 
accepted in industry studies, so much so, that “AmosWEB”—a.k.a. “The Encyclonomic 
WEBpedia”—describes them as the “analytical standards in the study of the structure of the 
industry.”  For a more academically compelling justification of the 4-, 8-, 20-, and 50-firm 
concentration ratios, the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census provides them in 
the “Economic Census” and other reports that address industry concentration.  The calculation of 
the 100-firm concentration ratio provides a direct bridge to DoD’s top-100 reports and is a 
common measure in aggregate studies (Curry & George, 1983, p. 207).  Lastly, Kwoka (1981) 
provides strong justification for considering more than one concentration ratio. 
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example, the concentration ratio is rising for a particular group of firms, then, for 
purposes of this analysis, that group is becoming more consolidated.15,16 
The results show a striking increase in the 4- and 8-firm concentration ratios over 
the 1990s (see Figure 3).  In 1990, the top 4 firms accounted for about 18.5% of the DoD 
contract awards, just above the 17.7% average for the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s. By 1996, 
they accounted for 23.6% of the market, breaking the previous “record” of 23.2% in 
1958, and by 1999 they accounted for about 28.1%. The ratio was relatively stable 
through 2003, decreasing in 2004 and 2005, and it rose slightly in 2006, but not to the 
most recent peak, which was 28.8% in 2002.  The calculations for 2005 and 2006 may 
overstate the decline from 2002 because of the change in the DD350 reporting 
threshold; however, even after accounting for the change, the concentration ratio likely 
remained below the 28.8% peak. 
Speculatively, the post-2003 decline in concentration ratios may reflect the 
effects of the Iraqi War.  The DoD may be drawing from different firms at different market 
levels for different types of products (e.g., it may be requiring more sustainment services 
and ordering fewer new weapon systems).  The rise of Halliburton to the top 8 in 2005—
it ranked 6th—provides circumstantial evidence. 
                                                
15 Concentration ratios have also been used as proxies for competition (O’Neill, 1996); however, 
this paper considers concentration and the relationship between concentration and competition 
separately. 
16 The ratios also make partial use of Dunn’s matrix (see footnote 7; Dunn, 1995, pp. 402-403), by 
establishing a rough measure of DoD’s dependence on suppliers at different market levels. 
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Figure 3. 4- and 8-Firm Defense Industry Concentration Ratios 
(Based on data from DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008a; 2008b, from 1958-2006)) 
The 20-, 50-, and 100-firm defense industry concentration ratios did not rise 
along with the 4- and 8-firm ratios; the 50- and 100-firm ratios declined over much of the 
1990s, just as they did through much of the preceding decades and did not begin to rise 
until the end of the 1990s (see Figure 4).  The 50- and 100-firm ratios have also dropped 
off since 2003, with a slight resurgence in 2006. 
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Figure 4. 4-, 8-, 20-, 50-, and 100-Firm Concentration Ratios 
(Based on data from DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008a; 2008b, from 1958-2006)) 
A more formal correlation analysis clarifies the relationships among concentration 
ratios at different market levels.  The relationships between the 4- and 8-firm 
concentration ratios and the 50- and 100-firm concentrations are the strongest.  The 4-
firm and 8-firm concentration ratios are positively and significantly correlated at 0.926; 
the 50-firm and 100-firm concentration ratios also are positively and significantly 
correlated at 0.977. To the extent that the 4- and 8-firm concentration ratios are 
correlated with the 50- and 100-firm concentration ratios, however weakly, they are 
negatively correlated.  The results pivot around the 20-firm concentration ratio.  The 
highest levels of the industry do not appear to be “behaving” like the next highest levels.  
Two alternative data presentations shed additional light on the time-path of 
industry consolidation and on differences across and within market levels. 
The first presentation replaces the concentration ratios of the top 4, top 8, top 20, 
etc., which are aggregate categories, with marginal market-level breakouts, i.e., the top 
1-4, top 5-8, top 9-20, top 21-50, and top 51-100 (see Figure 5).17 The marginal 
breakouts highlight substantial differences across and within the market levels.  While 
the “paths” of the top 4 and top 8 firms look nearly identical in Figures 3 and 4, the paths 
for the breakouts of the top 1-4 and top 5-8 firms in Figure 5 are quite dissimilar.  
Whereas the top-most firms became increasingly concentrated—a handful of major 
players became even more major—at lower but-still-quite-high levels, the industry 
became more diffuse or remained largely as it was in the 1980s and prior decades.  For 
                                                
17 According to Curry & George (1983, p. 207), R.A. Miller introduced the concept of the marginal 
concentration ratio in a paper, “Marginal Concentration Ratios and Industrial Profit Rates: Some 
Empirical Results,” published in the Southern Economic Journal in October of 1967. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 58 - 
=
=
the top 5-50 firms, a downward slide in concentration began in the mid-to-late-1980s, 
when the DoD budget began its decline (the budget peaked in real terms in 1985).  The 






































Figure 5. 1-4-, 5-8-, 9-20-, 21-50-, and 51-100-Firm Concentration Ratios 
(Based on data from DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008a; 2008b, from 1958-2006)) 
The second presentation compares the market shares of each of the top 50 firms 
at 5-year intervals (1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004) to their counterparts in 1984 (see 
Figure 6).19  The x-axis in Figure 6 shows the rank of the firm from 1 to 50 (based on its 
share of the DoD market, measured in the dollar value of DoD contract awards), and the 
y-axis shows the difference between its market share and the share of the equally-
ranked firm in 1984.  For example, in 1989 the first-ranked firm’s market share was 
almost 1 percentage point higher than that of the first-ranked firm in 1984 (in this case, 
the same firm, but not necessarily so); in 1994 the first-ranked firm’s market share was 
                                                
18 Though tempting to equate rank with size to draw conclusions for large, medium, and small 
firms, rank and size are not equivalent.  Firms of similar rank may be quite different in size and 
firms of less-than-top-most rank may also be quite large.  The top-100 firms are the top of literally 
tens of thousands of firms that serve the DoD market, to rank 50th or 51st is not trivial.  In 2006, 
the 50th firm, Dell, did about $636 million in business with DoD; the 51st firm, American Body 
Armor, did another $635 million. 
19 The authors initially conducted this analysis using data from 1984, the first year for which the 
DD350 text files provide ultimate parent company identifiers and are in the process of 
incorporating data from earlier years.  However, a comparison of the top-50 firms’ ranks and 
market shares in the mid-to-late 1980s and around each of the interval years suggests that 1984 
provides a reasonable anchor and that the 5-year intervals are representative of overall trends in 
the industry.  The 4-firm concentration ratio for 1984 is also close to the historical average for the 
decades preceding the 1990s. 
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2.1 percentage points higher than that of the first-ranked firm in 1984; in 1999 the first-
ranked firm’s market share was 4.3 percentage points higher than that of the first-ranked 
firm in 1984; and in 2004 the first-ranked firm’s market share was 3.2 percentage points 






































Figure 6. Changes in Market Share by Firm Rank 
(Based on data from DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1984-2004)) 
The differences in market shares grew over the 1990s but then subsided in the 
2000s. The differences in shares are most pronounced among the top-20 firms, 
especially the top 10, and all but vanish by the 50th firm. Lastly, the differences for the 
top-5 to top-50 firms are often negative, not positive, which implies that, for all but the 
very top-most firms, the market became more diffuse, not less.  The change in 
distribution might be consistent with consolidation among the DoD’s very top-most firms 
and a “hollowing out” of upper-to-mid-ranking firms, perhaps by absorption, but also with 
equal or heightened competition among all but the very top-most firms.  For firms ranked 
outside the top 50, the market shares in 1989-2004 look like “business as usual.” 
Possible Explanations 
Why did the defense industry’s top-most firms consolidate in the 1990s, and why 
has consolidation shown sign of abating more recently? It is tempting to view the 
numbers and say “it’s all about the defense budget” or “it’s all about DoOD policy,” but 
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the seemingly obvious could be wrong and potentially misleading. Why the red flag?20  
First, US defense budgets, including procurement budgets, have seen substantial 
downturns in the past without inspiring dramatic consolidation (see Figure 7), and 
second, the defense industry does not operate in a vacuum. Yes, demand for defense 
products contracted when the Cold War ended declined, possibly so-much-so that it 
could no longer sustain the then-larger number of major contractors, and, yes, DOD 
reportedly announced its support for consolidation during the Last Supper of 1993, but 
the rest of the US economy was also experiencing a dramatic wave of corporate activity, 





























































Figure 7. DoD Budget Authority in 2000 Dollars 
(Based on data from the DoD National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 and 2008 
Budgets and Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
A simple empirical model considers the possibility of multiple contributing factors 
by regressing the 4-firm concentration ratio for 1958-2006 on combinations of both 
economy-wide and DoD-specific variables, including real gross domestic product (GDP), 
the number of M&As in all industries, real DoD budget authority (BA), and a dummy 
variable for DoD policy, to capture the effects of the Last Supper and subsequent DoD 
policy actions, including cost reimbursements. 
                                                
20 Other analysts have also questioned popular wisdom. Hensel (2007) suggests that that 
economy-wide exuberance in the 1990s might have been responsible for the wave of M&As in 
the defense industry and assesses the correlations between aerospace-defense M&As, 
economy-wide M&As, and DoD outlays in the 1992-2004 period.  Flamm (1998, pp. 45-46) notes 
that the aircraft, aircraft engines, and munitions industries became more consolidated in the 
1980s, during a period in which spending “soared.”  Note: This analysis does not report an 
increase in overall defense-industry concentration during that period; rather, it suggests stable or 
declining market shares. 
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Several statistical challenges arose in the analysis, including missing data, i.e., 
the absence of economy-wide M&A data for 1958-1961; evidence of autocorrelation and 
collinearity; and the presence of a non-specific upward trend over most of the period of 
analysis.  Initial data runs indicated positive first-order serial correlation at a significance 
level of 0.01, suggesting the importance of including a lagged industry concentration 
variable among the independent variables.  Initial data runs also indicated likely 
collinearity among the independent variables, especially among GDP, economy-wide 
M&As, lagged industry concentration, and a proposed trend term.21  Ultimately, a model 
that included economy-wide M&As and excluded GDP offered the strongest statistical 
results but necessitated a 1962 start date (n = 45).22 
Y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + B4X4+ B5X5 
Where: 
Y = 4-firm concentration ratio (in decimal terms, e.g., 0.18, 0.25, etc.) (CR4F) 
X1 = Lagged 4-firm concentration ratio (one period lag) (CR4F-L) 
X2 = Lagged real DoD BA (in $2000 billions) (BA-L) 
X3 = DoD policy (0, 1 dummy) (POL) 
X4 = Number of economy-wide M&As (MA) 
X5 = Trend term (Linear, 1…N) (TR) 
Table 1 shows the results of six model runs.  The first considers only one 
independent variable, X1, the lagged 4-firm concentration ration (CR4F-L).  The second 
run adds the trend term, X5.  The third run adds X2, lagged real DoD BA (BA-L).  The lag 
allows firms to adjust to new information about the budget and for changes in BA to 
begin to transform themselves into changes in actual spending and contracting actions.23  
The fourth run adds X3, the policy variable (POL), defined as “1” for 1993-1997 
(arguably, the period in which DoD most actively promoted consolidation) and “0” for all 
                                                
21 We model the concentration ratio with a deterministic time trend, implying the process is trend-
stationary.  Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests of stationarity support this modeling choice.  
Specifically, a process is trend-stationary if the de-trended series is stationary (see Hamilton, 
1994, p. 435).  We also tested for a cointegrating relationship between the concentration ratio and 
the BA series or the MA series.  The Johansen procedure failed to find evidence of cointegration 
for either pair of variables.   
22 Starting with either 1958 or 1962 and substituting other economy-wide variables, such as GDP, 
the Dow Industrial Average or corporate profits, yields similar but statistically weaker results, 
which tend to conflate the roles of the economic variables and the underlying positive trend. 
23 Eliminating the lag on BA does not have a dramatic effect on the results nor does substituting 
other lagged or un-lagged measures of defense spending, including total outlays and various 
measures of procurement, research and development, and operations and maintenance. 
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other years.24  The fifth run adds X4, the number of economy-wide M&As (MA).  The 6th 
and final run removes the policy variable.  A priori, one might expect the signs on the X1 
(CR4F-L), X2 (BA-L), X3 (POL), X4 (MA), and X5 (TR) coefficients to be positive, 
negative, positive, positive, and positive, respectively. 
                                                
24 Some have described the discontinuation of reimbursements and the denial of the Lockheed-
Martin-Northrop-Grumman merger in 1998 as a change in DoD policy (e.g., Flamm, 2005), but it 
may be more accurate to describe it as a continuation of the same policy in the face of a change 
in circumstance.  The DoD had said that it would support consolidation to the point that it made 
sense, and, in 1998, it may have stopped making sense.  Nevertheless, be it a labeled a change 
of “policy” or “circumstance,” something appears to have changed in the DoD’s behavior in 1998. 
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Table 1. Regression Results for Concentration Ratio Model 
 Intercept CR4F-L BA-L POL MA TR 
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(Based on data from DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008a; 2008b, from 1958-2006), DoD National 
Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 and 2008 Budgets, the Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; and FactSet Mergerstat, LLC (b), using SPSS v16) 
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The results of the 1st regression indicate that lagged industry concentration 
accounts for a large share of the variance in industry concentration.25  Nevertheless, the 
underlying statistical process may be more than just an autoregressive “Black Box.”  
Focusing on the results of the 6th and final regression: 
 The coefficient on the DoD BA variable is statistically significant, at the 0.10 
confidence level, and signed as expected (if BA decreases by a billion dollars in 
one year, the 4-firm concentration ratio increases by about 0.00009 in the next 
year, indicating a small but non-negligible increase, for a budget that moves in 
increments of multiple billions of dollars.) 
 The coefficient on the economy-wide M&A variable is also statistically significant 
and signed as expected (all else constant, the increase in economy-wide M&As 
in 2006, would have been associated with an increase in the 4-firm concentration 
ratio of about 0.002, also a small but non-negligible increase). 
 Lagged industry concentration and economy-wide M&As are significantly 
correlated, but fortunately this is one of the “happy situations” that Gujarati 
discusses in his text (2006, p. 377).  The variables’ collinearity neither eliminates 
statistical significance nor results in “incorrect” signage. 
In the 4th and 5th regressions the coefficient on the DoD policy variable is not 
statistically significant and, in an unreported regression that focuses solely on policy, by 
excluding the DoD BA variable, it is not significant either.26  The budget data may say all 
that needs to be said about DoD’s role in shaping the industry—hard dollars may be 
more important than proclamations, even when proclamations come with changes in 
policy processes and the possibility of cost reimbursements. 
Given the predictive strength of the lagged defense-industry concentration 
variable, it is striking that both BA and economy-wide M&As find moderate predictive 
significance.  The jump from “predictor” to “driver” is a long and dangerous one; 
however, the results suggest a role for the defense budget and the general economy in 
shaping events.  The declining DoD budget may have been an important driver of 
defense industry consolidation in the 1990s but perhaps not the only driver.  Ironically, it 
may have been a peculiar combination of economy-wide exuberance and defense-wide 
doldrums that led to the industry’s reformation.27,28 
                                                
25 The standardized coefficient (Beta) for CR4F-L is 0.894 in the first regression; 0.738 in the 
second regression; 0.696 in the third; 0.721 in the fourth; 0.597 in the fifth; and 0.571 in the sixth. 
26 The unreported regression includes lagged industry concentration, policy, and the trend term. 
27 For insight to the underlying causes of the economy-wide wave, including the roles of 
deregulation and governance, see Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001) and Holmstrom & Kaplan 
(2001).  Note that past authors have not necessarily found a strong correlation between M&As 
and industry or aggregate concentration ratios; for example, see Curry & George (1983) and 
White (2002). 
28 A closer look at the industrial composition of DOD’s top firms suggests another possible driver 
requiring further consideration: an aging or “maturing” industry, like aircraft manufacturing, may 
have less ability—or need—to sustain a large number of leading firms than a newly developing 
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Over the past few years, the 4-firm concentration ratio has tracked more closely 
with the DoD budget, which has been growing,29 and less closely with economy-wide 
M&As, which have been largely increasing.  It is also tracking less closely with 
aerospace-defense M&As, which may speak to the rising importance of sustainment 
services and other war-related purchases in the spending mix. 
These results are not just academically interesting, they are also relevant to 
policy making.  The DoD may be the sole purchaser of some or even many defense-
related products, thus, highly influential in its purchase habits, but its purchase habits do 
not solely determine the fate of the industry.  The DoD’s control over the firms that arm, 
feed, and clothe it is by no means absolute.  Defense firms, even including the firms that 
are most dependent on the DoD, are also captive to larger market forces: they seek 
financing in global markets and must satisfy their investors.  Need be, they can opt out 
entirely—in the extreme, by terminating their operations and liquidating their assets—if 
the opportunity cost of doing business with the DoD becomes too great.  With that in 
mind, the following section briefly considers the possible implications of consolidation. 
Implications for Defense Acquisitions 
Building on a long-standing tradition, this section relies heavily on standard 
economic models and tools to consider the implications of defense industry 
consolidation for DoD acquisitions (for some early examples, see Adams & Adams, 
1972; Bohi, 1973; Peck & Scherer, 1962; Stigler & Friedland, 1971; and Weidenbaum, 
1968).30,31 
Concerns about consolidation stem in large part from those about deviations 
from competition (see Ackerman, Giovachino, Tighe & Trunkey, 1995): are firms in the 
defense industry consolidating that are behaving less competitively and, if they are, will 
their behavior have a pronounced effect on the price, quantity, quality, or timeliness of 
deliveries in the near term or on productivity and innovation in the longer term? 
Consolidation and Competition 
A simple market model and a preliminary assessment of data on the extent of 
competition in contract awards shed light on static concerns about price and quantity. 
                                                                                                                                              
industry. Whether the industry’s relative maturity would have contributed positively, negatively, or 
not at all to the corporate activity of the 1990s remains an open empirical question. 
29 In the context of a negative relationship, to “track” really means to move in opposition. 
30 Peck & Scherer (1962) have an entire chapter addressing “The Nonmarket Character of the 
Weapons Acquisition Process”; nevertheless, they conduct an economic analysis of the 
acquisition process, relying almost exclusively on standard economic—and market—principles. 
31 Occasionally, skeptics argue that the defense industry is unique; that it has no real market for 
its products; and by extension, that standard economic models and tools have little practical use.  
This skepticism may reflect a misunderstanding both of the nature of the “standard economic 
models and tools” and of how “uniqueness” enters into economic analysis. See Johnson (1958) 
for a related study of the possible uniqueness of agricultural markets.  The issue is not whether 
an industry is unique but whether standard models and tools can identify and incorporate its 
uniqueness. 
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The Simple Market Model 
The “simple market model” is a model of bilateral monopoly. In the bilateral 
monopoly a single buyer, a monopsonist, meets a single seller, a monopolist (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2001, pp. 358-359 and pp. 525-527). Prices and quantities are indeterminate 
but bound by the standard monopsonist and monopolist outcomes. The model is highly 
stylized. In most instances, the sole-buyer-sole-seller assumption is an exaggeration; 
however, the model provides a basis for considering the effects of convergence toward 
unity on either side of the market.32 To the extent that defense industry consolidation 
reduces competition among producers of particular defense-related products, particularly 
those with a single primary purchaser ( i.e., the DoD), the model provides insight. 
Figure 8 depicts the marriage of the monopsony and monopoly.  In a case that 
concerns a pre-existing monopsony or quasi-monopsony, such as the DoD, and the 
possible convergence of the supply side of the market to monopoly, the relevant 
comparison is not that of the bilateral monopoly and a perfectly competitive market but of 
the bilateral monopoly and a stand-alone monopsony.  Nevertheless, in comparing the 
two imperfect markets, perfect competition provides a useful reference point. 
When a monopsony faces competitive suppliers, it faces the entire market supply 
curve because it is the only purchaser in the market;33 when it purchases more of the 
product in question, price rises; and when it purchases less, price falls.  It recognizes the 
effect of its purchases on price and so it purchases less than it would in a perfectly 
competitive market.  Although the equilibrium price is lower than in a perfectly 
competitive market, the quantity is also lower. 
                                                
32 For a small set of defense-related products, such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, pure 
monopsony and pure monopoly provide a reasonably accurate characterization. 
33 The monopsonist does not have a true demand curve; rather, it has a marginal valuation (MV) 
curve.  This is analogous to the case of the monopolist, supply, and marginal cost. 
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Notes: S = supply; AE = average expense associated with each unit of purchase or input, which 
is also the industry’s supply (S) curve; MC = marginal cost; ME = marginal expense associated 
with each unit of purchase or input; MV = marginal value to the purchaser, which is shown as D = 
demand for the perfectly competitive market; MR = marginal revenue; Pc = the equilibrium price 
in the perfectly competitive market; Pmonopsony = the equilibrium price in the monopsony-only 
market; Pmonopoly = the equilibrium price in the monopoly-only market; Qc = the equilibrium 
quantity in the perfectly competitive market; Qmonopsony = the equilibrium quantity in the 
monopsony-only market; Qmonopoly = the equilibrium quantity in the monopoly-only market.  
Absent the monopoly, the monopsonist would equate ME and MV and sets price and quantity 
along AE, the industry’s supply curve.  Absent the monopsony, the monopolist would equate MC 
and MR and set price and quantity along D, the purchasers’ demand curve.  The deadweight loss 
associated with the monopoly, absent the monopsony, would be the area C+D, which in this 
depiction would be somewhat less than that which would be associated with the pure 
monopsony.  
Figure 8. Monopoly Meets Monopsony 
(Based on data from Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001, pp. 347, 358-359, and 525-527) 
In the bilateral monopoly, price can settle anywhere at or between Pmonopsony 
and Pmonopoly, including at the perfectly competitive level; however, if the firm has any 
negotiating leverage vis-à-vis DoD, the bilateral monopoly price will be higher than the 
monopsony-only price and possibly closer to the competitive price.  Quantity will settle 
somewhere below the perfectly competitive level because neither the monopsonist nor 
the monopolist has an incentive to exceed it; however, depending on the relative slopes 
of the various curves, it may settle above or below the monopsony-only quantity.  As 
depicted in Figure 8, the introduction of monopoly to the erstwhile-monopsony-only 
market could result in a higher price and higher quantity, but with different relative 
slopes; it could also result in higher prices and lower quantities. 
The new-found market power of the monopolist firm would likely result in a 
transfer of some surplus from the purchaser (i.e., the DoD) to the firm, which, though not 
a “good thing” from the DoD’s perspective in the short term, could have positive 
consequences if it implies the increased viability of the industry in the long term.  The net 
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effect on society-at-large is ambiguous and context specific.  Society may actually gain 
surplus from convergence to monopoly. 
The model becomes more complicated with economies of scale, the promise of 
which provided some or much impetus for the DoD’s promotion of consolidation in 
aerospace, shipbuilding, and elsewhere.  In such instances, convergence to monopoly 
may result in lower prices and greater efficiency than would occur in the more 
traditionally-depicted bilateral monopoly.  If firms consolidate, so that each produces at 
greater volume, they can move down their respective cost curves and capture those 
economies.  By definition, unit costs drop with increases in output—the cost of 
production may be $2.2 billion per ship if two firms produce 4 ships each and only $2 
billion per ship if one firm produces all 8 ships—so that one firm can produce the same 
total output at lower total cost than two or more.34  The monopsonist bids-up prices with 
each additional purchase, but additional purchases also drive down cost.  To the extent 
that the monopsonist can extract some of the benefits of the cost reductions, its 
purchases may have a less pronounced price-raising effect than in the simple case. 
The foregoing model suggests that, if an increase in industry concentration 
results in less effective competition among firms, then the prices of affected defense-
related products may rise and quantities may fall or rise.  Ultimately, the price and 
quantity outcomes will depend partly on the DoD’s negotiating abilities; it will have lost 
some but not all of its relative market power.  The outcomes will also depend on whether 
firms in the defense industry experience economies of scale.  Moreover, and perhaps 
surprisingly, society at large may find itself with more economic surplus than under 
conditions of pure monopsony, even in the absence of economies of scale. 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment 
The question remains, however, as to whether the market has become less 
competitive.  Does an increase in concentration among top-ranked firms necessarily 
imply a loss of effective competition?  One way to approach this question is to identify 
changes in the DoD contracting practices.  Are fewer contracts awarded competitively 
now than in the past, particularly to industry leaders?  Admittedly, a decrease in 
competitive awards may not be causally related to an increase in defense industry 
concentration, even if contemporaneous and highly correlated;35 however a clear pattern 
in the data (or lack thereof) may lend credence to (or refute) a relationship. 
This section evaluates the frequency and distribution of one DD350 variable, 
“Extent Competed” (A = Competed; B = Not Available for Competition; C = Follow on to 
Competed Action; and D = Not Competed), among top 100 firms; future analyses will 
also consider four additional variables: “Number of Offerors Solicited,” “Number of Offers 
Received,” “Solicitation Procedures,” and “Authority for Other than Full and Open 
Competition.”  The DD350 provides reasonably complete coverage for “Extent 
Competed,” with consistent documentation and formatting, starting in 1989, but provides 
only limited coverage for the other variables. 
                                                
34 From Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2001, p. 227), “output can be doubled for less than a doubling of 
price.”  A natural monopoly is said to experience “strong” economies of scale. 
35 Just as in the case of concentration itself, many “drivers” may explain the difference in 
practices. 
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The evaluation begins with data in 5-year increments, comparing the shares of 
contract dollars awarded competitively, either directly (“Competed”) or indirectly (“Follow 
on to Competed Action”) to firms operating at different market levels, e.g., top 4, top 8,… 
top 100, and overall, in 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.  It then provides additional detail for 
the years between 1989 and 1994.  It also considers the extent of competition in each 
year in relation to industry concentration.  The results are preliminary for at least two 
reasons: first, because of coding issues in the underlying data and, second, because of 
mechanical difficulties sorting the data that could lead to error.  Future rounds of analysis 
will address both concerns. 
Table 2 shows the share of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded, either 
directly or indirectly (hereafter the “competitive share”), by year and market level. 
Table 2. The Extent of Competition over 5-Year Intervals 
(Based on data from DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1989-2004)) 
Top 4 Top 8 Top 20 Top 50 Top 100 All
1989 60.72 64.71 65.00 64.51 64.86 68.06
1994 53.83 49.96 51.50 53.92 56.56 63.22
1999 52.20 51.40 55.16 56.04 58.21 65.13
2004 48.40 49.86 52.41 56.80 57.39 64.16
Top 1-4 Top 5-8 Top 9-20 Top 21-50 Top 51-100 101+
1989 60.72 71.74 65.56 62.72 67.61 74.50
1994 53.83 41.59 55.14 62.63 74.56 74.24
1999 52.20 48.42 70.53 60.55 74.05 75.67
2004 48.40 53.46 61.97 75.99 61.84 75.99
 
Note: This table shows the percentages of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded, either 
directly or indirectly, in aggregate categories and for marginal market-level breakouts. 
The results for the incremental years (1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004) indicate a 
consistent downward trend in the extent of direct and indirect competition among the 
DoD’s top-most suppliers (i.e., the aggregate top 4); however, as previously, the results 
across and within market levels are mixed.  Each of the top 8, top 20, etc., aggregate 
categories experienced a decline in competitive awards from 1989 to 1994 and a partial 
rebound in 1999.  The differences among the breakouts are more pronounced: the top 
21-50 became more competitive over time and the top 51-100, after experiencing a 
substantial increase in competitive awards in the 1990s, saw a large drop in 2004. 
Figures 9 and 10, which show the competitive shares for the top 4, 8, 20, etc., 
aggregate categories (top panel) and for the top 4, top 5-8, top 9-10 etc., marginal 
market-level breakouts (bottom panel), starkly illustrate the relative and absolute 
“mixedness” of the results across and within market levels. 
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Note: This figure shows the percentages of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded, either 
directly or indirectly, in aggregate market-level categories. 
Figure 9. A Comparison of Competitiveness by Aggregate Market Levels 

























Note: This figure shows the percentages of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded, either 
directly or indirectly, for marginal market-level breakouts. 
Figure 10. A Comparison of Competitiveness for Marginal Market Levels 
(Based on data from DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1989-2004)). 
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Even within the top 4, the results are mixed.  Though not show in Table 2 or 
Figures 9 and 10, the first-ranked firm’s competitive share was 49, 39, 65, and 55% in 
each of 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004, respectively.36  Contrary to expectation, the firm’s 
competitive share peaked just as its market share was cresting (its share of the DoD 
market was over 10% in 1999 and reached over 11% in 2000). 
Recalling the earlier finding of an increase in diffusion among the top 5-8, 9-20, 
and 21-50 firms over the 1990s, the data speak inconsistently to the extent of 
competition at those levels.  The top 5-8 firms saw a dramatic decline in the share of 
competitive awards from 1989 to 1994 and then a substantial rebound from 1994 to 
1999 and again from 1999 to 2004; the top 9-20 saw large fluctuations over the same 
period; the top 21-50 saw an overall increase; and the top 51-100 saw an increase in the 
1990s and a decline in the 2000s.  Moreover, whereas the market-share results 
previously suggested “business as usual” for the top 51-100 firms throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s; these competitive-share results seem to shift “business as usual” to 
the next market level (i.e., to the 101st firm) and those ranking behind it. 
The one nearly consistent pattern to be found in the data is the dramatic 
change—mostly a drop—in the extent of competition between 1989 and 1994.  The 
change raises questions about the usefulness of 1989 as an anchor point (was it an 
outlier?) and about the nature of the transition (if 1989 was not an outlier, was the 
transition smooth or sudden, e.g., did it occur in close proximity to the Last Supper).  
Table 3 includes data for 1989 and 1994 and the years between them. 
                                                
36 Note: The first-ranked firm in 1989 and 1994 was McDonnell Douglas; the first-ranked firm in 
1999 and 2004 was, as it is today, Lockheed Martin. 
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Table 3. Competitive Contract Awards in a Transition Period? 
(Based on data from DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1989-2004)) 
Top 4 Top 8 Top 20 Top 50 Top 100 All
1989 60.72 64.71 65.00 64.51 64.86 68.06
1990 57.77 61.09 60.06 61.38 62.27 65.85
1991 53.75 59.22 59.24 59.75 61.35 64.88
1992 64.65 57.72 57.34 58.59 59.67 63.45
1993 52.67 50.89 51.51 54.92 56.62 61.78
1994 53.83 49.96 51.50 53.92 56.56 63.22
Top 1-4 Top 5-8 Top 9-20 Top 21-50 Top 51-100 101+
1989 60.72 71.74 65.56 62.72 67.61 74.50
1990 57.77 66.85 58.22 65.80 69.05 72.95
1991 53.75 69.92 59.26 61.45 72.12 70.73
1992 64.65 47.72 56.67 63.01 67.64 69.65
1993 52.67 47.27 52.79 65.49 68.79 70.48
1994 53.83 41.59 55.14 62.63 74.56 74.24
 
Note: As above, this table shows the percentages of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded, 
either directly or indirectly, in aggregate categories and for marginal market-level breakouts.  
Looking more closely at the data for 1989 through 1994, the results for the top 4, 
8, 20 etc., aggregate categories suggest a reasonably smooth glide path from 1989 to 
1994 for all but the top 4, but not for the marginal market-level breakouts. 
The data for the 1989-1994 transition suggest that 1989 was not necessarily an 
outlier and that competition dropped off at some market levels in the years between 
1989 and 1994, but that the path from 1989 to 1994 was neither entirely smooth nor tied 
to a particular event, be it the Last Supper or any other policy action. 
Lastly, and perhaps somewhat more concretely, an analysis of the correlation 
between competition and concentration—via an analysis of the correlation between the 
shares of DoD contract dollars competitively awarded and the market shares of DoD’s 
suppliers—suggests a negative relationship between competition and concentration for 
the top 4 firms, in aggregate, but not necessarily for the others (see Table 4). 
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Table 4. Correlations between Competition and Concentration 
(Based on data from DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1989-2004)) 
Top 4 Top 8 Top 20 Top 50 Top 100
-0.5599 -0.3211 0.5675 0.8261 0.7834
Top 1-4 Top 5-8 Top 9-20 Top 21-50Top 51-100 101+
-0.5599 0.4420 -0.4021 0.0027 0.5513 0.0890
 
Note: This table shows the correlations between the competitive shares and market shares at 
each market level, both for aggregate categories and marginal market-level breakouts. 
With data for a small number of years it is difficult, if not impossible, to pull a 
clear and compelling story from the statistical results.37  Even within the top 4, the results 
are mixed.  Recalling the noteworthy increase in the first-ranked firm’s competitive share 
after 1994, the correlation between competition and concentration appears to be 
moderately positive at 0.5034. 
On balance and notwithstanding the unexpected results for the first-ranked firm, 
it seems that competition declined among the top-most firms in the 1990s, but at other 
market levels the trends in competition are less clear.  The lack of clarity may stem from 
a lack of data, as the analysis currently “misses” the years 1995-1998, 2000-2003, and 
2005-2006, or from the underlying methodology.  The analysis works with concentration 
ratios for firms in a buyer-defined (DoD) industry that do not necessarily produce like 
goods and services; thus, the ratios provide, at best, imperfect proxies for concentration 
among producers of particular product lines.  To the extent that purchases of particular 
types of items drive the data on competition, the analysis may fail to identify the relevant 
relationships between concentration and competition. 
Consolidation, Productivity, and Innovation 
This section offers a brief discussion of the issues surrounding consolidation, 
productivity, and innovation, while addressing some initial observations on trends in 
consolidation and productivity in the aircraft industry, as a rough proxy for the larger 
industry.38 Future research should look more closely at both the theoretical and empirical 
relationship between consolidation and productivity and between consolidation and 
innovation. 
In considering productivity and innovation, the case can be argued for or against 
negative relationships with consolidation.  The case “for” may be more familiar: a 
reduction in competition (e.g., via an increase in consolidation) would result in reductions 
in productivity (or its growth) and innovation because firms have less need to improve 
either.  The case “against” may be less familiar: post-consolidation firms have more 
profits to allocate to productivity and innovation-enhancing activities and have incentives 
to do so because they fear the threat of future competition.  In the extreme, firms may 
                                                
37 The correlation calculations include data for 1995, bringing the total number of observations to 
nine (1989-1995, 1999, and 2004) for each market level. 
38 BLS publishes annual data on labor productivity in the aircraft industry but does not publish 
such data for a more broadly defined defense-aerospace or defense industry. 
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undertake productivity and innovation-enhancing activities, such as R&D, until they have 
fully expended the “excess” profits they are seeking to preserve. 
A cursory look at the data on aircraft labor productivity (available from 1972-
2000) and defense industry concentration39 (available from 1984-2006) shows an overall 
upward trend in both (in the period of overlap from 1984-2000), with some opposing 
movement.  A closer look at correlations between aircraft labor productivity and defense 
industry concentration, controlling for steady increases in manufacturing productivity, 
lends some statistical weight, albeit far from conclusive, to a negative relationship 
between aircraft labor productivity and industry concentration. 
Figure 11 traces aircraft labor productivity and the 4-firm defense industry 



































Note: The aircraft labor productivity variable is an index (2000 = 1). 
Figure 11. Aircraft Labor Productivity and Defense Industry Concentration 
(Based on data from US Department of Labor (2005) and DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b,  
from 1984-2004)) 
The correlations among the three variables are all strongly positive, ranging from 
0.753, between aircraft labor productivity and the 4-firm concentration ratio, and 0.947 
                                                
39 This analysis uses the 4-firm concentration ratio as a proxy for aircraft industry concentration, 
both of which have been trending upward; however, the defense industry—writ large, in terms of 
DoD contract awards—is considerably less concentrated, in absolute terms, than the aircraft 
industry.  The Census Bureau (see http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html) 
typically publishes estimates of aircraft industry concentration every five years.  In the US market, 
the four largest aircraft manufacturers accounted for over 80% of shipments in the late 1990s and 
just less than 60% in the late 1950s; the top eight accounted for well over 90% in the late 1990s. 
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between aircraft labor productivity and manufacturing productivity. But, the partial 
correlation between aircraft labor productivity and the 4-firm concentration ratio, after 
controlling for the contemporaneous rise in manufacturing labor productivity, is actually 
negative, -0.572, and moderately significant 
An even more cursory look at the data on R&D expenditures (more precisely, 
company-funded applied research and development or AR&D) in the aircraft industry 
and defense industry concentration shows a stronger negative correlation, i.e., about -
0.73 (see Figure 12); however, a careful analysis of the relationship between innovation 
and concentration would require a much closer examination of all R&D expenditures and 
other measures of innovation, such as patent awards, in relation to industry 



























































Note: AR&D = applied research and development; CR = concentration ratio. 
Figure 12. Aircraft AR&D Expenditures and Defense Industry Concentration 
(Based on data for company funded applied research and development from the Aerospace 
Industries Association (2005, p. 105) and DoD DD350 (DoD, SIAD, 2008b, from 1984-2003), 
using a BEA deflator) 
The data on concentration and competition do not paint a clear picture of 
negative or positive relationships across and among market levels; however, for the top 
4 aggregate category, they generally seem to move in opposition.  To the extent that this 
can be taken as a sign of less competition at that level, the relationships between 
productivity and 4-firm concentration and innovation and 4-firm concentration, may 
reflect underlying relationships between both variables and competition.  At risk of 
overreaching with inadequate data, the correlations hint at the possibility of negative 
relationships and provide no immediate evidence to the contrary. 
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Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
In some respects, the “eye chart” is right.  It speaks a simple, plausible, and 
possibly self-evident truth.  The DoD’s top-most suppliers (i.e., the top 4), in aggregate, 
have increased their market share and become less competitive since the mid-to-late 
1980s.  However, the “truth” of the chart is less evident beyond the top 4 and even within 
the top 4.  For example, the first-ranked firm may hold a larger share of the market now 
than in the 1980s; indeed, it has held a larger share of the market over the past 10 years 
than at any time since 1958, but it also faces competition, either directly or indirectly, for 
a larger share of its DoD dollars. Underlying differences in the first-ranked firms in each 
era may help explain the result.  In the 1980s, McDonnell Douglas may have produced a 
narrower range of products that were not competed openly; whereas, Lockheed Martin 
may now produce a wider range of products that are competed openly. 
Together, the concentration ratios and competitive shares provide an aggregate 
view of an industry defined in terms of a single buyer: the DoD.  In so doing, they enable 
consideration of the forest; however, it may be helpful to begin to view the trees.  Future 
research will fill in the missing years in the analysis of competition (i.e., 1995-1998, 
2000-2003, and 2005-2006) and complete the assessment of competition and 
concentration, looking more closely at product lines. 
The eye chart also fails to fully capture the dynamism of the market.  For 
example, it fails to recognize new entrants and the role of globalization, which are 
sometimes one and the same.  (For example, BAE, a British-founded firm has 
dramatically increased its presence in the US market through a combination of direct 
investment in the United States and trade.  It broke the top 8 in 2005.)  Another new-
entrant issue involves the changing composition of defense spending and the increasing 
prominence of service providers, especially post 9-11 and in Iraq.  Noting that the top 
51-100 firms and the 101st and beyond have largely experienced “business as usual,” 
the data suggest both continuity and churn: some firms may be absorbed—as may be 
their fondest desire—and others may enter the market anew.  As above, consideration of 
industry concentration in terms of particular product lines may be fruitful. 
To the extent that the top-most level of the market has become less competitive, 
the simple, static bilateral monopoly model suggests that DoD may be paying more for 
some products, but the quantity implications are ambiguous.  Moreover, if DoD’s 
suppliers experience economies of scale, then the DoD may actually be paying less for 
some goods and services post-consolidation. Perhaps surprisingly, society-at-large may 
be economically better off with consolidation even without economies of scale. 
However, dynamic concerns about productivity and innovation suggest a need 
for a closer examination.  A cursory look at data on labor productivity and R&D in the 
aircraft industry suggests the possibility of a negative relationship vis-à-vis consolidation.  
A rough-and-ready look at correlations among pertinent variables is no basis for 
conclusions, but it is a reason to look more closely in the future. 
Lastly, the statistical analysis of industry concentration and contributing factors 
suggests, on the one hand, the shared authority of DoD and the larger economy in 
determining the fate of the industry and, on the other hand, the relative lack of 
importance of policy proclamations, even when they come with changes in policy 
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processes and potential cost reimbursements.  DoD may have a significant say in what 
happens in the defense industry, but it cannot control the market altogether. 
Looking to the future, the implications of the statistical assessment are striking.  
At present, the defense industry—as it is reflected in the 4-firm concentration ratio—is 
more closely tracking defense spending (in the sense that spending is rising and the 4-
firm concentration ratio is still substantially below peak) than the larger economy; 
however, were spending to decline (e.g., at the end of the war in Iraq) the conditions 
might be right for an increase in consolidation. 
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Abstract 
Open systems and evolutionary acquisition are two recent innovations designed to 
improve program performance with flexibility. The full potential of these approaches has not 
been captured, partially because of integration challenges during implementation. The 
current work investigates the impacts of open systems and evolutionary acquisition on DoD 
development programs. Development changes required to simultaneously use open 
systems and evolutionary acquisition are used to identify and describe impacts of 
implementation on program process and management. A dynamic simulation model of a 
program using both evolutionary acquisition and open systems is described and used to 
map these impacts. Simulation results generally support the suggested impacts identified in 
the literature and provide a possible explanation for changes in program performance. 
Implications for practice relate to changes in the types and timing of risk and a potential 
trading of design obsolescence risk for standards obsolescence risk.  
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In order for the military to prepare to meet current and future capability demands, 
major DoD systems must improve with evolving technologies and be interoperable. The 
continued and, in some cases, accelerating evolution of technologies creates new 
challenges that are difficult to forecast and require rapid acquisition response. Integrated 
human-computer decision-making tools, advanced materials, NCS tools, and nano-level 
structures are examples of evolving technologies that present challenges and potential 
solutions that must be integrated by defense acquisition programs. The use of legacy and 
other weapon platforms, joint service solutions, the information and communication needs of 
Network Centric Systems (NCS), and coordination with allies in joint operations each require 
weapon systems that can operate across system, platform, and systems-of-systems 
boundaries. Providing those systems is an important acquisition challenge. Past DoD 
acquisition approaches have not fully provided the interoperability needed to meet these 
demands.   
Open systems (OSJTF, 2004, September) and evolutionary acquisition (DoD, 2004, 
November, section 4.4.1) are two relatively recent DoD acquisition initiatives that seek to 
address system interoperability and technology evolution challenges and that help the DoD 
meet current and future capability needs. An open systems (OS) approach and evolutionary 
acquisition (EA) share several high-level objectives. Both approaches seek to improve 
performance over the system’s lifetime and reduce acquisition cycle-time. Both approaches 
also attempt to improve system performance via flexibility for the integration of new 
technologies and information into systems as they evolve. The open systems approach 
facilitates upgrades through modularity. EA does this by multiple product releases and 
deliberate deferral of some functionality—allowing technologies and requirements to evolve 
and mature. Both OS and EA seek to reduce acquisition cycle-time to provide currently 
available functionality. OS provide a means of incorporating current and future functionality, 
and evolutionary acquisition limits the scope of development blocks to only the technologies 
and capabilities that are attainable in the near future.  
Open systems and evolutionary acquisition share at least two important 
implementation approaches. First, both OS and EA incorporate flexibility into acquisition to 
manage uncertainty in technology. Open systems build flexibility into development products 
with modular design and standardized key interfaces. Evolutionary acquisition builds 
flexibility into development processes through the design of incremental capability blocks. 
These flexibilities create options that potentially increase system performance, reduce cost, 
or both, by allowing technological uncertainties to partially resolve before important 
development decisions are made. Second, both OS and EA place emphasis upon interfaces 
to address interoperability. Within an evolutionary approach, interface management is 
critical to successfully integrating designs across development blocks. This need increases 
for systems with interfaces across platforms or systems-of-systems. In contrast to these 
challenges, an OS approach focuses on explicitly identifying and managing key interfaces 
that can benefit from modular design and open systems as a means of improving 
interoperability.  
The evolutionary acquisition challenge and the open systems method suggest that 
the two acquisition approaches must be integrated and may be synergistic. But the 
complexity of the processes and the requirements of the two approaches make their 
integration, synergy, and successful implementation anything but easy or certain. The 
requirements of the approaches have been largely identified, and some of the required 
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changes in programs for the use of EA and OS together have been identified. But a focused 
study of the impacts of integrating open systems and evolutionary acquisition is needed both 
to identify the impacts on development processes and to point to potential program design 
and management actions in order to exploit their potential. It is not obvious how to 
investigate and better understand the integration and implementation issues presented by 
evolutionary acquisition and open systems as concurrent approaches. How does the use of 
evolutionary acquisition and open systems together impact a system’s development 
processes and management? How do those impacts affect acquisition program 
performance?  
The current work partially addresses these issues as follows. The researchers review 
the evolutionary acquisition and open systems approaches through the lens of their 
influence on program processes and management. Required changes in programs identified 
in the existing literature are then used to describe challenges to integrating the approaches 
and to describe specific influences on program management. After describing the modeling 
approach and simulation model of an acquisition program, the researchers map the specific 
influences into changes in model variables. They then use the results of simulations of the 
evolutionary acquisition program without and with open systems as a basis for a discussion 
of both the needs for successful programs that use both approaches, as well as the use of 
simulation modeling as a tool for investigating these acquisition-implementation issues. The 
paper closes with recommendations for future work.   
Evolutionary Acquisition  
In the year 2000, the Defense Department promulgated the term “evolutionary 
acquisition” (EA) in its policy documents governing the strategy for acquisition of materiel 
and mandated such strategies be used as the preferred approach to procurement 
(USD(AT&L), 2000, October 23). Later elaborated as spiral and incremental strategies, 
these approaches contrast to others that are based on more serial, sequential or singular 
efforts to arrive at a product solution. The latter are often termed as: single-step-to-full-
capability, grand design, big bang, technological leap, waterfall, rational-comprehensive, 
and the unified development method (Forsberg, Mooz & Cotterman, 2005, p. 354).  The 
overarching goals and principles of the DoD’s evolutionary acquisition are to ensure that the 
Defense Acquisition System provides useful military capability to the operational user as 
rapidly as possible, and such strategies shall be the preferred approach to satisfying 
operational needs. Evolutionary acquisition strategies define, develop, and produce/deploy 
an initial, militarily useful capability ("Block 1") based upon proven technology, time-phased 
requirements, projected threat assessments, and demonstrated manufacturing capabilities. 
They also plan for subsequent development and production/deployment of increments 
beyond the initial capability over time (Blocks II, III, and beyond) (USD(AT&L), 2000, 
October 23). Figure 1 shows the conceptual difference between a traditional single-step-to-
capacity acquisition process and an evolutionary acquisition process with two development 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Traditional Single Step to Capacity and  
Evolutionary Acquisition Approaches  
(Dillard, 2005) 
The policy for evolutionary acquisition was aimed at improving all parameters of 
program success, but clearly and explicitly, its single most important objective was to reduce 
long product cycle-times to deliver operationally useful equipment. Figure 1 illustrates the 
hypothetical earlier start of production and the overlapping development blocks that are 
characteristic of evolutionary acquisition.  
The authors, in their previous work (Dillard & Ford, 2007) investigated 
implementation challenges of evolutionary acquisition using the same approach we are 
using in the current work. We found, in part, that an evolutionary development approach 
significantly increases the number of development phases and activities that must be 
managed and coordinated at any given time over that required for single-block development. 
This, consequently, increases the organizational project management resource needs for 
successful acquisition over those necessary for single-block projects. Using open systems 
with an evolutionary approach may or may not accentuate these challenges.  
Open Systems in DoD Acquisition 
Open Systems were made a part of DoD acquisition in DoD 5000.1 (USD(AT&L), 
2003, May 12) which says, “a modular open systems approach shall be employed where 
feasible” (p. 7). A subsequent memorandum (USD(AT&L), 2004, July 7) clarified the central 
role of OS in acquisition by saying the approach is “an integral part of the toolset that will 
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help DoD achieve its goal of providing the joint combat capabilities required in the 21st 
century, including supporting and evolving these capabilities over their total life-cycle” (p. 8). 
The Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) leads the DoD OS effort (OSTJF, 2004, 
September). Several terms defined in that guide are relevant to and used in the current 
work, including:  
 Open architecture: An architecture that employs open standards for key interfaces 
within a system. 
 Open standards: Standards that are widely used, readily available, consensus-
based, published and maintained by recognized industry standards organizations 
(versus “closed,” which are not). 
 Open system: A system that employs modular design, uses widely supported and 
consensus-based standards for its key interfaces, and has been subjected to 
successful validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of its key 
interfaces.    
 Open systems environment (OSE): A comprehensive set of interfaces, services, 
and supporting formats, plus aspects of interoperability of application, as specified 
by Information Technology (IT) standards and profiles. An OSE enables information 
systems to be developed, operated, and maintained independent of application-
specific technical solutions or vendor products.  
An open systems approach uses the concepts of key versus non-key interfaces and 
open versus closed interfaces, as defined above, to build flexibility into programs. Figure 2 
illustrates potential locations of these interfaces in a conceptual system with modular 
subsystems/components. The centrality of these concepts to the open systems approach 
greatly increases the importance of the intended and unintended impacts of a shift away 
from the traditional focus on customized designs to integration through open interfaces.  
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Challenges of Integrating Evolutionary Acquisition and Open 
Systems 
Program managers using open systems and evolutionary acquisition in an integrated 
fashion may be able to achieve interoperability and insert evolving technologies better than 
project managers using either approach alone. But, despite their potential, the combination 
of OS and EA has not yet been fully developed or implemented in DoD acquisition. This is 
perceived to be largely because the issues related to their implementation have not been 
completely identified or resolved. This incomplete resolution of implementation for open 
systems and evolutionary acquisition individually makes understanding their interactions and 
the impacts of those interactions on acquisition programs difficult. Therefore, the challenges 
and solutions for implementing either approach are not yet fully understood. For example, 
the application of OS to hardware/software systems may present particular challenges.  
The adoption and use of open systems in DoD acquisition requires several different 
activities that impact the acquisition process in different ways. Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) 
identify some of these activities. We describe the most important activities identified by 
Meyers and Oberndorf with our assessment of their impacts on the evolutionary acquisition 
process:  
1. Build a baseline of standards and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. 
This change increases the scope of the Block 1 requirements phase and early 
design (pre-system acquisition) to describe the requirements in terms of standards.  
2. Build a high-level model of the system for use in applying the open systems 
approach. This change increases the scope of early design in Block 1.  
3. Document the open architecture in a way that shows the evaluation of 
alternative architectures, identifies components, technologies, etc. This change 
increases the scope of the early design activities and advanced development phases 
in all Blocks.  
4. Coordinate standards and establish liaisons with standards bodies and users. 
This change increases scope of all phases in all blocks because it is an on-going 
process.  
5. Implement the use of the selected standards in the development process. This 
change decreases scope of advanced development phase in all blocks due to 
component design activities being replaced with component selection.   
6. Integrate components into the product and test the integrated system. This 
change increases problems/rework in advanced development and manufacturing 
phases of all blocks.  
Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) also investigated the use of open systems in 
acquisition. They describe the impacts of OS on acquisition as a shift away from design 
(which, in OS, is completed by the broader commercial market) to integration of elements 
into products (which, in OS, is increasingly completed with elements that were not 
developed specifically for the DoD). Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson identified several areas 
of open systems design that pose risks, which we describe with our assessment of the 
primary impacts of OS on evolutionary acquisition processes.  
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1. Slower integration and testing of standards-based elements into products. This 
change delays the discovery of integration problems until later in projects.  
2. Reduced DoD control over standards. This change increases the number and size 
of design problems due to faster evolution of the standard used in the product.  
3. Increased standards-selection risk due to evolution of standards and the 
possibility that standards will not endure. This change both increases the number 
and size of design problems due to the possibility that the selected standard will not 
endure, and increases testing and integration (regardless of whether problems are 
discovered or not) due to more frequent changes in standards.  
4. Increased standard change risk—knowing when to shift from one standard to 
another. This change increases testing and integration (regardless of whether 
problems are discovered or not) due to more frequent changes in standards. It also 
increases the number and size of integration problems that need to be discovered 
and resolved due to both the need to change to the new standard more often and the 
possibility of changing too early, too late, or to the wrong standard if more than one 
are available (e.g., competing for market dominance).  
5. Increased and continuous testing requirements due to the need to integrate 
evolving commercial and non-developmental items into systems. This change 
increases testing and integration (regardless of whether problems are discovered or 
not) due to more frequent component redesigns.   
6. Development of support concepts early in the acquisition cycle—causing 
increased standards-selection risk due to large amounts of information needed 
about currently available standards. This change increases standards research 
and planning early in acquisition, which would include increased interface design and 
management.  
7. Reduced control over detailed component design due to design by industry 
based on industry-controlled standards. This change increases the number and 
size of integration problems due to component designs that do not exactly match 
product needs.  
These specific influences pose significant individual challenges. However, they might 
also interact in ways that are difficult to predict or immediately recognize and address. In the 
Model Use section, we describe how we mapped these influences onto specific parts of an 
acquisition process to better understand how they impact program performance.   
The Research Approach 
Evolutionary acquisition and open systems approaches combine to create a complex 
set of development processes that evolve over time. An improved understanding of these 
processes and their management is available through formal modeling of the most important 
components and relationships that drive system performance and risk. Due to the number 
and complexity of the components and their relationships, the formal model structure and 
rigor of calculations can simulate and forecast performance and risk better than informal 
tacit predictions by humans. Therefore, we applied a computational experimentation 
approach to investigating evolutionary acquisition and open systems projects, integrating 
theory and practice in a computational tool that allows controlled experimentation through 
simulation. The current work reflects project, product development, and management 
theories.  
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The system dynamics methodology was applied to model a DoD acquisition project 
with evolutionary processes and open systems. System dynamics uses a computational 
experimentation approach to understanding and improving dynamically complex systems. 
The system dynamics perspective focuses on the roles of accumulations and flows, 
feedback, and nonlinear relationships in managerial control. The methodology’s ability to 
model many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money), processes (e.g., 
design, technology development, quality assurance), and managerial decision-making and 
actions (e.g., forecasting, resource allocation) makes it useful for investigating acquisition 
projects. Forrester (1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) 
specifies the modeling process with examples and describes numerous applications. When 
applied to development projects, system dynamics focuses on how performance evolves in 
response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., evolutionary development vs. 
traditional), managerial decision-making (e.g., scope developed in specific blocks), and 
development processes (e.g., concurrence). System dynamics is considered appropriate for 
modeling acquisition projects because of its ability to explicitly model critical aspects of 
development projects (Ford & Sterman, 1998; Cooper, 1993a,b,c; Cooper & Mullen, 1993; 
Cooper, 1994). System dynamics has been successfully applied to a variety of project 
management issues, including prediction/discovery of failures in project fast-track 
implementation (Ford & Sterman, 2003b), poor schedule performance (Abdel-Hamid, 1988), 
and the impacts of changes (Rodriguez & Williams, 1997; Cooper, 1980) and concealing 
rework requirements (Ford & Sterman, 2003a) on project performance. See Lyneis and Ford 
(2007) for a review of the application of system dynamics to projects.  
The simulation model used here is based on previously developed system dynamics 
models of product development in several industries that have been developed and tested 
over several decades, as described and referenced below. Therefore, the model is founded 
on well-established and tested components. Previous models have developed structures for 
many components and aspects of acquisition. However, previous models have not been 
used to investigate the integration of EA and OS in acquisition projects. The current model 
was originally developed to investigate EA and is described in detail by Dillard and Ford 
(2007).   
A Conceptual Model of an Evolutionary Acquisition Program 
The model reflects the structure of development work moving through the separate 
development blocks of an acquisition project. In the model, four types of work flow through 
each block of an acquisition project: the development of requirements, the development of 
technologies, the design of product components, and the manufacture of products. Within a 
development block, each type of work flows through a development phase that completes a 
critical aspect of the project: 1) develop requirements, 2) develop technologies, 3) design 
product components (advanced development), and 4) manufacture products. The exception 
is requirements, which also measures progress through the final phase, 5) conduct user 
product testing. Development phases and information flows in a single block, as depicted in 
the model is shown in Figure 3. Arrows between phases indicate primary information flows. 
The start of all phases (except the development of requirements) is constrained by the 
completion of previous (“upstream”) phases. The completion of some requirements allows 
the start of technology development, reflecting the concurrent nature of this portion of 
acquisition. Both requirements development and technology development must be 
completed for Advanced Development to begin. The completion of Advanced Development 
allows manufacturing to begin. When some products have been manufactured, they are 
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shipped to users for readiness testing. Figure 3 also identifies the five major reviews within a 
single acquisition block (A, B, Design Readiness Review, C, and Full-rate Production) at 
their approximate times during a project. These reviews are necessary, but are “off-core” 
activities that add work beyond that needed to complete the basic products of each phase 
(requirements, technologies, designs, products, and readiness for use confirmation).  
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Figure 3. Information Flows in a Single Block Acquisition Project 
Figure 4 depicts an acquisition project with multiple iterations or blocks. The first 
block is the same as Figure 3 above. Subsequent blocks have the same basic information 
flow, but can also be delayed by the completion of phases in previous blocks or constrained 
by the lack of progress in their own block. Importantly, in addition to the flow of information 
downstream through phases (black arrows in Figure 4), multiple iteration acquisition also 
provides opportunities for information to flow upstream, such as from User Product Testing 
in an earlier iteration to Develop Requirements or Advanced Development in a subsequent 
iteration (red vertical arrows in Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Information Flows in a Three-block Acquisition Project 
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A Formal Simulation Model of an Evolutionary Acquisition 
Program  
The conceptual model described above was used to build a formal computer 
simulation model of an acquisition program that can reflect evolutionary acquisition and the 
use of open systems. See Dillard and Ford (2007) for details. The simulation model is a 
system of nonlinear differential equations. Each phase is represented by a generic structure, 
which is parameterized to reflect a specific phase of development.  
Project performance is measured in three dimensions: schedule, cost, and product-
performance risk. Schedule performance is measured by the time required to test and 
approve a given number or fraction of requirements by users. Cost is measured in dollars 
based on the size of direct and indirect work forces and the duration of phases and blocks. 
Product-performance risk is measured by the average percent of the requirements provided 
(approved by users) at any given time. This average reflects the combination of multiple 
requirements. All the requirements can be considered met completely when the average 
percent of the requirements provided is 100% for a development block.  
The formal model was calibrated to the Javelin project described by Dillard and Ford 
(2007) based on data collected from a manager on the project (the second author) and 
performance data (e.g., schedule and costs) on the project. The model was tested with the 
three types of tests of system dynamics models suggested by Forrester and Senge (1980): 
structural similarity to the actual system, reasonable behavior over a wide range of input 
values, and behavior similarity to actual systems. The model was found to be useful for 
investigating the impacts of OS and EA on acquisition projects.  
Model Use 
To investigate the impacts of opens systems on evolutionary acquisition, we 
simulated a project similar to the Javelin project twice: first as if the project did not use open 
systems and then as if the project used an open systems approach. We then compared the 
behavior and project performance. The program base-case model and simulation described 
in Dillard and Ford (2007) reflects an evolutionary acquisition program that does not include 
open systems impacts. To add the impacts of open systems to the model, we first mapped 
the identified impacts based on Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) onto model variables as 
follows (Table 1):  
Table 1. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition due to Changes 
Suggested by Meyers and Oberndorf (2001) 
Change Required by  
Open Systems Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
1) Build standards & COTS for 
program use 
Increases Requirements scope in Block1 
2) Build high-level model with 
open system 
Increases Technology Development scope in Block 1 
3) Document use of OS Increases Technology Development scope in all blocks 
4) Coordinate standards Increases scope of all phases in all blocks 
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5) Implement OS Decreases Advanced Development scope in all blocks 
Fewer Advanced Development design problems in all 
blocks 
6) Integrate components More Advanced Development integration problems in all 
blocks 
More Manufacturing integration problems in all blocks 
 
We also mapped the impacts of required changes to acquisition projects identified by 
Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) onto model variables as follows (Table 2):  
Table 2. Impacts of Open Systems on Evolutionary Acquisition due to Changes 
Suggested by Hanratty, Lightsey, and Larson (1999) 
Change Required by  
Open Systems 
Impact on Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
7) Slower integration and 
testing 
a1) Reduces problem discovery in Technology 
Development and Advanced Development phases in 
all blocks 
a2) Increases problem discovery in Manufacturing phases 
in all blocks 
b1) Decreases problem discovery in earlier blocks (all 
phases except Requirements) 
b2) Increases problem discovery in later blocks (all phases 
except Requirements) 
8) Track and change with 
evolving standards 
More problems in Advanced Development and 
Manufacturing phases in later blocks 
Increases scope in Technology Development and 
Advanced Development phases in all blocks 
9) Increase testing to discover 
increased integration 
problems 
Increases scope in Technology Development, Advanced 
Development, and Manufacturing phases in all blocks 
10) Build support system 
(OSE)  
Increased scope in Requirements phase in Block 1 
 
Several of the changes above impact the same portions of an evolutionary process, 
sometimes in the same directions and sometimes in opposite directions. Therefore, we 
regrouped the impacts (Table 3) according to model variable that described a specific 
program block and development phase (e.g., scope of work in Block 1, Requirements 
Phase). The three variables found to best describe the impacts of open systems on 
evolutionary acquisition programs are the scope of work, rework fraction, and quality 
assurance (QA) effectiveness. In the table below and within the model, the scope represents 
the work that must be completed in a development phase. The Rework Fraction reflects the 
number of problems that are created in a development phase. The QA effectiveness reflects 
the difficulty of discovering problems to be resolved. The unit of measure of change was 
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chosen as the percent change from the base case that the use of open systems would 
cause. This normalizes impacts for different phases (e.g., a change of 10 to a phase with a 
scope of 50 is very large compared to the same change to a phase with a scope of 5,000) 
and facilitates assessment of the changes. No known data is available to complete Table 3 
based on an actual acquisition program. However, order of magnitude estimates that are in 
a reasonable rank order of size are adequate because of the preliminary nature of the study. 
The net changes of all the specific influences are summarized in Table 3. See Appendix A 
for a more detailed description of the estimates.  
Table 3. Estimated Changes in Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
to Reflect Open Systems 







DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 1    
   Requirements +7 0 0
   Develop Techn.  -15 0 -10
   Advanced Dev.  -17 -5 -10
   Manufacturing +2 +5 +5
   Testing by User +1 0 -5
Net Change from Base Case -0.22 0% -20%
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 2 
   Requirements +1 0 0
   Develop Techn.  -16 0 -5
   Advanced Dev.  -17 0 -5
   Manufacturing +2 +10 +10
   Testing by User +1 0 0
Net Change from Base Case +29% +10% 0%
 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 3 
   Requirements +1 0 0
   Develop Techn.  -16 0 0
   Advanced Dev.  -17 +5 0
   Manufacturing +2 +15 +15
   Testing by User 1 0 +5
Net Change from Base Case  +29 +20 +20
 
Simulation Results  
Figure 5 shows a plot of the simulated percent of project requirements provided to 
users by the acquisition program without open systems (Line 1) and with open systems 
(Line 2). The simulated program has three development blocks, and the simulation clearly 
shows the evolutionary acquisition nature of the program—with three increases in 
requirements provided as each development block is completed. The simulation also shows 
the program with open systems provides as many or more requirements at any point in time 
than the program without open systems. This supports the open systems approach claim 
that it can facilitate providing more requirements faster.   
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Figure 5. Requirement Fulfillment with Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
In addition to supporting the potential gains available through evolutionary 
acquisition and open systems, the simulation describes the interaction of evolutionary 
acquisition and open systems in more detail, providing the opportunity for improved 
understanding. The simulation shows that the improvement in time-to-requirement increases 
with each block, indicating that open systems can improve this dimension of program 
performance during multiple development blocks. An open systems approach may 
leverage its benefits when used with evolutionary acquisition through repeated 
capture of benefits generated in early development blocks in subsequent 
development blocks.  If an OS approach is implemented with EA, programs may be able to 
reap the benefits first achieved in earlier blocks in subsequent downstream blocks, 
effectively benefitting more than once for the open systems work done early.   
However, time to delivery of requirements is only one measure of program 
performance. Cost is another important performance measure. The simulated program 
without open systems costs $5.39 million through complete release to users, and the 
program with open systems costs $3.84 million through complete release to users.1 
Reduced costs are an established potential benefit of using open systems, largely through 
reduced design scope. This is the case in the model, in which a significant reduction in 
design scope is assumed to be a fundamental impact of using open systems. However, the 
simulation points out an additional potential cost benefit of using open systems. Shorter 
programs tend to cost less (all other things held equal). Therefore, open systems can 
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improve cost performance by interacting with evolutionary acquisition to enhance the 
schedule performance available through evolutionary acquisition alone.  
A third important performance measure is the quality of the developed product. Less-
than-desired quality can be caused by many things, including not or partially fulfilling 
requirements, design errors that reduce product performance or increase operations or 
maintenance costs, and integration errors that make future upgrades difficult, slow, or 
expensive. Design and integration errors are particularly important in the current work 
because of their central role in open systems. Acquisition program changes required by 
open systems clearly alter the nature, number, and timing of both design and integration 
errors. Generally, early design errors are expected to be reduced, but later integration errors 
may increase due to evolving standards. Errors that are discovered and addressed during 
an acquisition program are not as problematic as those that remain after the product has 
been put into service. Undiscovered and released errors are problematic because they can 
severely increase operations, maintenance, and upgrade costs.  
The model was used to simulate the number of undiscovered errors in released work 
without and with open systems. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the number of undiscovered 
and released errors as a percent of the program scope. In general, the number of released 
errors increases as work is completed until the next development phase begins receiving 
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Figure 6. Undiscovered Problems in Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
Figure 6 shows that the simulated project with open systems generates and fails to 
find and resolve more errors before release. To further investigate this, the errors were 
disaggregated into design errors and integration errors based on the assumption that errors 
in the early development phases of each block (requirements and technology development 
and advanced development) are primarily design errors, and errors in manufacturing and 
testing are primarily integration errors. Figure 7 shows the undiscovered and released 
design errors as a percent of scope with and without open systems, and Figure 8 shows the 
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systems. Note that the vertical scale in Figure 8 (0-20%) is four times larger than the vertical 
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Figure 7. Undiscovered and Released Design Errors in Evolutionary Acquisition  
without (Line 1) and with (Line 2) Open Systems 
The differences in the timing of when design errors are generated, discovered and 
resolved, or missed and released is primarily due to the faster development with open 
systems. More importantly, the total percent of design errors at the completion of the 
program is nearly the same for the two programs. This suggests that the important impacts 














2 2 2 2







0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time (Week)
 
Figure 8. Undiscovered Integration Errors in Evolutionary Acquisition  
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There are at least two important differences between the number of undiscovered 
and released design errors (Figure 7) and the number of undiscovered and released 
integration errors (Figure 8). First, the programs generated and failed to resolve three to four 
times as many integration errors than design errors. This suggests that PMs using open 
systems must address integration issues if they wish to succeed. This finding also supports 
the importance of the shift from design to integration identified by other investigators. 
Second, the program with open systems generated at least 25% more integration errors 
than the program without open systems (3+% more than 13%). This difference in integration 
errors explains essentially the entire difference in total undiscovered and released errors 
(Figure 6).  
In summary, the simulation results show that open systems can interact with 
evolutionary acquisition to improve the timing of products (Figure 5), reduce development 
costs, and increase the number of undiscovered and released integration errors (Figures 6-
8). This suggests that open systems and evolutionary acquisition can interact to 
improve schedule and cost performance, but that these benefits may come at the cost 
of increased risk of high operations, maintenance, and upgrade costs when the 
integration errors are eventually discovered and must be resolved.  
Implications for Evolutionary Acquisition Practice with Open 
Systems  
The identification of impacts of open systems on evolutionary acquisition programs 
and the simulation results carry potentially valuable implications for acquisition program 
managers.  
Shifting the Types and Amounts of Risk  
Adding open systems to evolutionary acquisition shifts the program management 
focus from design to standards and integration. This impacts when the program accepts and 
must manage different types and amounts of risk. Open systems reduce design risks by 
designing components, subsystems, and systems to be consistent with established 
standards. Design risk is also reduced, as an OS approach uses pre-designed and pre-
tested components that have been designed and tested to established standards. Open 
systems may increase other risks, however. Standards selection and change risks are 
increased because programs using open systems are more dependent on standards than 
programs using customized designs; OS also have little influence over the evolution of those 
standards. Integration risks may increase significantly as standards change over the product 
lifecycle, and new standards may not be compatible with the current design of products. 
Different types of skills are needed to manage different types of risk. For example, detailed 
component design risk management requires technical expertise for design review and 
component testing, but integration risk management requires a broader, systems 
understanding of the product and how subsystems work together to fulfill requirements. 
Acquisition programs using open systems need a different set of risk-management skills 
than programs not using open systems. Less-detailed technical expertise will likely be 
needed, and more integration and systems expertise will be needed. If open systems are 
integrated into evolutionary acquisition (which repeats the development process over 
multiple blocks), then acquisition programs will require significant and extended 
integration and systems expertise. This will also change the skill sets needed by the DoD 
acquisition workforce.  
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A Temporal Shift in Program Risks   
Design risks occur relatively early in programs and product lifecycles, whereas 
integration risks occur relatively late. Therefore, the use of open systems will shift program 
risk to emerge later in projects. The simulations support this result with the increase in the 
number of undiscovered and released integration errors with open systems. If costs follow 
risk, this may result in lower development costs due to lower design risk, but higher 
operating, maintenance, and upgrade costs due to higher integration risk. Figure 9 
describes the relative costs in a product lifecycle. Integration of OS into EA may reduce 
Research and Development costs when programs can capture design benefits, but may 
increase Operating and Support costs when integration and evolving standards risks may 
increase costs. The sizes of these cost changes are uncertain, but the potential for early 












Figure 9. Relative Costs during a Product Lifecycle  
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2004, November, p. 43) 
By stretching acquisition across multiple blocks, evolutionary acquisition may 
accentuate the impacts of a temporal shift in program risk. Therefore, if using open 
systems causes this temporal shift in risks, then programs integrating open systems 
and evolutionary acquisition may experience an increase in the relative size of 
product costs during use.  
Trading Design Obsolescence for Integration Obsolescence 
Traditional acquisition processes commit programs to customized designs and, 
therefore, bear significant design obsolescence risk when threats and technologies evolve 
away from the design. An open systems approach can reduce that risk by allowing the use 
of more plug-and-play components that can be replaced with improved components that 
meet the chosen standard. However, by using open systems, a program must also commit 
to one or more standards early in development and, therefore, bear significant standards 
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obsolescence risk if and as standards evolve away from the needs of the program and as 
integration problems increase. Evolutionary acquisition’s need for integration across 
multiple development blocks can increase the impact of open systems on 
obsolescence risk. Adding open systems to evolutionary acquisition may cause 
programs to trade away design risk for increased integration risk.  
Conclusions 
The current work has extended and expanded the descriptions of the impacts of 
using open systems and evolutionary acquisition together on development processes and 
management. We then mapped those impacts into a computer simulation model and used 
that model to investigate how open systems and evolutionary acquisition interact. Results 
include that the changes required to implement open systems in evolutionary acquisition 
significantly impact development processes and management, particularly scopes of design, 
standards, and integration work, the generation of different types of problems, and the 
timing of the discovery of problems. The shift from a focus on design to a focus on 
integration was found to be particularly important. Simulation reinforced the potential for 
open systems to accelerate acquisition and revealed a potentially important distinction 
between design and integration errors in explaining the impacts of required changes. 
Implications for practice included shifts in the type and timing of risks due to open systems 
use and the possibility of trading design obsolescence for integration obsolescence (e.g., 
compatibility).  
This research has contributed to the understanding of open systems and 
evolutionary acquisition is several ways. The work improved the description and 
specification of impacts of acquisition policy on acquisition practice. The work also used 
dynamic computer simulation to model and investigate open systems and to model 
evolutionary acquisition and open systems together, both for the first time to our knowledge. 
The results of the simulation reinforced several suggested impacts of open systems and 
provided additional causal rationale behind why suggested impacts may occur. These 
rationales were the basis of potential implications for the evolutionary acquisition practice 
with open systems. The reasoning provided based on the computer simulation can be used 
to extend and deepen decision-makers’ understanding of open systems and evolutionary 
acquisition and design program processes and management.   
Future researchers can improve and extend the work described here by gathering 
additional data about the use of open systems with evolutionary acquisition in practice and, 
in so doing, testing the existence and importance of suggested impacts. The similarity of the 
model and, thereby, confidence in results can be improved by using additional acquisition 
projects that use both evolutionary acquisition and open systems.2 Finally, additional 
recommendations for practice can be developed based upon the model developed here and 
elsewhere. These investigations can further develop the understanding of how to effectively 
integrate open systems and evolutionary acquisition and, consequently, improve the 
systems and products provided to warfighters.  
                                                
2 The authors are currently working with a large navy acquisition project to do this.  
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Appendix A. Mapping Specific Influences of Open Systems 
onto Evolutionary Acquisition Programs Processes  
The researchers estimated the impact of each specific, identified and described 
influence on the scope of work, rework fraction, and quality assurance (QA) effectiveness. 
They measured the scope of work by the number of equal-sized work packages that must 
be completed in a development phase. They measured the rework fraction by the percent of 
those work packages that require changes; this measurement reflects the number of 
problems that are created in a development phase. They measured the QA effectiveness 
with the fraction of the work packages discovered to need rework. Although no known data 
is available as a basis for the estimated changes, order of magnitude estimates that are in a 
reasonable rank order of size are adequate because of the preliminary nature of the study. 
To facilitate mapping of the specific influences above to model changes, the researchers 
listed the specific influences after the individual impacts on each model parameter.  
Table 4.  Detailed Estimated of Changes in Evolutionary Acquisition Processes 
to Reflect Open Systems 
Program Block and 
Phase Scope of Work 
Rework 
Fraction QA Effectiveness 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 1    
   Requirements +1+1+5 (1,4,10) 0 0
   Develop Techn.  
+1+1+1-20 
+1+1(1,2,3,5,8,9) 0 -5 -5 (7a,7b)
   Advanced Dev.  +1-20 +1+1 (4,5,8,9) -10 +5(5,6) -5 -5 (7a,7b)
   Manufacturing +1 +1(4,9) +5 (6) +10 -5 (7a,7b)
   Testing by User +1 (4) 0 -5 (7b) 
Net Change in Base Case -22 0 -20
  
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 2  
   Requirements +1 (4) 0 0
   Develop Techn.  +1+1 -20+1+1 (3,4,5,8,9) 0 -5 (7a)
   Advanced Dev.  +1-20 +1+1 (4,5,8,9) -10 +5 +5(5,6,8) -5 (7a)
   Manufacturing +1 +1(4,9) +5 +5 (6,8) +10 (7a)
   Testing by User +1 (4) 0 0
Net Change in Base Case 29 10 0
  
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 3  
   Requirements +1 (4) 0 0
   Develop Techn.  +1+1-20+1+1 (3,4,5,8,9) 0 -5 +5 (7a,7b)
   Advanced Dev.  +1-20+1 +1(4,5,8,9) -10 +5+10 (5,6,8) -5 +5 (7a,7b)
   Manufacturing +1+1 (4,9) +5 +10 (6,8) +10 +5 (7a,7b)
   Testing by User +1 (4) 0 +5 (7b)
Net Change in Base Case  29 20 20
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Evolutionary acquisition holds the potential to improve both the cost of defense 
acquisition and the performance of acquired systems.  Traditional acquisition programs 
tend to employ promising, yet immature, technologies and develop them within the 
program.  Because immature technologies are inherently risky, unforeseen obstacles to 
development can lead to substantial cost overruns and schedule delays. This results in 
infrequent, but large, increments of deployed capability.  In contrast, evolutionary 
acquisition employs more mature, less-risky technologies.  This results in more frequent, 
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smaller increments of deployed capability.  In theory, evolutionary acquisition could be 
more cost effective than traditional acquisition approaches because it avoids most of the 
risk inherent to technology development.  However, there is a latent issue regarding 
evolutionary acquisition. If technology is not matured within a program, it must be 
matured somewhere else.  For critical, DoD-specific technologies, this cost must 
logically fall on the DoD itself.  The question, then, is whether it is more cost effective to 
mature technologies within the R&D system or within an acquisition program?  A 
simulation of the defense acquisition system is developed to address this question. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past several years, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has 
been attempting to transform itself from an organization designed to meet the Cold War 
threat of the Soviet Union to a more flexible, adaptable organization that is ready to meet 
the regional and asymmetric threats the US expects to face in the coming years.  To 
facilitate this transformation, several modifications have been made to the defense 
acquisition system—the most important being the shift to evolutionary acquisition. 
Evolutionary acquisition is an attempt to address one of the most common 
criticisms of the defense acquisition system.  Traditional acquisition programs attempt 
large, revolutionary leaps in system capability through the use of immature and risky 
technology.  Not only does immature technology often require more time and money to 
develop, but it also introduces uncertainty that may lead to significant delays and cost 
overruns.  Consequently, warfighters must often make due with increasingly obsolete 
equipment during the long intervals between new system deployments, and there is little 
flexibility to adapt to emerging threats and exploit technology opportunities. 
Evolutionary acquisition, on the other hand, attempts to set more modest 
capability goals for each acquisition.  The idea is to use more mature, and hence, less-
risky technology, in order to shorten acquisition cycle-times.  Thus, each acquisition 
cycle under evolutionary acquisition should be shorter and cost less than more 
traditional programs.  As a result, warfighters should receive more frequent upgrades to 
their equipment and, thus, should be at less risk of going to war with obsolete hardware. 
Despite the apparent motivation to implement evolutionary acquisition and 
committing the approach to policy, it would seem that the DoD has had limited success 
in doing so (Lorell, Lowell & Younossi, 2006).  In fact, the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has suggested that DoD reforms have not gone far enough (GAO 2003; 
2006, September; 2006, April; 2007a). They advocate adapting commercial best 
practices regarding technology and product development to the defense acquisition 
system.  Among these are a centralized portfolio approach to managing new systems 
and technologies, a staged knowledge-based approach to both acquisition and 
technology development, strict enforcement of technology maturity requirements, and a 
more evolutionary approach to new system development. 
Since these reforms are derived from the commercial world, the obvious question 
is whether they will translate well to a government context.  The defense acquisition 
system differs from a commercial product development process in several respects. In 
particular, the government essentially serves as a technology developer, system 
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developer, customer, and user.  Furthermore, the DoD and a few allies are really the 
only customers for the systems and technologies developed within the defense 
acquisition system.  Thus, there is a more limited capacity to purchase multiple 
evolutionary iterations of a system than there would be with a consumer product.  
Consequently, the pertinent question is, if evolutionary acquisition were fully 
implemented, would there be any tangible benefit for the Department of Defense?  Since 
evolutionary acquisition is inseparable from technology policy, the objective of this paper 
is to consider the implications of an evolutionary technology policy on the cost and 
performance of the defense acquisition system. 
As a first step to better understanding the system level trade-offs of technology 
policy on acquisition, the work presented in this paper attempts to model the basic 
“physics” of the acquisition system, in particular, the relationship between the R&D 
process and the acquisition lifecycle.  The purpose is to gain insight into the most 
fundamental system-level influences on the efficacy of acquisition policies.  To that end, 
an idealized view of the acquisition system is adopted to which complicating factors may 
be subsequently added to test their effects.  The acquisition model was implemented as 
a discrete event simulation with the key decision variable being the maturity level at 
which a technology moves from R&D to an acquisition effort.  Extensive sensitivity 
analyses were performed and several insights into the impact of technology policy on 
acquisition were generated.  The most important output of this effort, however, is an 
informed set of future research directions that will facilitate more definitive answers to 
major policy questions regarding evolutionary acquisition.  What follows is a summary of 
key findings.  For a more detailed discussion of the analysis approach and results see 
Pennock (2008). 
2. Background 
As was mentioned previously, evolutionary acquisition is an attempt to reduce 
acquisition cycle-times by setting capability goals that are more modest than is typical of 
a traditional program.  This allows programs to utilize more mature technology and, 
hence, reduce the amount of technology risk.  In theory, this should reduce cost, 
schedule, and performance uncertainty.  The hope is that it will lead to less-expensive 
acquisition programs that proceed more quickly. Consequently, warfighters would 
receive up-to-date equipment more frequently and at lower cost. 
The motivating issue behind evolutionary acquisition is cycle-time. In theory, 
shorter cycles mean that each is less expensive and new technologies can be moved 
into the field faster to meet emerging warfighter needs.  The driving issue, then, is how 
big of a leap in capability should one attempt during each acquisition cycle?  Of course, 
the risk associated with the size of the leap is linked to the maturity of the required 
technology.  Thus, evolutionary acquisition is really all about technology policy because 
with a large enough leap, evolutionary becomes revolutionary. 
So where does the DoD's approach to evolutionary acquisition come in?  A key 
issue is that the DoD does not manage technology or “product” portfolios in the same 
manner as a large commercial enterprise.  In part, this is due the public nature of the 
defense enterprise.  Even so, the GAO asserts that the DoD should adopt additional 
commercial best practices regarding the centralized management of its acquisition and 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 109 - 
=
=
technology portfolios and the management of technology transitions from R&D to 
acquisition programs (GAO, 2006, September; 2007a).  Under the current system, there 
is often a funding gap in technology development.  Early-stage technologies are funded 
through the R&D system (or S&T as it is known in the DoD), and late-stage technologies 
are often funded in support of a particular acquisition effort.  It is technologies in the 
middle stages of maturation that are often left without obvious ownership and hence 
funding.  Consequently, if certain technologies are required by an acquisition effort, their 
development through the middle stages must be funded in support of the development of 
a particular system. This requires early commitment to a technology when its final 
realization is still uncertain.  In the past, this has often led to disappointment as 
technologies took longer to develop and did not perform as well as expected.  In fact, a 
recent National Research Council report suggests that concept decisions made prior to 
Milestone A determine 70-75% of lifecycle costs (NRC, 2008).  Early commitment to 
system concepts that depend on immature technologies sacrifices flexibility and may 
lead to costly rework.  
Theoretically, if the DoD adopted the commercial new product model that the 
GAO suggests (GAO, 2006, September; 2007a), it would allow the DoD greater flexibility 
in how to select and mature technologies for development in anticipation of future 
acquisition program needs.  In essence, it would lead to the creation of additional 
technology options.  This would reduce the burden and risks of technology development 
on acquisition programs since they could choose from a portfolio of mature technologies. 
So in the end, the two fundamental questions of evolutionary acquisition are how 
mature should technologies be when they are transitioned from R&D to acquisition 
efforts, and what is the best approach to mature them?  All else being equal, this 
essentially determines the acquisition cycle-time as well as the size of the capability 
improvement for each cycle.  Ultimately, the answer will hinge on factors such as the 
cost of technology maturation, the rate of learning from fielded systems, and the 
overhead cost associated with an acquisition cycle. 
3. Model Setup 
The motivation behind the structure of the model is to represent the set of 
commercial best practices recommended by the GAO for implementation in the context 
of the defense acquisition system.  This includes both a staged, centrally managed 
technology development process as well a strictly enforced acquisition program lifecycle. 
Given the staged nature of both R&D and acquisition, discrete event simulation was the 
logical choice to capture the behavior of the system. As was mentioned previously, the 
representation of the defense acquisition system presented here is intentionally scaled-
down and idealized.  The benefit of an idealized model is two-fold. First, the scaled-down 
representation is more tractable and allows us to attempt multiple experimental 
excursions.  Second, it allows us to consider the structural impacts of technology policy 
unobscured by the inconsistent implementation that occurs in the actual defense 
acquisition system.  In particular, the modeling emphasis was on the linkage between 
the movement of technologies through the R&D process to the length and cost of the 
acquisition cycles.  In order to represent the impact of technology policy on defense 
acquisition, there were three key features of the system that required consideration: the 
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movement of technologies through the R&D system, the movement of programs through 
the acquisition process, and the rate of technological progression. 
The simulation was implemented using the Arena 10.0 software package and 
consists of three major components: the technology development process model, the 
system acquisition process model, and the technical progress model.  The technology 
development process model describes how technologies with potential defense 
application are matured through the defense R&D system.  This process provides a 
portfolio of technologies for use by acquisition programs.  The system acquisition 
process model describes the lifecycle of a defense acquisition program from concept 
development to deployment.  Finally, the technical progress model describes how the 
capabilities provided by technologies improve over time. 
3.1  Technology Development Process Model 
The technology development process model simulates the movement of 
individual technologies through a maturation process. Ideally, a technology development 
process is centrally managed and staged.  Technologies are selected for development 
based on their potential applicability to future products. In the commercial world, product 
and technology roadmaps drive development.  These roadmaps, and the organization's 
commitment to them, provide a shared vision that the DoD often lacks. However, 
developing the technologies to satisfy the roadmap entails a certain amount of risk.  In 
order to mitigate that risk, each technology must pass through a series of stage-gates.  
Each gate provides an opportunity to evaluate the status of a technology and determine 
whether it should continue to receive funding.  Such a system facilitates prioritization of 
technology projects as well as risk mitigation.  It is important to note that the Department 
of Defense has not consistently implemented such a system (GAO, 2006, September).  
Instead, there are a number of different organizations throughout the DoD that perform 
or fund R&D work, each with its own way of managing technology projects.  These 
inconsistencies preclude the effective management of technology development and 
promote duplication and mismatch between the technology supplied by R&D 
organizations and the technology demanded by acquisition programs. Consequently, for 
this study, the technology development process was modeled in the spirit of the GAO's 
recommendation of a centrally-managed and staged technology development process. 
The process starts when new but immature technologies arrive for evaluation.  
The arriving technologies are prioritized and then funded until the budget is expended.  
Rejected technologies are considered for funding in future rounds, and successfully 
matured technologies move on to the next stage. The sequence repeats until each 
technology is either successfully matured or discarded.  The maturity of each technology 
is measured by the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale.  The purpose of a 
properly functioning technology development process is to prioritize and fund these 
technologies by potential cost and benefit.  The process used in this simulation is 
represented in Figure 1. For more information see Pennock (2008). 
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Figure 1. The Technology Development Process Model 
3.2  System Acquisition Process Model 
The system acquisition process model describes the lifecycle of a defense 
acquisition program. It is based on the five-stage Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework (DoD, 2006).  As with the technology development process model described 
above, the acquisition process model in the simulation will assume that acquisition 
programs follow the rules, and, consequently, programs will move through each phase in 
order with no concurrency. 
Within the simulation model, the basic unit in the system acquisition process is a 
program to acquire a system. It is assumed that the DoD has several types of systems. 
Each type is continuously cycling through the acquisition process.  For example, if the 
Air Force deploys a new air superiority fighter, it is assumed that it will begin concept 
development of its replacement shortly thereafter.  This assumption will be relaxed later. 
Each type of system is dependent upon several technologies, each from a 
different application area. For example, an air superiority fighter might require a 
propulsion technology, a sensor technology, and an avionics technology.  The 
acquisition process model used in the simulation is illustrated in Figure 2. For more 
information see Pennock (2008). 
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Note: Operations and Support was considered outside the scope of this simulation. 
Figure 2. The System Acquisition Process Model 
 
Ultimately, the purpose of acquiring a system is to provide military capabilities.  It 
is assumed that each system deployed provides a capability.  Capability in the model is 
an abstract representation of military utility.  It is assumed that there is a synergistic 
effect between the technologies employed in the system: the system being greater than 
the sum of its parts.  Thus, a multiplicative model is used to represent capability. The 
capability of a deployed system is the product of the performance levels for each of its 
required technologies. Thus, an air superiority fighter without a propulsion system is 
useless no matter how capable its sensor is.  This measure of capability allows us to 
determine the cost effectiveness of a particular technology policy. 
3.3  Technical Progress Model 
The final key feature of the simulation is the model of technical progress.  Where 
do new, more capable technologies come from?  It is important to note that the 
technology development model in this simulation does not consider basic research.  In 
fact, TRL 1 signifies the transition of ideas, concepts, and technologies from basic 
research to applied research.  Thus, we can assume that there is a certain amount of 
research occurring exogenous to the simulation. This research may come from 
government or commercial sources.  The key is that there is a constant inflow of new 
technologies and that their performance improves over time. The purpose of the 
technology development process is to adapt these technologies for use in a military 
system.  There is one caveat, however, and that is that a purely exogenous technical 
progress model neglects the learning that inevitably occurs from fielding systems.  For 
example, valuable information gathered from field use of a jet engine will likely inform the 
development of the next generation jet engine.  Thus, there is a learning effect, and the 
more rapidly systems are fielded, the sooner subsequent learning will be available for 
future technologies.  This is especially true for military-specific technologies in which the 
only source of user feedback is the military itself. 
Consequently, the technical progress model in this simulation attempts to model 
both these features. To do so, a hybrid model was created. First, there is a baseline 
technology coefficient for each application area.  Whenever a technology is fielded, the 
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coefficient is multiplied by a learning factor (e.g., 1.1).  This captures the learning from 
implementation. Second, there is an exponential growth model for each application area.  
This represents the learning from exogenous R&D activities. The two are multiplied 
together to determine the current technology level and are represented by the equation 
gtCe  
where C is the technology coefficient and g is the exogenous growth rate. 
Arriving technologies are assigned a performance as a random variation on this value. 
The parameters of this model can be adjusted to accommodate the specific situation of 
each application area. For example, technologies that are used commercially may have 
a high exogenous growth rate and low learning factor because their progress would 
continue regardless of military use.  The reverse may be true for military-specific 
technologies since there would be little learning from commercial use. 
4. Experimental Design 
4.1  Simulation Parameters 
As previously mentioned, the DoD has been relatively inconsistent in its 
implementation of its own policies, and evolutionary policies—in particular—are fairly 
new.  Consequently, using historical data to set simulation parameters is particularly 
problematic.  In fact, a RAND study to assess cost growth in weapon system programs 
found a number of issues in the available cost data for defense acquisition programs 
(Arena, Leonard, Murray & Younossi, 2006).  Some of these issues include significant 
aggregation of data, baseline changes, changes in reporting guidelines, and incomplete 
data.  The situation is worse for technology maturation.  As indicated by the GAO, the 
DoD does not systematically track its technology development efforts (GAO, 2006, 
September).  Furthermore, the introduction of TRL levels to the DoD is fairly recent, so 
there is little experience with their application in a DoD context.  Since NASA has been 
using the TRL scale for some time, it would seemingly be a logical source of information 
regarding the cost and risk associated with maturing technologies through TRL levels.  
Unfortunately, a 2005 study at NASA to determine the cost and risk found that poor 
record keeping resulted in insufficient useful data to achieve statistically significant 
results (Kirn, 2005). 
Fortunately, the aim of this study is not to precisely recreate the defense 
acquisition system as it is but to identify policy directions to determine how it should be.  
This, in combination with extensive sensitivity analysis, allows for a more reasonable 
margin of error in setting the simulation parameters.  Consequently, the actual values 
used in the experiments are an amalgamation from several sources, including reports 
and studies from both government and commercial sources (Bodner & Rouse, 2007; 
DoD, 2007 April; DoD, 2007 August; Fox, 1988; GAO, 2007b; Kirn, 2005; Stevens & 
Burley, 1997). 
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4.2  Basic Experiment 
In order to answer the research questions posed in this paper, three cases were 
developed.  The three cases are variations on the key experimental variables, the Min 
TRL and the Fallback TRL.  The Min TRL is the minimum maturity requirement for a 
technology used in an acquisition program, and the Fallback TRL is the minimum 
maturity selected when the first choice technology fails. The cases are as follows: 
• Base Case—The base case most closely resembles the current modus operandi of 
the defense acquisition system.  Technologies are selected at mid-TRL levels and 
final maturation occurs during the technology development phase of an acquisition 
effort.  High performing, but immature technologies are preferred over more mature, 
proven technologies.  If a technology fails, however, the program will fall back to a 
more mature technology. 
o Min TRL = 4 
o Fallback TRL = 7 
• Evolutionary Acquisition—In this case, programs may only use fully mature 
technology. Maturation of technology is funded in the R&D system, and there is 
effectively no technology development phase. (Note that TRL 7 was chosen here 
because TRL levels 8 and 9 are system specific.) 
o Min TRL = 7 
• Revolutionary Acquisition—Programs target maximum performance at all costs 
and, thus, always choose the technologies with the highest expected performance.  
When a technology fails, another top performer is selected in its place. 
o Min TRL = 4 
o Fallback TRL = 4 
 
There are several outputs of interest.  These are the cost of operating the entire 
acquisition system, the cost of an individual program, the annual capability growth rate, 
and the acquisition program length.  Of course, we are interested in the long-run 
behavior of these outputs.  Consequently, to perform the experiments, the simulation 
was run for a warm-up period in order to fully populate the technology portfolio, and then 
statistics were collected on the outputs of interest. 
In particular, each simulation was run for a warm-up period of 50 years and then 
statistics were collected for another 150 years.  There are 40 replications for each 
experimental case.  As for the acquisition programs, there are three system types each 
requiring three technologies.  Each of those technologies falls into one of six application 
areas. It was assumed that the three acquisition programs are homogenous in terms of 
cost and schedule risk, and it was also assumed that the application areas are 
homogeneous in terms of cost, schedule, and technical risk.  The budget for the 
technology development process was set to $3 billion, and was allocated among the six 
stages so as to ensure a smooth flow of technologies through the system.  It was also 
assumed that all of the stages are of equal length. This is simply to focus on the 
technical risk for the basic experiment.  Finally, the technical progress model is identical 
for all six application areas and features a mix of exogenous technical progression and 
learning. 
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4.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
The simulation developed is quite flexible and many different scenarios can be 
analyzed. A first order sensitivity analysis was performed, and the results are presented 
in Pennock (2008).  It was found that the simulation outputs were particularly sensitive to 
five factors: the R&D budget size, the R&D budget distribution, the rate of technical 
learning, the technology development stage length, and production costs.  The impact of 
the size of the R&D budget was examined by leaving the percent allocated per stage the 
same but varying the aggregate amount over the range of -50% to +50%.  The budget 
distribution was analyzed by reducing the budget for stages 4, 5, and 6.  This particular 
scenario was designed to represent the status quo of the defense technology 
development process.  To understand the influence of the rate of technical learning, the 
learning factor from the technical progress model was varied between 1 (no learning) 
and 2.  In the basic experiment, all technology development stages are one year in 
length.  To understand the impact of stage length, the scenarios were run with stage 
lengths of two years and three years.  Finally, the influence of production costs was 
analyzed by varying the cost rate from -100% to +100% of the baseline value. 
5. Results and Analysis 
5.1  Results of the Basic Experiment 
First, we will consider the results of the basic experiment.  The average values of 
each of the output statistics are displayed in Table 1.  Note that for compactness, system 
specific outputs are only shown for system 1. The results are similar for the other two 
systems.  The most obvious question is how do these program outputs compare to real 
acquisition programs?  As far as program duration, the distributional parameters for 
concept development, system development, and production were derived from Fox 
(1988, p. 29). with an average program duration of 15 years.  We see from Table 1 that 
the base case has an average duration of 14 years, which is fairly close.  As for cost, 
Fox does not provide cost data, but a recent GAO report provides the cost and schedule 
performance of 62 current weapons system programs (GAO, 2007b).  An analysis of 
these data reveals that the average program cost is approximately $16 billion.  An 
important caveat is that these data cover a wide range of programs.  Some are small 
upgrade programs that are short and inexpensive while others are major system of 
systems acquisitions that will take 30 years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars.  
Even so, we can see from Table 1 that the average program cost for the base case is 
approximately $16 billion.  Thus, we can say that the simulation outputs are within the 
right order of magnitude for an “average” acquisition program. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 116 - 
=
=
Table 1. The Average Output Values over 40 Repetitions for the Scenarios  
of the Basic Experiment 
Output Base Case Evolutionary Revolutionary
Total Acquisition System 
Operating Cost
($ million, annualized)











In order to understand these results fully, we will address each of the four outputs 
in turn.  Figure 3a depicts the 95% confidence intervals for the average annual cost to 
operate the acquisition system. Clearly, evolutionary acquisition is the most expensive 
and revolutionary acquisition is the least expensive. If the technology policy is less 
aggressive with evolutionary acquisition, why would it be more expensive? To better 
understand this outcome, let us consider the average cost of the individual programs. 
Figure 3b shows the confidence intervals for the average program cost to acquire 
a system of type 1. Here we see that the average program cost is actually lower with 
evolutionary acquisition than revolutionary acquisition. So as evolutionary acquisition 
supporters suggest, using mature technology must lower program cost. Then why does 
the acquisition system cost more to operate under evolutionary acquisition? 
The answer is revealed when we examine the average program duration or 
cycle-time.  In Figure 3c, we see that the program length is much shorter with 
evolutionary acquisition. With a shorter cycle-time, acquisitions happen more frequently. 
Each cycle imposes overhead costs including system development, production, and 
deployment costs. Since these overhead costs are far greater than any savings that 
would result from more efficient management of the technology portfolio, the overall cost 
rises. 
But does the additional cost of evolutionary acquisition buy the DoD anything?  
Figure 3d reveals that evolutionary acquisition results in a superior annual capability 
growth rate.  The annual capability growth rate is the “average” annual rate of capability 
improvement. Much like an interest rate, even small differences in the rate can result in a 
huge difference in the level of deployed capability over the long-run. Thus, we see that 
there is a cost/performance trade-off governed by the technology maturity requirement.  
Allowing less-mature technology hurts system performance because it takes longer to 
move technologies into the field, but since it incurs large production costs less often, it is 
also less expensive. Strictly enforcing maturity requirements, on the other hand, means 
shorter, less-expensive programs that achieve high performance by moving technologies 
into the field more quickly.  Unfortunately, this incurs production costs more frequently 
and results in increased operating costs for the acquisition system as a whole. 
In fact, by varying the technology policy we can move along a roughly linear 
frontier of cost/performance combinations. Figure 4 shows the cost and performance for 
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all possible technology polices such that 1 ≤ Min TRL ≤ 7 and Fallback TRL ≥ Min TRL.  
At first, this result would seem to suggest that technology policy should not be strictly 
enforced as budgetary restrictions would force changes in technology policy to meet cost 
goals.  Fortunately, this is not the case. 
In order to maintain a consistent, evolutionary technology policy but retain the 
ability to trade performance for cost, all that is required is to insert a delay between 
acquisition cycles.  Figure 5 depicts the cost/performance combinations for the 
evolutionary policy with inter-cycle delays ranging from 0 to 7 years.  Also shown is the 
linear trend line from Figure 4.  Clearly, the introduction of a delay allows the 
evolutionary policy to replicate the cost/performance combinations achieved through 
shifts in technology policy.  Thus, for any given cost target, an efficient policy can be 
found by imposing the evolutionary maturity requirements in combination with the 
appropriate inter-acquisition cycle delay. 
5.2  Sensitivity Results 
The previous section presented the results of the basic experiment, but there 
remains a question of robustness.  How stable are results?  Are there any cases in 
which the evolutionary policy is not the best performing?   While five scenarios were 
described in Section 4.3 above, due to space constraints only two will be presented 
here.  For the remainder see Pennock (2008). 
First, we consider the distribution of the R&D budget among the stages.  In 
particular, this scenario is designed to represent a situation that is often referred to as 
crossing the chasm.  Crossing the chasm describes the difficulty that technology 
development efforts often encounter in moving through the middle stages of technology 
maturation because of a scarcity of funding.  To simulate this scenario, funding for 
stages 4, 5, and 6 was varied over a range of 25% to 100% of the baseline value.  
Figure 6 reveals that the best policy from a performance standpoint is quite sensitive to 
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Figure 4. Cost/Performance Trade-off for All Possible Technology Policies with a 
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Figure 5. Cost/Performance Trade-off Replicated through the Evolutionary Policy with 
an Inter-cycle Delay 
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Figure 6. Capability Growth Rate when Middle-stage R&D Funding Is Cut 
 
As we would expect, the evolutionary policy is the most sensitive since it is 
dependent upon a constant supply of mature technologies.  On the opposite end, the 
revolutionary policy is the most robust since it can provide its own middle-stage funding, and 
once again, the base case falls in between.  Given the varied rates of performance decay 
among the three policies, there are domains in which each is dominant.  When R&D is well 
funded, the evolutionary policy provides superior performance.  As middle-stage funding is 
reduced by more than 25%, the performance of the base case policy begins to exceed the 
performance of the evolutionary policy.  As funding declines further, the revolutionary policy 
becomes the top performing policy. 
Of all of the scenarios presented in this paper, the crossing the chasm scenario is 
probably the most similar to business as usual at the DoD.  Typically, S&T funding covers 
early-stage technology development, but once technologies reach the middle stages, the 
only readily available source of funding is through an acquisition effort.  The base case 
policy is also fairly similar to the risk mitigation strategy that many acquisition programs use: 
try to utilize the most promising technology, but if that fails, fall back to the existing, mature 
technology.  Thus, it would seem that given the circumstances that most acquisition 
programs operate under, the business as usual policy is quite rational.  Of course, it should 
be pointed out that all of the acquisition policies perform better when middle-stage R&D is 
well funded. 
The final scenario represents the impact of production costs on the affordability of 
evolutionary acquisition.  The production cost rate was varied from zero to $8 billion per 
year.  Figure 7 reveals that as procurement cost increases, the spread between the 
operating costs of the three policies increases.  The shorter the acquisition cycle, the more 
frequently production costs are incurred and, consequently, the greater the impact of an 
increase in production costs.  Conversely, the lower production costs are, the more cost 
effective evolutionary acquisition becomes. 
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Figure 7. The Annual Acquisition System Operating Cost as a Function of the 
Production Cost Rate 
6. Discussion 
The production cost scenario raises several issues regarding evolutionary 
acquisition.  Clearly, the more expensive it is to produce and deploy the next iteration of a 
system, the less affordable evolutionary acquisition becomes.  But, of course, that is 
dependent upon the nature of the system under consideration, and this is a key difference 
between evolutionary practices in a commercial setting versus a defense setting.  A 
commercial firm does not purchase its own product.  In fact, if we take the example of a car 
manufacturer—there is always a substantial portion of the customer base that is looking to 
buy a new car.  Thus, the car manufacturer is going to build and sell cars continuously. The 
costs of upgrading a model might include the costs of any technology development, the cost 
of changing the design, and the cost of any retooling that must be done at production 
facilities.  If the manufacturer is particularly successful, it may gain market share from its 
competitors, and thus, the investment pays for itself.  Consequently, a commercial firm can 
actually make more money from cycling faster and using an evolutionary approach.  When 
the DoD would like to buy a new weapon system, it must pay for all of the same 
development costs and purchase the product.  Furthermore, if through more rapid 
acquisition cycles the DoD improves the performance growth rate of its systems, it may 
outperform its adversaries, but it does not generate a monetary return to help fund the faster 
pace of system development. 
Thus, the cost of evolutionary acquisition is critically dependent upon the length and 
cost of stages in the system acquisition lifecycle.  The simulation model presented in this 
paper was generic in the sense that it assumed that something was acquired in each cycle, 
but it did not differentiate between a new system design or a product upgrade.  
Representing either case could be achieved by simply changing the cost and duration 
parameters in the model.  The key outcome of the evolutionary policy was that simply 
employing mature technology shortened the acquisition cycle and reduced the cost of each 
cycle. In the examples above, however, the decline in cycle costs from more efficient 
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technology development alone was not sufficient to compensate for the increase in the cycle 
rate.  Thus, total acquisition costs rose with evolutionary acquisition. Some have suggested, 
however, that the length and cost of other phases of the acquisition lifecycle would decline 
under evolutionary acquisition as well. The idea is that if acquisition programs are less 
ambitious and shorter, development will be easier and there will be fewer problems with 
unstable funding.  Thus, we should expect lower system development and procurement 
costs as well.  Consequently, the question becomes, if the costs of system development and 
production decline under evolutionary acquisition, does evolutionary acquisition then 
become less expensive than more traditional methods? 
To consider this question let us develop a very simple model for the cost of operating 
the defense acquisition system. First, we define the following symbols: 
• rij ≡ the acquisition cycle rate for system i under policy j in cycles per year. 
• Cij ≡ the cost per acquisition cycle for system i under policy j. 
• Kj ≡ the total cost per year for operating the defense R&D system under policy j. 
• Aj ≡ the annual cost of operating the defense acquisition system under policy j. 
 




ijijj KCrA += ∑
=1
 
where n is the number of systems begin acquired.  Thus, if policy e represents 
evolutionary acquisition and policy t represents traditional acquisition, then evolutionary 
acquisition would be less expensive if Ae < At.  For the moment, let us assume that all 
systems being acquired have identical cost and cycle rates. This leaves us with the 
relationship 
.ttteee KCnrKCnr +<+  
Furthermore, if we assume that we keep our R&D budget fixed we can simplify even 









C <  
Of course, since the rate of acquisition is slower under the traditional acquisition 
policy, the right-hand side will be strictly less than one.  This implies that a simple decline in 
program costs from evolutionary acquisition is not sufficient to reduce the total cost to 
operate the acquisition system.  Instead, program costs must decline sufficiently to offset the 
increase in the rate of acquisition. 
To better illustrate this point, imagine that acquisition cycles were weekly and cost 
$10.  The operating cost would be $10 per week.  Now let us assume that we institute a new 
policy that reduces cycle costs to $8 per cycle, but the cycles now occur twice as fast.  That 
means that under the new policy, the operating cost would be $16 per week.  Thus, even 
though the cost per cycle decreased, the total cost increased. 
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When we consider defense acquisition cycles, if the system development and 
procurement costs also drop under evolutionary acquisition, it might seem to suggest that 
we could overcome this deficit.  If, however, the durations of system development and 
technology development also decrease, then the equivalent cost threshold becomes even 
more difficult to reach.  Furthermore, if we consider spiral development when there are 
several short, overlapping cycles, we see that we would require fairly low development, 
production, and deployment costs to compensate for the speed of the cycles. 
Thus, the critical question becomes, how does evolutionary acquisition affect the 
length and cost of development and procurement activities versus a traditional single-step to 
capability approach?  This is not a trivial question, and the answer will likely depend on the 
type of system being acquired.  Upgrades to complex, integrated systems can lead to 
substantial design modifications to accommodate even seemingly simple changes and using 
more mature technologies does not correlate to easier integration (Smaling & de Weck, 
2007). In fact, experiences at Westland Helicopters indicate that even when a system such 
as a military helicopter is designed with modularity and upgradeability in mind, changes can 
unexpectedly propagate through large portions of the system design (Clarkson, Simons & 
Eckert, 2004; Eckert, Clarkson & Zanker, 2004). At the other end of the spectrum, systems 
with very loose coupling between system components may be quite amenable to rapid 
upgrade and change.  Perhaps the most extreme example of this type of system is the 
Internet, in which the system architecture changes continuously without any supervision or 
control. 
Thus, this issue merits substantial additional research and is really the determining 
factor regarding evolutionary acquisition's potential for cost savings.  This is not to suggest 
that if the costs of acquiring a particular system type do not decline under evolutionary 
acquisition that the approach is useless.  The results of this study suggest that evolutionary 
acquisition delivers other benefits such as a boost in the capability of systems actually 
deployed in the field. Instead, it simply means that additional capability will continue to come 
at additional cost.  Consequently, cost and performance may be traded off by simply, 
appropriately spacing acquisition cycles. 
7. Conclusions and Further Research 
The results from this simulation study lead to some highly suggestive findings and 
critical avenues for future research.  First and foremost, with a first-order representation of 
the acquisition system, the results suggest that the adoption of evolutionary acquisition 
policies has the potential to improve the performance of deployed systems. However, lower 
operating costs for the defense acquisition system are not automatic.  While each individual 
program should be less expensive under evolutionary acquisition policies, the faster 
acquisition cycle-time means that development, production, and deployment costs are 
incurred more frequently. This may overwhelm any cost savings from managing technology 
development more efficiently.  As discussed in Section 6, these cycle costs must decline 
sufficiently under evolutionary acquisition to achieve net cost savings.  Thus, depending on 
the type of system being acquired, evolutionary acquisition may actually be more expensive 
than traditional means of acquiring military systems.  This is a critical issue for future 
research.  However, this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of traditional 
acquisition methods.  Instead, acquisition cycle-time can be used to control the costs of an 
evolutionary policy without reverting to a traditional approach that employs immature 
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technology.  A requirement for mature technologies can be consistently imposed with the 
next acquisition cycle beginning only when it is affordable. 
There are some important caveats on this conclusion, however.  First, the above 
results are more significant for military-specific technologies than commercial technologies.  
Commercial technologies will continue to develop and improve regardless of the actions of 
the DoD because the DoD is actually a small player in the market.  One example is 
microprocessor technology.  On the Comanche helicopter program, the mission processing 
technology was changed three times because Intel introduced newer processor models 
faster than the DoD could develop an advanced combat helicopter (Rogers & Birmingham, 
2004).  For military-specific technologies, however, forward progress is dependent upon 
actually testing and fielding a technology and gathering user feedback.  Thus, the faster 
acquisition cycles are, the faster learning can be incorporated into new technologies under 
development.  Of course, faster acquisition cycles also mean that exogenously developed 
commercial technologies can also be moved into the field faster. 
Second, evolutionary acquisition policies do not function well when the R&D process 
is underfunded.  Evolutionary acquisition depends on a steady stream of mature 
technologies.  When the research pipeline is “starved,” not only does the performance of 
deployed systems decline on average, but it also becomes more unpredictable. More 
traditional acquisition methods mitigate this risk by using an acquisition effort to secure 
funding for technology development. 
Third, the underfunding of middle-stage technologies, as is typical for government 
technology development (Cornford & Sarsfield, 2004), also adversely impacts evolutionary 
acquisition policies.  Under these circumstances, traditional approaches to acquisition are 
actually superior to evolutionary methods since they mitigate the risk of technologies failing 
to cross the chasm. Thus, it would seem that business as usual is quite reasonable under 
the current funding environment for military R&D activities.  Though, it is important to point 
out that traditional acquisition policies under this scenario still underperform evolutionary 
policies when R&D is fully funded. 
Finally, there are several features of the current defense acquisition system that 
were not considered in this analysis.  First and foremost among these is concurrency. For 
major acquisition efforts there is often substantial overlap between the technology 
development, system development, and production phases. While this is often an attempt to 
compress an otherwise long acquisition cycle, the resulting rework often increases costs 
and leads to performance shortfalls.  This problem has been extensively documented 
elsewhere, and there is no need for it to be recapitulated here. If, however, the imposition of 
evolutionary acquisition and its shorter acquisition cycles reduced the temptation to use a 
concurrent acquisition strategy, it is possible that there could be a net cost savings through 
the reduction of rework, but that determination must be relegated to future work. Other 
features of defense acquisition not considered in this model are operations and 
maintenance costs, basic research funding, non-centralized acquisition management, 
program cancellation, program budgeting, the capacity of the industrial base, the capacity of 
the government to consume, and system integration issues.  Each of these factors certainly 
influences the behavior and cost effectiveness of the defense acquisition system and may 
be examined in future work. 
What we can ultimately derive from this study is that, at least to a first order, there 
are definite benefits to the better management and development of new technologies 
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implied in evolutionary acquisition.  A well-managed technology portfolio leads to the 
development of technology options, which creates the flexibility to maximize the ability of 
acquired systems to meet emerging threats.  Traditional programs, through their early 
commitment to particular approaches and technologies, sacrifice some of this flexibility.  The 
outstanding question raised is whether the increased flexibility created by evolutionary 
acquisition comes at additional cost.  What this study revealed is that net cost savings are 
not automatic.  Additional research is required to determine under what circumstances they 
are possible.  
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The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale is a measure of maturity of an 
individual technology, with a view towards operational use in a system context.  A 
comprehensive set of concerns becomes relevant when this metric is abstracted from an 
individual technology to a system context, which may involve interplay among multiple 
technologies that are integrated through the defense acquisition process.  This paper 
proposes the development of a system-focused approach for managing system 
development and making effective and efficient decisions during the defense acquisition 
process. For this to be accomplished, a new System Readiness Level (SRL) index will 
incorporate both the current TRL scale and the concept of an integration readiness level 
(IRL). This paper describes the foundations for the SRL and provides techniques for 
determining current and future readiness of a system to determine its position in the defense 
acquisition process.  In addition, it proposes optimization models than can provide 
management with an optimal development plan that can meet the objectives of the 
development team, based on constrained resources.  These, in turn, can become the 
foundation for the development of a monitoring and evaluation tool that will be analogous to 
Earned Value Management used in project management. 
1. Introduction 
In theory, technology and system development follow similar evolution (or 
maturation) paths; a technology is inserted into a system (e.g., spiral development) based 
on its maturity, functionality and environmental readiness, and ability to interoperate with the 
intended system.  However, the assessments made during the acquisition lifecycle that 
support these decisions are not always effective, efficient, or well developed.  Recently, the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) stated that many of the programs in the Department 
of Defense (DoD) plan to hold design reviews or to make a production decision without 
demonstrating the level of technology maturity that should have been there before the start 
of development (GAO, 1999).  In many US government agencies and contractors, 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is used to assess the maturity of evolving technologies 
(materials, components, devices, etc.) prior to incorporating a technology into a system or 
subsystem.  In the 1990s the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
instituted this nine-level metric as a systematic metric/measurement approach to assess the 
maturity of a particular technology and to allow consistent comparison of maturity between 
different types of technologies (Mankins, 2002).  Given the pragmatic benefits of this 
concept, in 1999, the DoD embraced a similar TRL concept (USD(AT&L), 2005: DoD, 2005).  
While the use of TRL is similar in these organizations, TRL was not intended to measure the 
integration of technologies, but was to be used as ontology for contracting support (Sadin, 
Povinelli, & Rosen, 1989), thus TRL does not address:  
 A complete representation of the (difficulty of) integration of the subject technology or 
subsystems into an operational system (Mankins, 2002; Dowling & Pardoe, 2005; 
Valerdi & Kohl, 2004),  
 The uncertainty that may be expected in moving through the maturation of TRL 
(Mankins, 2002; Dowling & Pardoe, 2005; Smith, 2005; Cundiff, 2002), and  
 Comparative analysis techniques for alternative TRLs (Mankins, 2002; Dowling & 
Pardoe, 2005; Smith, 2005; Cundiff, 2002).   
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Based on these fundamental conjectures, a more comprehensive set of concerns 
becomes relevant when TRL is abstracted from the level of an individual technology to a 
system context, which usually involves the interplay among multiple technologies. Similarly 
relevant is the case in which these technologies are integrated through the defense 
acquisition process.  That is, component level considerations relating to integration, 
interoperability, and sustainment become equally or more important from a systems 
perspective in an operational environment.  
Technology insertion as part of a defense acquisition process needs a quantitative 
assessment tool that can determine whether a group of separate technology components 
with their associated (and demonstrated) TRL ratings can be integrated into a larger 
complex system at a reasonably low risk in order to perform a required function or mission at 
some performance level. 
However, before such a tool can be developed, we must first address the issue of 
measuring the maturity of the integration elements.  The very first attempt to address this 
was done by Mankins (2002) when he proposed an Integrated Technology Analysis 
Methodology to estimate an Integrated Technology Index (ITI).  The ITI was then used for a 
comparative ranking of competing advanced systems.  The study brought to the forefront the 
difficulty of progressing through the TRL index and choosing between competing alternative 
technologies; it did not adequately address the integration aspects of systems development. 
Based on concerns for successful insertion of technologies into a system, the 
Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom developed a Technology Insertion Metric that 
includes, among other things an Integration Maturity Level (Dowling & Pardoe, 2005).  
Building upon these efforts, Gove, Sauser, and Ramirez-Marquez (2008) performed a 
thorough review of aerospace and defense-related literature to identify the requirements for 
developing a seven-level integration metric which they called Integration Readiness Level 
(IRL).  It has since evolved into the nine-level concept (Gove, 2007) described in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1. Integration Readiness Levels 
IRL Definition 
9 Integration is Mission Proven through successful mission operations. 
8 Actual integration is completed and Mission Qualified through test and demonstration, in the system environment. 
7 The integration of technologies has been Verified and Validated with sufficient detail to be actionable. 
6 The integrating technologies can Accept, Translate, and Structure Information for its intended application. 
5 There is sufficient Control between technologies necessary to establish, manage, and terminate the integration. 
4 There is sufficient detail in the Quality and Assurance of the integration between technologies. 
3 There is Compatibility (i.e., common language) between technologies to orderly and efficiently integrate and interact. 
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2 There is some level of specificity to characterize the Interaction (i.e., ability to influence) between technologies through their interface. 
1 An Interface between technologies has been identified with sufficient detail to allow characterization of the relationship. 
 
IRL is a systematic measurement of the interfacing of compatible interactions for 
various technologies and the consistent comparison of the maturity between integration 
points.  The introduction of IRL to the assessment process not only checks the place of 
technology on an integration readiness scale, but also presents a direction for improving 
integration with other technologies. Just as TRL has been used to assess the risk 
associated with developing technologies, IRL is designed to assess the risk associated with 
integrating these technologies. Now that both the technologies and integration elements can 
be assessed and mapped along an objective numerical scale, the next challenge is to 
develop a metric that can assess the maturity of the entire system that is under 
development.  Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez, Henry, and DiMarzio (2008) were able to 
demonstrate how using a normalized matrix of pair-wise comparisons of TRLs and IRLs for 
any system under development can yield a measure of system maturity, called Systems 
Readiness Level (SRL).  The SRL metric can be used to determine the maturity of a system 
and its status within a developmental lifecycle.   Table 2 presents the definitions of the 
various levels of the SRL and a representation of how the SRL index correlates to a systems 
engineering lifecycle. 
Table 2. System Readiness Levels 
SRL Acquisition Phase Definitions 
0.90 to 
1.00 
Operations & Support Execute a support program that meets operational 
support performance requirements and sustains 
the system in the most cost-effective manner over 
its total lifecycle. 
0.70 to 
0.89 






Develop system capability or (increments thereof); 
reduce integration and manufacturing risk; ensure 
operational supportability; reduce logistics footprint; 
implement human systems integration; design for 
production; ensure affordability and protection of 
critical program information; and demonstrate 






Reduce technology risks and determine 




Concept Refinement Refine initial concept; develop system/technology 
strategy. 
NOTE: These ranges have been derived conceptually and are undergoing field 
verification and validation under Naval Postgraduate School Contract # 
N00244-08-0005. 
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2. Calculating System Readiness Level 
The computation of the SRL is a function of two matrices:  
1. Matrix TRL provides a blueprint of the state of the system with respect to the 
readiness of its technologies. That is, TRL is defined as a vector with n entries for 
which the ith entry defines the TRL of the ith technology.  
2. Matrix IRL illustrates how the different technologies are integrated from a system 
perspective. IRL defined as an n×n matrix for which the element IRLij represents the 
maturity of integration between the ith and jth technologies.  
In these matrices, the standard TRL and IRL levels corresponding to values from 1 
through 9 should be normalized. Also, it has been assumed that on the one hand, a value of 
0 for element IRLij defines that the ith and jth technologies are impossible to integrate. On the 
other hand, a value of 1 for element IRLij can be understood as one of the following, with 
respect to the ith and jth technologies: 1) are completely compatible within the total system, 2) 
do not interfere with each others functions, 3) require no modification of the individual 
technologies, and 4) require no integration linkage development. Also, it is important to note 
that IRLii may have a value lower than 1, illustrating that the technology may be a composite 
of different sub-technologies that are not absolutely mature. 
In any system, each of the constituent technologies is connected to a minimum of 
one other technology through a bi-directional integration.  How each technology is integrated 
with other technologies is used to formulate an equation for calculating SRL that is a 
function of the TRL and IRL values of the technologies and the interactions that form the 
system.  In order to estimate a value of SRL from the TRL and IRL values, we propose a 
normalized matrix of pair-wise comparison of TRL and IRL indices. That is, for a system with 
n technologies, we first formulate a TRL matrix, labeled [TRL]. This matrix is a single column 
matrix containing the values of the TRL of each technology in the system. In this respect, 
[TRL] is defined in Equation 1, where TRLi is the TRL of technology i. 





















Second, an IRL matrix is created as a symmetric square matrix (of size n×n) of all 
possible integrations between any two technologies in the system. For a system with n 
technologies, [IRL] is defined in Equation 2, where IRLij is the IRL between technologies i 
and j.  It is important to note that whenever two technologies are not planned for integration, 
the IRL value assumed for these specific technologies is the hypothetical integration of a 
technology i to itself; therefore, it is given the maximum level of 9 and is denoted by IRLi 
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Although the original values for both TRL and IRL can be used, the use of 
normalized values allows a more accurate comparison when comparing the use of 
competing technologies. Thus, the values used in [TRL] and [IRL] are normalized (0,1) from 
the original (1,9) levels.  Based on these two matrices, an SRL matrix is obtained by 
obtaining the product of the TRL and IRL matrices, as shown in Equation 3. 
Equation 3.  [ ] [ ] [ ] 11 ××× ×= nnnn TRLIRLSRL  
The SRL matrix consists of one element for each of the constituent technologies. 
From an integration perspective, it quantifies the readiness level of a specific technology 
with respect to every other technology in the system while also accounting for the 
development state of each technology through TRL. Mathematically, for a system with n 
technologies, [SRL] is as shown in Equation 4. 











































where IRLij=IRLji.  
Each of the SRL values obtained in Equation 4 would fall within the interval (0,n).  
For consistency, these values of SRL should be divided by n to obtain the normalized value 
between (0,1). Notice that [SRL] can be used as a decision-making tool since its elements 
provide a prioritization guide of the system’s technologies and integrations. Thus, [SRL] can 
point out deficiencies in the maturation process.  
The SRL for the complete system is the average of all such normalized SRL values, 
as shown in Equation 5. Equal weights are given to each technology, and hence, a simple 
average is estimated.  A standard deviation can also be calculated to indicate the variation 
in the system maturity and parity in subsystem development. 









⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=   
where ni is the number of integrations with technology i. 
3. An Example of SRL Calculation 
The following example will use a real blue-water ship that is currently under 
development to show the steps involved in calculating its SRL value.  This system example 
will be referred to as System X and its contemplated architecture is shown in Figure 1.  For 
this system, the following matrices can be created for the TRL and IRL, based on the 
definitions presented earlier in Tables 1 and 2. 
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As indicated in the above integration matrix, we assign an IRL value of 0 when there 
is no integration link contemplated between any 2 technologies.  For integration to itself, an 
IRL value of 9 is used. After normalization of the [TRL] and [IRL] matrices, calculate [SRL] 
as follows: 
Equations 3a and 4a. [ ] [ ] [ ]
1
2
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Table 3. Individual SRL Values 
SRL1 SRL2 SRL3 SRL4 SRL5 SRL6 SRL7 SRL8 SRL9 SRL10 
2.000 3.691 2.605 4.481 1.963 3.728 2.000 2.333 2.000 1.519 
SRL11 SRL12 SRL13 SRL14 SRL15 SRL16 SRL17 SRL18 SRL19 SRL20 




1 2 1 2 20
1 2
... ...
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The calculated Composite SRL index indicates that the system under development is 
currently in the System Development and Demonstration phase.  Aside from providing an 
assessment of overall system development, it can also be a guide in prioritizing potential 
areas that require further development. This new index can then interact with decision-
making tools for the potential acquisition of systems, which involve the dependency and 
interplay among performance, availability (reliability, maintainability, and supportability), 
process efficiency (system operations, maintenance, and logistics support), system lifecycle 
cost, and system maturity (measured by SRL).  The overarching perspective of this 
methodology provides a context for the “trade space” available to a systems engineer or 
program manager, along with the articulation of the overall objective of maximizing the 
operational effectiveness of systems. 
4. Potential Applications of SRL: Future Research 
Given the ability to estimate readiness of a system under development, organizations 
can systematically evaluate the implications of using alternative technologies or system 
architectures, prepare development plans that optimize the objectives of the development 
team, and eventually be able to evaluate and monitor the progress of the development effort 
to identify problem areas and corrective measures. 
4.1  Optimization Models   
In the defense acquisition process, there are factors that may strategically alter the 
decision to develop one system over another; supersede a new, more functional system 
over another; determine if a system or technology has become inadequate due to changes 
in other systems or technologies; invest in the development of a new system or maintain 
existing systems; and classify a systems obsolescence and longevity.  To address these 
challenges, we can use SRL as a method for determining current and future readiness of a 
system in order to determine its position in the defense acquisition process.  While 
identifying the current SRL of a system can provide managerial insight, optimizing the future 
value of this index based on constrained resources will enhance managerial capabilities. 
The optimization of SRL based on resource allocation can allow for decisions to be 
made regarding the trade-offs among: 1) system attributes such as availability, performance, 
efficiency, and total ownership cost and 2) the components necessary for producing 
affordable system operational effectiveness (pp. 14-15). These attributes have objectives 
and ranges for components such as capability, reliability, maintainability, supportability, and 
producibility, and it is the interplay among them that drives the different levels for both IRL 
and TRL of the elements in a system. Thus, the optimal selection of which components to 
enhance to improve the system SRL becomes an optimal system design development 
problem.  
The optimal design of systems is a classical optimization problem in the area of 
systems engineering.  In general, the objective of these problems is to optimize a function-
of-merit of the system design (reliability, cost, mean time to failure, supportability, etc.) 
subject to known constraints on resources (cost, weight, volume, etc.) and/or system 
performance requirements (reliability, availability, mean time to failure, etc.). To optimize this 
specific function, it is generally assumed that the system can be decomposed into a system 
that contains a known number of subsystems or elements (as in Figure 1) and, for each of 
these elements, a known set of functionally equivalent components types (with different 
performance specifications) can be used in the design. 
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From a system engineering design perspective, an optimization approach that 
balances needs (i.e., the enhancement of the SRL) with resources (i.e., cost of technologies, 
cost of technology development, etc.), can be an effective and efficient method for reducing 
risk. That is, the development of a SRL index correlated with the defense acquisition 
process can be used as an optimization framework for the systems engineer or program 
manager to design-in enhanced system reliability, maintainability, and supportability to 
achieve the desired reductions in the necessary logistics footprint and the associated 
lifecycle cost.  
Optimization becomes crucial when trying to decide between competing system 
design alternatives or when trying to decide which individual TRL or IRL to improve. To 
make the best decision, optimization models can be developed to assist management to 
choose SRL improvement opportunities. It is reasonable to assume that improvements will 
result in costs associated with the purchase of new technology, rework of existing 
equipment, training of employees, hiring new employees, and enhancements to information 
technology infrastructure. Two models can be developed. The first model considers 
minimizing the development cost associated to increasing SRL to some predefined user 
level, λ.  The second model is to maximize the SRL (a function of TRL and IRL) under 
constraints associated with resources.  The mathematical forms of these models follow.  
4.1.1 System Cost of Development (SCOD) Minimization 
Model SCODmin illustrates an optimization model whose objective is to minimize 
development cost (a function of TRL and IRL development) under constraints associated 
with schedule and the required SRL value. The general mathematical form of Model 
SCODmin follows: 
Minimize: SCOD(TRL,IRL) = SCODfixed + SCODvariable (TRL,IRL) 
Subject to: SRL(TRL,IRL) ≥ λ 
   R1 (TRL,IRL) ≤  r1 
   . 
   . 
   . 
   Rh (TRL,IRL) ≤  rh 
The matrices IRL and TRL in Model SCODmin contain the decision variables. Each of 
these variables are integer valued and bounded by (IRLi,9) and (TRLi,9), respectively. That 
is, the TRL/IRL for the ith component cannot be below its current level or above perfect 
technology development/integration (IRL or TRL = 9).  
To completely characterize the decision variables in Model SCODmin, it is necessary 
to introduce the following transformation:  
yi
k = 1 If TRLi = k
0 otherwise
⎧ ⎨ ⎩   and  xij
k = 1 If IRLij = k
0 otherwise
⎧ ⎨ ⎩   for k=1,…9 
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Notice that based on these binary variables, each of the possible TRL and IRL in the 
system can be obtained as TRLi = kyik
k=1
9∑  and IRLij = kxijk
k=1
9∑ . Based on these binary 
variables, SRLi is transformed to 
SRLi = kxi1k
k=1





9∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ + kxi2
k
k=1
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⎞ 
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k
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Thus, based on the computation of the SRL with these decision variables, Model 
SCODmin belongs to the class of binary, integer-valued, non-linear problems. For a system 
with n technologies containing m (m≤(n-1)n/2) distinct integrations, and assuming all 
technologies and integrations are at their lowest levels, there are 9n+m potential solutions to 
Model SCODmin.  Evaluating each possible solution is prohibitive, so to generate an optimal 
solution faster, a meta-heuristic approach developed by Ramirez-Marquez and Rocco 
(Ramirez-Marquez & Rocco, 2008) will be applied to the system under development.  This 
approach, called Probabilistic Solution Discovery Algorithm (PSDA), has the capability of 
producing quasi-optimal solutions in a relatively short period of time.  However, it must be 
mentioned that the results cannot be proven to be the optimal solution.  Nevertheless, prior 
tests have indicated that PSDA results tend to be better than results from alternative meta-
heuristic approaches. 
4.1.2 SRL Maximization 
Model SRLmax follows the same general formulation.  It illustrates the optimization 
model with the objective to maximize the SRL (a function of TRL and IRL) under constraints 
associated with resources. This model recognizes that the technologies compete for 
resources and that benefits can result in an improved SRL via the optimal allocation of such 
resources. The general mathematical form of Model SRLmax is 
Model SRLmax 
  
Max SRL TRL ,IRL( )
s.t .
R1 TRL ,IRL( ) ≤ r1
M
R H TRL ,IRL( ) ≤ rH
 
The success of implementing these models depends on the consistent and 
continuous definition of needed capabilities, the maturation of technologies that lead to 
disciplined development, and the production of systems that provide increasing capability 
towards a material concept.  A fundamental challenge to defense acquisition is that the 
ultimate functionality cannot be defined at the beginning of the program.  Only by the 
maturation of the technologies, matched with the evolving needs of the user, can they 
provide the user with capability. 
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4.2  System Earned Readiness Management (SERM)  
The optimization models above can provide valuable insight into the development of 
a methodology for monitoring and evaluating the overall progress of the development effort.  
This is primarily due to the fact that the models can identify the optimal development path 
that can be followed.  That is, they identify to what TRL the critical technology elements 
(CTEs) and which IRL the integration elements should be matured, as well as when those 
TRLs and IRLs can be achieved. 
With these data, we can develop an analytical tool and methodology for evaluating 
overall progress in systems development as well as measure the impact of alternative or 
competing architectures, critical technologies and integration elements on the maturity of 
systems within the systems engineering lifecycle.  Furthermore, it can serve as a guide to 
anticipate the lifecycle implications of the decisions made during the development process.  
The proposed methodology is termed System Earned Readiness Management (SERM).  It 
will be analogous to Earned Value Management (EVM), an analytical tool used in Project 
Management (pp. 17-18). 
While the optimization models are unavoidably mathematically involved, SERM itself 
is envisioned to be a relatively simple management tool.  It will measure in aggregate terms 
the level of accomplishment of the system development process.  When compared to the 
development plans and factor estimates that have been prescribed for a particular system 
under development, management can make conclusions on its status and suggest 
necessary adjustments to correct any significant deviations.  SERM is expected to be valid 
throughout a wide range of systems with varying degrees of complexity and is intended to 
be a tool that is easy to use, notwithstanding the complex mathematical algorithms behind it. 
Logically, SERM can only be useful if the system under development is already 
covered by a sufficiently detailed development plan.  That is, the system requirements, 
design and development schedules have already been frozen.  However, there are many 
systems under development that are inherently fraught with high degrees of uncertainty that 
emanate from the high levels of novelty as well as technology of the system.  To be properly 
managed, such systems have to go through several requirements and design cycles before 
both can be frozen (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).  However, the need for monitoring and 
evaluating these systems before the final development cycle still exists.  Developing a 
modified SERM (to be called SERM-U) for such situations will be the ultimate objective. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper proposes the inclusion of a separate maturity index to measure the 
progress of the development of the integration links of a system under development.  This 
metric called Integration Readiness Level (IRL) is necessary because in some projects, 
integration elements have been overlooked and have resulted into major debacles.  The 
paper also introduces the development of a system-focused approach for managing system 
development and making effective and efficient decisions during the defense acquisition 
process. For this to be accomplished, a new System Readiness Level (SRL) index will 
incorporate both the current TRL scale and the proposed IRL metric.  The foundations of the 
SRL are described and we show the techniques for determining current and future readiness 
of a system to determine its position in the defense acquisition process.  In addition, it 
proposes optimization models than can provide management with an optimal development 
plan that can meet the objectives of the development team based on constrained resources.  
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These, in turn, can become the foundation for the development of a monitoring and 
evaluation tool that will be analogous to Earned Value Management, which is used in project 
management. 
The conceptual development of these metrics and tools outpace their validation and 
verification in the field.  Currently, what is necessary is to have greater involvement from 
practitioners so that the acquisition community can agree to a common measurement and 
language that can only improve the system development and acquisition process. 
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Abstract 
The Navy’s open architecture framework is intended to promote reuse and reduce 
costs. This paper focuses on exploiting open architecture principles to reduce testing effort 
and costs in cases in which the requirements and code for a subsystem have not been 
changed, but the code is running on new hardware and/or new operating systems due to a 
technology-advancement upgrade. This situation is common in Navy and DoD contexts 
such as submarine, aircraft carrier, and airframe systems, and accounts for a substantial 
fraction of the testing effort. Unmodified software components need to be retested after a 
technology upgrade in some, but not necessarily in all cases. This paper reports some early 
research on conditions under which testing of unmodified components can be avoided after 
a technology upgrade, outlines an approach for identifying situations in which retesting can 
be safely reduced, and indicates how to focus retesting in cases in which it cannot be 
avoided. 
Keywords: open architecture, reducing regression testing, automated testing, statistical 
testing, dependency analysis, reuse, operating system upgrades, hardware upgrades. 
1. Introduction 
The Navy is implementing the open architecture framework for developing joint 
interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open system design principles and 
architectures. Research being performed at the Naval Postgraduate School is pursuing a 
complementary effort to identify weaknesses and gaps in the current state of knowledge 
with respect to the development and testing of DoD/DoN systems according to such open 
systems principles, and to develop or adapt new methods for overcoming those 
weaknesses. The purpose of this effort is to provide sound engineering approaches to better 
realize the potential benefits of Navy open architectures and to provide concrete means that 
support economical acquisition and effective sustainment of such systems. 
This project focuses primarily on improving test and evaluation of systems with open 
architectures, since this aspect can greatly benefit from improvements. Specific goals of this 
research are to enable the following: (i) reduction of unnecessary testing on every system 
change, (ii) identification of what specific testing and checking procedures need to be 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 143 - 
=
=
repeated after changes, (iii) limiting the scope of retesting when the latter is necessary, and 
(iv) enabling a single analysis to provide assurance that all possible configurations that can 
be generated in a model-driven architecture will satisfy given dependability requirements. 
This paper reports some preliminary results of this project that address the first three of the 
goals listed above. A roadmap and technical approach for reaching the fourth goal are 
outlined in Berzins, Rodriquez and Wessman (2007). 
The roadmap provides a long-term plan for eventually eliminating the need for 
regression testing after each reconfiguration and eventually enabling a “plug-and-fight” 
capability. This plan depends on the design and certification of a common architecture for a 
family of systems (FOS) that span a parameterized range of expected requirements, based 
on detailed standards for the components and connections. In this approach, the 
architecture is certified to meet its requirements, components are tested against standards 
and requirement parameters, and reconfiguration is achieved by swapping plug-compatible 
components with different requirement parameters (2007). 
This paper focuses on the shorter-term problem of safely reducing testing for 
software components whose code has not been changed, without waiting for the results of 
long-term research and without relying on architecture-level certification. 
The motivating context for the work reported here was to increase the effectiveness 
of quality assurance for Navy technology upgrades. The first step was to investigate 
conditions under which it is safe to reduce testing for software components whose code has 
not been changed, so that a larger fraction of the available time and effort could be focused 
on testing the new functionality introduced by the upgrade.  
This focus was adopted after the author interviewed representatives from four of the 
organizations actually involved in developing such technology upgrades. These interviews 
indicated (with unanimous support) that those organizations’ highest current priorities are 
reducing testing for unmodified software components after a technology upgrade and 
adapting automated testing methods into production use. The initial research, therefore, 
explored practical methods for checking conditions under which it is safe to reduce or 
eliminate retesting for unchanged components, and sought solutions that leverage 
automated testing in the contexts in which it is easiest and most effective to do so. 
Technology upgrades are typically performed on a two-year cycle. They often involve 
migration to the best hardware and operating system version available at the time, where 
“best” implies a balanced tradeoff between high performance and reliable operation. 
Typically, only a small fraction of the application code has been changed. However, current 
certification practices require all of the code to be retested prior to deployment, whether it 
has been modified or not. Retesting of an unchanged module can be avoided only if we can 
establish that it has not been adversely impacted by the change. The rest of this paper 
explores ways to determine that, and the conditions under which such determination is 
possible. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methods for 
deciding when re-testing of unchanged components can be safely reduced or eliminated 
entirely. Section 3 discusses the costs of the automated testing of operating system services 
needed to support some of the methods presented in Section 2. Section 4 explains the 
significance of operational profiles (probability distributions characterizing expected 
workloads for software services), which are also needed to support the types of automated 
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testing needed by methods proposed in Section 2. Section 5 identifies the conditions under 
which unchanged code does need to be tested, along with the potential failure modes that 
may need to be guarded against and how to focus the retesting to guard against these 
modes without repeating previous testing effort. Section 6 identifies some relevant previous 
work, and Section 7 concludes with a summary of the steps that should be taken to enable 
practical application of the test-reduction approach presented in this paper. 
2. Deciding When Retesting Can Be Avoided 
If the requirements related to a component have not changed, and the behavior of 
the components has not changed, then retesting may not be necessary. As discussed 
further in Section 4 of this paper, the range of conditions under which a component is 
expected to provide its operational capabilities is a part of its requirements that is particularly 
relevant to testing and re-testing. The rest of this section addresses how to statically and 
dynamically check that the behavior of a component has not changed, assuming for the 
moment that its requirements and range of operating conditions have not changed. 
A type of dependency analysis known as program slicing can be used to identify 
parts of the unchanged code that have the same behavior in the new release as in previous 
one (Weiser, 1984, July).  A program slice at a given observation point is a self-contained 
subset of the code in the sense that it contains all of the code that can affect the behavior 
visible at the observation point. If two different programs have the same slice for a given 
observation point, then they have the same visible behavior at that point. Consequently, if 
the new release has the same slice as the old release for a given service, then that service 
will have exactly the same behavior in the new release as in the old one and, consequently, 
may not need regression testing (Gallagher, 1991, August). This fact is useful because 
program slices can be computed for software systems on practical (large) scales. The 
testing-reduction method that follows from this observation is to compute the slice of each 
service with respect to the new release and the old release, and retest only the services for 
which these slices differ. 
In the context of technology-advancement upgrades, the test-reduction method 
described above must be augmented with focused, automated testing to produce a 
substantial reduction in retesting. Technology upgrades usually run on a new version of the 
operating system. If the source code of the operating system is proprietary and, hence, not 
available for static analysis (commonly true, except for open source systems such as 
LINUX), then the only safe assumption is that all operating system services have been 
impacted by the upgrade to the new version. Thus, any service whose slice includes a 
dependency on a system call would be potentially impacted and would have to be retested, 
based on the simple slicing approach outlined in the previous paragraph. This is likely to 
include most of the application-level modules, thus severely limiting the amount of savings 
that can be obtained using slicing alone.   
Automated testing, however, can enable larger reductions in retesting if it is focused 
on the middleware interface to the underlying operating system services. Fortunately, the 
author’s interviews with representative stakeholders confirmed that most Navy systems with 
open architectures are designed around a middleware interface that encapsulates all 
operating system calls. Such middleware interfaces are also prevalent in other DoD 
systems, including the US Army’s FCS. Application architectures are typically designed in 
this way to ease the job of porting the application to new operating systems, whether they 
are new releases of the same product or different products. Consequently, each new 
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release of the operating system and the neighboring middleware layer are both designed to 
preserve the observable behavior of the previously available system calls if at all possible—
even if the details of the implementation may vary from one release to the next. If we know 
that the observable behavior of a given system call is the same in the old and the new 
version of the operating system, then we can truncate the slice at the middleware layer for 
that call, and conclude that the behavior of an application service is unaffected by the OS 
change if its abbreviated slices in the two versions are the same. The proposed 
enhancement to dependency analysis using program slicing is to check this property for 
each system call in the middleware layer via automated testing. 
This same strategy can also be applied at higher levels of middleware. For example, 
for the common case of applications that have been developed for the Java or .NET 
platforms, the interface to operating system resources is the framework runtime, such as the 
interface to the Java foundation classes. One related viable strategy for reducing testing of 
unchanged application code is bounding slicing by the interfaces at this level and using 
automated testing to show equivalent behaviors of the two releases at these interfaces. A 
related, common pattern of changes that should not affect behavior involves framework 
evolution, in which applications are recoded to migrate from “deprecated” (soon to become 
obsolete) interfaces to the corresponding new versions of the interfaces. Although such 
changes produce differences in the code, they are intended to preserve behavior, and 
should be amenable to the automated test strategy. Thus, modules one level above the 
framework runtime interfaces are additional candidates for automated testing and slicing 
cutoff boundaries. 
Automated testing is attractive in these contexts because a simple, reliable 
implementation of a “test oracle” is possible for the encapsulated operating systems 
services.  A “test oracle” is a process for automatically determining which test outputs pass 
and which ones fail. The “unchanged behavior” condition can be easily checked by software 
for a given set of input data. This is possible since both the old and the new versions of the 
operating system are available for testing, and test scaffolding software can compare the 
results of the two versions via equality tests. The existence of such a “test oracle” implies 
that the OS middleware testing process can be completely automated—enabling economic 
and practical testing with statistically significant sample sizes that support very high 
confidence levels, or, in some cases, even exhaustive testing of the operating system 
interfaces that supports definite conclusions. The proposed automated testing process 
would, thus, classify all of the services in the middleware interface to the operating system 
into two groups: those whose behavior is the same in both versions of the operating system 
(the preserved services), and those whose behavior differs in the two versions (the modified 
services). We expect the first group to be much larger than the second group. 
In such cases, we can cut off slices at the system calls to the preserved services, 
and conclude that unmodified application components do not have to be retested unless 
their slices differ or contain system calls that invoke one of the modified services. The 
operating system interface always needs to be thoroughly retested, but this can be done by 
the affordable automated process described above. 
The above analysis depends on the assumption that we can accept a statistical 
inference about the unchanged behavior of the operating system’s calls, if the statistical 
confidence level is high enough. Since most military decisions must be based on information 
that has the same degree of uncertainty, we do not expect lack of certainty to be a problem 
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in principle. We, therefore, consider how to determine what level of confidence would be 
“high enough” and how many test cases are necessary to reach that level of confidence. 
We start with a consideration that should be meaningful to the stakeholders: if the 
mean time between observations of a behavioral difference in a given operating systems 
service is substantially (k times) longer than a mission, it is acceptable to ignore risks due to 
the possibility of such an unexpected difference.  The meaning of “substantially” can be 
expressed as a numerical safety factor k that can be understood and set by system 
stakeholders based on their tolerance for risk. 
Next, we measure the mean number of executions per mission es for each service s 
in the middleware interface to the operating system. The objective of the automated testing 
for each service s is to ensure the mean number of executions between observed 
differences in the behavior of service s is at least Ns, where 
Ns = k es. 
Theorem 4.3 from Howden (1987) can then be used to determine the required 
number of test cases Ts for each service: 
Ts = Ns log2 Ns. 
If we run Ts test cases that are independently drawn from the probability distribution 
characterizing the mission (called the operational profile), the theorem will enable us to 
conclude that the mean number of executions is at least Ns with a statistical confidence 
level (1 – 1/Ns); however, this is contingent upon none of the Ts test cases showing any 
differences in the behavior of the services under the new version of the operating system 
from those in the previously released version. 
The rationale for this choice of confidence level is that it makes the probability of 
making a false positive conclusion no more than the acceptable frequency of behavioral 
differences, thus scaling the risk due to random sampling errors to match the specified 
maximum acceptable failure rate. False positive conclusions correspond to cases in which 
the frequency of behavioral differences in the new release of the operating system service in 
question is actually greater than the target bound (1/Ns), but the automated testing 
procedure failed to observe a difference due to random sampling fluctuations that caused 
conforming results to appear purely by chance. The test set size Ts has been chosen to 
make the probability of such a chance observation at most (1/Ns). 
Thorough statistical testing of the operating system interfaces has the additional 
benefits of increasing confidence that differences in hardware (and possibly different 
versions of the compilers, linkers and loaders) have not affected the behavior of the 
applications built using these services. 
3. Cost of Automated Testing 
There are several different kinds of automated testing. The most common kind is 
semi-automated testing. This approach automates the type of testing currently performed 
manually. It is commonly the first kind of automated testing implemented in an organization 
because it does not involve any process changes. In this type of approach, the test cases 
are still developed individually by test engineers, but the test cases are run automatically, 
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and the results are classified into pass or fail categories automatically—often by comparison 
to previously captured test outputs that were originally individually examined and 
categorized by people. In this approach, execution and categorization of test results is 
automated, but the choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions are not. This 
approach saves appreciable time and effort relative to a completely manual approach, but 
the human effort required is still proportional to the number of test cases. 
Another approach particularly relevant in our context is automated statistical testing. 
In this approach, the choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions are automated, 
as well. This makes a great difference because the human effort involved does not increase 
with the number of test cases to be executed. This enables economical application of the 
very large test sets needed to achieve the coverage required to support high levels of 
statistical confidence in the dependability of the software. The high levels of statistical 
confidence are needed to avoid testing for other unchanged code based on indirect 
evidence that the behavior of the underlying services on which the unchanged code 
depends has not changed. 
The context identified in the previous section is well suited for automated statistical 
testing, because the choice of test cases and the initial pass/fail decisions are easily 
automated in that context: the first can be done by random sampling from the operational 
profile, and the second by comparison of the results produced by the previous release of the 
software to those produced by the new release.  
The variation in the number of the test cases Ts required as a function of the 
acceptable risk of false positive conclusions (1/Ns) is illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Number of Test Cases Required for Different Levels of Risk Tolerance 
Ns C Ts 
103 .999 1.0 x 104 
104 .9999 1.3 x 105 
105 .99999 1.7 x 106 
106 .999999 2.0 x 107 
107 .9999999 2.3 x 108 
108 .99999999 2.7 x 109 
109 .999999999  3.0 x 1010 
Ns: Desired lower bound on mean number of executions between differences 
C: Statistical confidence level  
Ts: Number of independent random test cases required 
 
Figure 1 shows how the cost characteristics of the proposed automated testing 
approach compare to the costs of manual testing. The cost curves are close to straight lines; 
the fixed costs of automated testing are larger than for manual testing, and the marginal cost 
of adding another test case is much smaller for automated testing than for manual testing. 
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Figure 1. Testing Cost Characteristics 
In order to determine the crossover points, we must have experimental data. 
However, we expect automated testing to be affordable—even for the very large numbers of 
test cases needed for high confidence in stability of OS services across different releases. 
We also expect manual and semi-automated approaches not to be affordable when we test 
to high confidence.  
Regarding the time and other resources to perform the proposed automated 
statistical testing, we can note the following: 
1. It typically takes a small amount of time to perform a single system call. 
2. Testing using independent, random samples is easily parallelizable and could be 
effectively spread over large numbers of processors using well-established 
techniques—such as Google’s Map Reduce programming model (Lammel, 2008, 
January)—if very high confidence levels are needed. 
3. Behavior of operating system calls can be tested independently of other shipboard 
systems and does not require interactions with human operators. 
Since the testing process is completely automated, the variable cost of these tests is 
due to computing time and hardware, but not to human effort. The benefit of the automated 
statistical test approach described here is that there are no variable costs for labor. Since 
computing resources are currently inexpensive and steadily getting cheaper, this implies 
that even the relatively large numbers of test cases needed for high confidence are likely to 
be affordable. 
This approach does involve some fixed costs for human effort that may be higher 
than in less-disciplined manual approaches. These costs are due to the need for the 
following activities: 
1. Measurement of operational profiles—i.e., the frequency distributions of operating 
system calls and their associated input parameters. Instrumented versions of the 
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software can be used during exercises to collect measurements of the operational 
profiles, or, if the computational overhead of doing this is acceptable, measurements 
could also be collected during actual operations. 
2. Coding more sophisticated test-driver software that includes code for generating 
random samples from the measured operational profiles, code that implements test 
oracles as described in Section 2, and code that keeps track of testing statistics and 
reports them. 
4. Why Do We Care about Operational Profiles? 
Accurate estimates of operational profiles, preferably based on actual 
measurements, are necessary because in all practical cases, the reliability of a software 
system is meaningless without firm knowledge of the operational profile. This claim is based 
on the hypothesis that all real systems have at least one input value x for which they 
perform correctly, and at least one other input value y for which they do not. If we know x 
and y, we can construct a spectrum of possible operational profiles for which the reliability of 
the same system ranges from 0 to 1 and attains every value in between.  
The above line of reasoning shows that the only systems whose reliabilities do not 
depend on the operational environment are those that fail for all possible inputs (reliability 
uniformly 0, not interesting), and those that operate correctly for all possible inputs (reliability 
uniformly 1, not attainable in practice for large systems). 
For all other systems, the reliability is determined by the operational profile and can 
vary widely for different operational contexts. This has serious implications for component 
reuse, which is a cornerstone of the open Navy architecture initiative. 
Operational profiles have been used by the testing research community for many 
years and have been applied in many contexts. For example, they have been measured and 
used to assess the reliability of telephone-switching software. 
5. When Retesting Is Needed 
If the process described in Section 2 shows that the slice of a given application level 
service differs in the new and previous release, then behavior of the system has been 
impacted, and the service needs retesting. Services whose requirements have changed will 
be in this category—so new functionality needs to be tested according to the criteria 
proposed in Section 2, as expected. If the behavior of unchanged modules with unchanged 
requirements can be affected by other modified modules, they will be also identified by the 
slicing process. These also need retesting to check if there are any unintended indirect 
consequences of the code changes. This is the effect most developers and test and 
evaluation organizations are concerned about guarding against. 
In addition, however, some modules may need to be retested even if their behavior 
has not changed, because reliability of a system depends on its environment as well as on 
its implementation. Thus, changes to the environment of a system can affect its reliability 
even if the behavior of the system remains unchanged. This possibility must be considered 
in the context of Navy open architectures because they strongly encourage reuse of 
components in a variety of operational environments to provide cost savings.  
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When a reusable component is moved unchanged to a new operating environment, 
we need to check whether its range of expected operating conditions has expanded—as 
manifested by an expanded range of expected input parameter values in its new operating 
environment in comparison to its previous operating environment. If this is the case, then the 
component needs to be tested both on samples from the previously untested part of the 
input space, as well as on scenarios typical of the novel features of the new operating 
environment for the reusable component. If the analysis of the operating environment is 
done properly, we will not have to repeat the tests conducted previously, but rather must run 
new and substantially different tests that focus on the new situations that are likely in the 
new operating environment but were not likely in the previous ones. 
One other issue to be considered is whether the requirements of the component 
involve timing constraints. The above discussion has focused mostly on the functional 
behavior of the component, and not on how much time it takes to produce those results. 
Components that are subject to strict timing requirements need additional quality-assurance; 
analysts must check those requirements if the characteristics of the hardware in the new 
release will differ from those in the old one. Perhaps surprisingly, this is the case even if the 
new hardware is faster than the old hardware. This is due to the properties of the scheduling 
methods to be used. In particular, it is known that rate-monotonic scheduling, one popular 
method for scheduling real-time software, is (in some cases) subject to anomalies. For 
instance, a given schedule may work fine for a given hardware configuration but may miss 
deadlines when executed on faster hardware. This can happen if uninterruptible operations 
or those that lock shared resources are executed in a different order on the new hardware—
due to the completion of a sped-up task prior to the release time of a competing task that 
was previously unreachable. Methods for checking dependencies on timing constraints are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
To focus retesting where it is needed most, the author recommends the 
establishment of an explicit process to track past and projected changes in operational 
profiles and to reflect these changes in testing plans. Some preliminary steps in this 
direction are to: 
1. Keep records of operational profiles used in testing previous releases of subsystems. 
2. Measure operational profiles under mission conditions and exercises exploring new 
concepts of operations. Check for differences from those covered in past testing.  
3. Focus retesting efforts on circumstances and scenarios that have weight in actual 
and projected operational profiles that have not been covered well in previous testing 
of the same unchanged components. 
6. Relevant Previous Work 
Program slicing has been used in a wide variety of applications, including testing 
(Binkley, 1998; Gupta, Harrold & Soffa, 1992; Harman & Danicic, 1995; Hierons, Harman & 
Danicic, 1999; Hierons, Harman, Fox, Ouarbya & Daoudi, 2002), debugging (Agrawal, 
DeMillo & Spafford, 1993; Lyle & Weiser, 1987), program understanding (De Lucia, Fasolino 
& Munro, 1996; Harman, Hierons, Danicic, Howroyd & Fox, 2001), reverse engineering 
(Canfora, Cimitile & Munro, 1994), software maintenance (Gallagher, 1991, August; Cimitile, 
De Lucia & Munro, 1994), change merging (Horwitz, Prins & Reps, 1989; Berzins & 
Dampier, 1996), and software metrics (Lakhotia, 1993; Bieman & Ott, 1994). More detailed 
surveys of previous work on slicing can be found in Binkley and Harmon (2004). Although 
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the subject is outside the scope of the current paper, which focuses on reducing testing by 
detecting unintended interactions between different parts of a program, Gallagher (1991, 
August) also outlines a method for preventing the introduction of new unintended 
interactions during software upgrades. 
Automated testing has been studied in a wide variety of contexts. An approach to 
automatically generating test-driver code from formal requirements is described in Berzins 
and Chaki (2002). This approach automatically generates open sets of test cases based on 
random samplings from implementations of operational profile distributions. The pass/fail 
decisions that classify the results produced by the individual test cases are made by 
software methods that are automatically generated from the requirements, which must be 
sufficiently precise and constructive to support this process. The number of test samples in 
the generated test set is automatically set to meet specified reliability goals expressed in 
terms of mean number of executions between failures. This work provides an approach to 
extending automated statistical testing to contexts beyond those in which the expected 
behavior of a module is unchanged in the new release. 
There has also been previous work on quality assurance for flexible systems at the 
levels of requirements (Luqi, Zhang, Berzins & Qiao, 2004, December; Luqi & Lange, 2006, 
November 8) and architectures (Berzins & Luqi, 2006, May 6; Luqi & Zhang, 2006, May 6). 
In addition, a method for assessing the impact of timing constraints on reliability of system 
upgrades can be found in Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March).  
7. Conclusion 
Further research is recommended to substantiate the practical applicability of the 
ideas outlined above. Experimental evaluation of the slicing method for identifying modules 
that do not have to be rested should be performed, together with the focused automated 
testing methods needed to fully realize the potential savings of the approach.  
Measurement and analysis of the operational profiles of reusable components can 
be used to support analysis of changes in the operating environment that may require 
focused retesting of components whose behavior has not changed. Operational profiles are 
probability distributions that serve as mathematical representations of the operating 
environment and that are needed to support statistically significant testing that can reduce 
the testing effort, as described above. These distributions can be measured by 
instrumenting components and collecting statistics as they run, either in exercises or during 
actual missions, and can be used to drive statistically based automated testing that can 
quantitatively assess the reliability of systems. 
Although it is not easy to convince contractors to automate their testing if they are 
not familiar with this approach, the economic incentives to do so are getting more 
compelling. This practical problem is particularly evident in the current situation—in which 
domain experts are often doing the project management and coding with little knowledge of 
or experience with recent advances in the techniques and tools used in software 
engineering. The increasing popularity of agile methods, which depend heavily on semi-
automated testing, should help change this perception. Pilot projects demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the suggested approach are recommended to provide concrete data about 
costs and benefits, thereby alleviating concerns about project risks due to technology 
innovations. 
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Abstract 
The cost of operating and maintaining weapon systems is a large expense to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and suitability performance is a major factor affecting these 
costs. Systems with poor suitability performance (such as low reliability, high failure rates, 
high spare parts usage, and low availability) are extremely difficult to support in a 
constrained resource environment. For many DoD acquisition programs, suitability lags 
effectiveness during program development. Suitability determinants (such as reliability and 
maintainability) are generally not addressed early enough during program development 
(prior to fielding) and are not prioritized with the same vigor and discipline as performance 
parameters like speed, accuracy, and lethality. The JROC, DOT&E, and USD(AT&L) have 
each called for increased attention to suitability improvement. 
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this article was to investigate the suitability performance 
challenges of the recently deployed Stryker system, which was accelerated into combat in 
2003. Suitability drivers were identified and possible causal factors were investigated. 
Several specific suitability issues for the Stryker system were revealed during this study. 
Stryker is performing well in the field with an Operational Readiness Rate (ORR) 
consistently above the required contractual value. However, a harsh combat scenario, 
dynamic threat environment, and extremely high tempo of operations have created unique 
challenges to operators and maintainers.  
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During his first annual report to Congress, the newly confirmed Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Dr. Charles E. McQueary made three initial 
observations. His first observation was that Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) is too 
often the place where performance deficiencies are discovered.  Finding performance 
problems early in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process is important—either 
in government Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) or contractor testing. Detecting and 
correcting design issues early in the development process will mitigate program cost 
overruns and schedule delays. McQueary’s second observation was that the DoD 
acquisition system is inherently slow and must improve to accommodate rapid fielding of 
new weapons systems and new technologies. The need for rapid fielding of new technology 
is evident in the extended hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., armor upgrades for the 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the new Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle). His third observation was that operational suitability of 
DoD systems is too low and needs to improve. The definition of operational suitability, which 
can be found in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Chapter 9 (Operational Test and 
Evaluation), Section 9.4.5 (Evaluation of Operational Suitability), is as follows:  
Operational Suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in 
field use, with consideration given to reliability, availability, compatibility, 
transportability, interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human 
factors, manpower supportability, logistics supportability, documentation, training 
requirements, and natural environmental effects and impacts. (Duma & Krieg, 2005) 
The Cost of Low Suitability 
Low suitability is a direct contributor to higher lifecycle support costs. Data for the 
previous three years (2004–2006) showed that 35% of Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
(IOT&E) phases resulted in unfavorable suitability evaluations as reported to Congress in 
each system’s Beyond Low Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) Report (Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation, 2007).  
While the technical performance of weapon systems (such as speed, accuracy, and 
firepower) has improved significantly over the last several decades, suitability parameters 
(such as reliability, availability, and maintainability) have not improved. Figures 1, 2, and 3 
indicate that this problem has been a trend for more than 20 years. All data in Figures 1–3 
are based on Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) programs evaluated during the 
years shown. Figure 1 (Duma & Krieg, 2005) shows that from 1985 through 1990, only 41% 
of programs evaluated by ATEC successfully demonstrated reliability requirements during 
operational testing. Figure 2 (Duma & Krieg, 2005) shows that between 1996 and 2000, only 
20% of programs met reliability requirements; and Figure 3 (US Army Test and Evaluation 








Figure 1. Reliability During Operational Tests (1985–1990) 
(Duma & Krieg, 2005) 
 
Figure 2. Reliability During Operational Tests (1996–2000) 
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Figure 3. Reliability During Operational Tests (1996–2005) 
(US Army Test and Evaluation Command, 2007) 
Stryker was a new Army program in 2000, but suitability issues were certainly not a 
new problem. The Defense Science Board (DSB) pointed out in 2000 that 80% of US Army 
defense systems fail to achieve even half of their required reliability parameters (National 
Research Council, 2006). Steps have been taken to help address this concern. In November 
2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USD(AT&L)), directed that acquisition programs measure performance in terms of 
operational availability, mission reliability, and cost per unit of usage (USD(AT&L), 2004). 
Three months later, the USD(AT&L) issued a memorandum on Total Life Cycle Systems 
Management (TLCSM) Metrics, which provided specific definitions, formulas, and metrics for 
calculating important suitability parameters, such as operational availability and mission 
reliability. In 2005, the DSB recommended that the DoD aggressively pursue implementation 
of performance-based logistics for all weapon systems. The USD(AT&L) has also directed 
that the TLCSM Executive Council develop a metrics handbook to be used in performance-
based contracts and sustainment oversight (USD(AT&L), 2004; 2006). In August 2006, the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) mandated a Key Performance Parameter 
(KPP) of materiel availability including key system attributes of materiel reliability and 
ownership costs (Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2006). These initiatives were 
designed to improve operational performance, establish standard suitability metrics, and 
reduce lifecycle support costs of new DoD weapon systems. 
McQueary’s third observation in his FY 2006 Annual Report is the basis for this 
research article. Many times, systems receiving favorable effectiveness evaluations but 
unfavorable suitability evaluations from IOT&E are fielded before suitability shortcomings 
are corrected. Even though there may be good reasons for deploying these systems before 
correcting all suitability issues (such as an urgent combat need or the negative 
consequences of stopping a hot production line), fielding systems before suitability 
 Amongst Systems Which Did Not Meet Reliability Requirements in OT, 
75% of Them Failed to Achieve Half of Their Requirement 
Only 34% Met 
Requirement 
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deficiencies are corrected will result in reduced operational availability and increased 
support costs. Low suitability directly results in increased lifecycle support costs. These 
costs can appear in many forms, such as increased spares, increased contractor support, 
increased maintenance actions, increased maintenance man-hours, decreased reliability, 
decreased availability, and decreased combat capability. Costs over and above the planned 
costs of lifecycle support can represent a large and unbudgeted expense for the DoD. This 
undesirable trend of low suitability during major weapon system development has been 
observed for at least 20 years across all services, and this trend is not improving. For 
example, the reliability success rate of Army systems tested in 1996–2005 (34%) is lower 
than the reliability success rate for 1985-1990 (41%).  
Overview 
The Stryker family of vehicles was conceived as part of the Army’s Transformation 
Campaign Plan. In 1999, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, came to the 
conclusion that the Army had serious deployability and mobility issues (Military.com, 2007). 
Though the Army was capable of full-spectrum dominance, its organization and force 
structure were not optimized for strategic responsiveness. Army light forces could deploy 
rapidly, but they lacked the lethality, mobility, and staying power necessary to be effective in 
peacekeeping scenarios. On the other hand, Army mechanized forces possessed the 
necessary lethality and staying power but required a large logistics footprint, which hindered 
their ability to be quickly deployed. 
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army announced a new Army vision in October 
1999 to build a landpower force capable of strategic dominance across the full spectrum of 
ground combat operations. The key to implementing this vision was that the Army become 
more strategically responsive. Stryker was designed as a full-spectrum, early-entry combat 
force and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingencies. It was developed 
to operate in a complex environment, including urban terrain, while confronting low- to mid-
range threats with conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Requirements for the Stryker 
include rapid deployment, early entry execution, and the ability to conduct effective combat 
operations immediately upon arrival (Training and Doctrine Command, 2000, June 30).     
Schedule-driven Compromises 
Stryker was initially deployed to Iraq in 2003 due to an urgent combat requirement. 
Prior to deployment, Stryker underwent an aggressive and accelerated development and 
test program. The urgency of the war prevented the complete spectrum of operational 
testing to be completed within allowable time constraints. During IOT&E, only a few selected 
missions, types of terrain, and levels of conflict intensity were evaluated. Also, vehicles used 
did not accrue sufficient operating time to yield statistically relevant Reliability and 
Maintainability (R&M) data.  In addition, a major configuration change was not included as 
part of IOT&E or PVT (Production Verification Tests) because add-on armor was not 
available for installation when testing was performed. The add-on armor package increased 
vehicle weight by approximately 20%. Since these tests were done in under-stressed 
conditions (without add-on armor), long-term durability problems were unlikely to be 
detected (National Research Council, 2004). 
Schedule-driven compromises in T&E are not unusual to DoD programs.  
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Pressures on program officials to meet budgets and deadlines, due to 
congressional and other oversight, result in test strategies geared toward 
demonstrating “successful” performance. Thus, testing is often carried out under 
benign or typical stresses and operating conditions, rather than striving to 
determine failure modes and system limitations under more extreme 
circumstances. (National Research Council, 2006, p. 19) 
According to an article printed in the Detroit News (Zagaroli, 2005), the Project on 
Government Oversight, a nonprofit government accountability organization, reported that 
Stryker was rushed through development, and lack of complete testing could give operators 
a false sense of security if failure modes are not understood (2005). However, the same 
newspaper article acknowledged that reports from the field overwhelmingly indicated that 
Stryker was performing in an outstanding manner. One of the early decisions made by the 
Army to support an accelerated development and deployment timeline was to rely on 
contractor performance-based logistics (PBL) support within the Stryker brigades. Some of 
the duties of the contractor personnel included conducting maintenance on the Stryker 
vehicle and managing the Stryker-specific supply chain. When Stryker was first deployed to 
Iraq, the Army did not have the institutional capability to train soldiers on conducting Stryker 
vehicle maintenance, and therefore faced an immediate need for contractor maintenance 
personnel to support the deployment (GAO, 2006, September 5).  
Each deployed Stryker brigade was fielded with 45 imbedded vehicle maintenance 
contractor personnel. The Army desires to eventually replace the 45 contractors with active 
duty soldiers. Current plans call for implementation (removal of embedded contractors) to 
begin in 2008; however, the GAO reported that this goal will be difficult for the Army to 
achieve for several reasons. First, the 45 imbedded contractor maintenance personnel must 
be replaced by 71 soldiers due to other collateral duties and common training requirements 
of soldiers. Second, the Army is very short of personnel with the five military occupational 
specialties for wheeled vehicle mechanics—resulting in a very difficult recruiting challenge 
for the Army. Currently, as reported by the Washington Post (White, 2007) and the New 
York Times (Cloud, 2007), the Army is falling short of current recruiting goals.  
Operational Readiness 
A key factor affecting Stryker suitability performance is deployed operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO). The program office estimates that the operational tempo is 6 times greater 
than the originally planned OPTEMPO. Other interviews yielded estimates of operational 
tempo up to 10 times the planned OPTEMPO. Harry Levins (2007) reports that vehicles in 
Iraq are using up 7 years of service life for each year of service in Iraq. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO, 2006, September 5) estimates that service life is being 
expended 800% faster than expected. This greatly increased operational tempo results in 
unexpected failure modes and increased failure rates. 
A general finding of this study was that the Army is satisfied with Stryker’s 
performance in the field. System performance in an asymmetric combat scenario under 
difficult environmental conditions exceeds Army expectations. Brigade commanders have 
consistently reported high operational readiness rates (greater than 90%) since Stryker was 
fielded, despite the fact that combat conditions in Iraq have been much different than 
expected (Figure 4). For example, from October 2003 to September 2005, the first two 
Stryker brigades that deployed to Iraq reported an average Operational Readiness Rate 
(ORR) of 96%, which was well above the Army-established ORR performance goal of 90%.  
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Figure 4. Operational Readiness Rates 
Due to the asymmetric nature of the threat forces and to the highly adaptive nature of 
the enemy, the combat scenarios and operating environment have been much different than 
expected. According to the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile (IAV OMS/MP) (Training and Doctrine Command, 2000), the 
Stryker planned mission profile called for operations on hard roads 20% of the time, and 
cross-country operations 80% of the time. The actual Stryker usage in Iraq has been almost 
the opposite (~ 80% on hard roads, 20% cross-country). Most missions resemble police 
actions in an urban environment on paved roads, and crews must routinely drive over curbs 
and other small obstacles to navigate the urban environment. This requires a higher tire 
pressure than normal, causing more vibration and shock loads and high structural stress on 
the vehicles.  
In response to the greater threat of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), and small projectiles, the Army configured Stryker with an add-on 
slat armor package and crews added sand bags. The additional weight affected the 
performance of the Stryker family of vehicles as follows: 
 To operate with the increased vehicle weight, the operating tire pressure had to be 
increased from the design specification of 80 psi to 95 psi. Stryker is configured with 
a centralized tire pressure system that is designed to automatically keep the tire 
pressure at the optimum value for specific terrain conditions, speed, and traction. 
The automatic inflation system was not designed to maintain 95 psi, so soldiers must 
set tire pressure manually and check it three times daily (Smith, 2005). The 
requirement to over-inflate the tires to 95 psi and to physically check tire pressure 
three times per day is an operational nuisance because these are unplanned, but 
necessary, preventive maintenance actions. Additionally, the combination of routine 
excessive structural stress and increased tire pressure causes unanticipated 
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structural failures. For example, a large number of wheel spindles developed fatigue 
cracks and had to be replaced early. Drive shafts are also failing sooner than 
expected.  
 Due to the issues of added weight, excessive tire pressure, and severe operating 
conditions, tires are also failing at a high rate. In one 96-hour test period at Fort Irwin, 
CA—with 16 Stryker vehicles—13 tires had to be changed (WorldNetDaily, 2003). 
The Washington Post reported that 11 tire and wheel assemblies fail every day, and 
the GAO asserts that each Stryker vehicle is going through one tire per day on 
average (Smith, 2005). The additional maintenance actions (checking/adjusting tire 
pressures and changing tires) are extremely burdensome to the crews since 
changing tires is not crew-level maintenance and requires special tools.  
 The 5,000 pounds of armor to counter RPG threats is generally effective but has 
many negative operational consequences, such as limited maneuverability, 
increased component stresses, safety issues, and transportability issues. The extra 
weight and increased physical dimensions caused by the add-on slat armor 
adversely impacts performance, especially when maneuvering in spaces with narrow 
clearance and maneuvering in wet conditions. Operations in soft sand or wet 
conditions (mud) place additional stress on engines, drive shafts, and differentials; 
these items have experienced higher-than-normal failure rates (Dougherty, 2004).  
 Also, the slat armor causes multiple problems for safe and effective operations. Slat 
armor can deform during normal operations, sometimes blocking escape hatches 
and the rear troop egress door. The armor adds approximately 3 feet to the vehicle’s 
width and can interfere with the driver’s vision. Armor also makes it difficult for others 
to see the Stryker at night, which is a safety hazard in the urban environment. The 
armor is very heavy for the rear ramp and strains lifting equipment; crews must 
sometimes manually assist raising or lowering the rear ramp. The armor attaching 
bolts on the rear ramp can break off with normal use (increasing the maintenance 
burden) and may generate unsafe conditions. In addition, slat armor prohibits normal 
use of storage racks, which may impact operations. Lastly, slat armor affects the 
transportability of the vehicle in a C-130 cargo aircraft, since the extra weight greatly 
reduces transport range (GAO, 2004).  
Even though these operational issues caused by the add-on slat armor place 
additional maintenance burdens on crews, Stryker has been reported to be well-suited for 
the urban fight. Unlike the M-1 tank, Stryker can operate very quietly at high speed, which 
can be a tremendous tactical advantage (Tyson, 2003). Most Army personnel interviewed 
felt strongly that Stryker’s tactical performance in the urban environment in Iraq was 
significantly better than the M113A3, HMMWV, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, or Abrams Tank.  
In response to unanticipated urgent combat needs in Iraq, some engineering 
improvements (configuration changes) were performed on the Stryker since deployment. 
Since the Army did not buy the technical data package because of its cost, these 
engineering changes have resulted in increased costs and potential risks (GAO, 2006, July). 
The GAO reports that current DoD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term 
technical data rights for weapon system sustainment. As part of the department’s acquisition 
reforms and performance-based strategies, the DoD has de-emphasized the acquisition of 
technical data rights. The GAO has recommended that the DoD recognize the need for the 
acquisition of technical data rights and asserts that without technical data rights, the DoD 
may face challenges in efficiently sustaining weapon systems throughout their lifecycle. 
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A very important contractual requirement for the prime contractor, General Dynamics 
Land Systems (GDLS), is to maintain an Operational Readiness Rate (ORR) of 90% or 
better. This requirement pertains only to the base vehicle configuration and does not include 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Since initial deployment, Stryker has routinely 
exceeded this operational requirement. The Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract effectively 
motivates GDLS to exceed 90% ORR; however, the contract is not necessarily effective at 
controlling support costs, and this may be a risk to the government (US Army Audit Agency, 
2005). One example of such a risk is the repair and replacement of a high-failure item—for 
example, cracked hydraulic reservoirs in the power pack. Maintenance procedures call for 
the entire power pack to be replaced as a unit, rather than removing and repairing/replacing 
the hydraulic reservoir within the power pack. Replacing entire power packs (instead of 
repairing/replacing hydraulic reservoirs within the power packs) results in shorter down-
times and higher ORR, but it also requires more power packs (very large, expensive units) 
to be purchased and shipped to operating bases and forward maintenance facilities. The net 
result is that higher operational readiness is being purchased with increased transportation 
and storage costs.  
Sustainability Challenges 
Since Stryker’s initial deployment was accelerated to meet an urgent combat need, 
the Stryker program team was performing the following activities concurrently: testing, 
production, fielding, training, and combat. In addition to the many challenges caused by 
these concurrent activities, the threat and operational environment in Iraq were different 
than anticipated, as previously mentioned. Several other factors added to the difficulty of 
maintaining Stryker vehicles in the field.  
First, the Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs) were not mature at the 
time of initial fielding. Many maintenance procedures could not be performed based on the 
IETMs because they were either not characterized correctly or crews were not adequately 
trained on their use. This situation led to tribal system maintenance, in which units 
depended on soldiers and contractors with experience on similar systems (like the M-113 
armored personnel carrier) to figure out how to perform the maintenance actions correctly.  
Second, since a large portion of maintenance actions were supported by contractor 
personnel, soldiers developed a rental car mentality. This lack of ownership mentality 
resulted in soldiers being overly dependent on contractor personnel to perform routine 
preventive maintenance actions, such as checking fluid levels. One vehicle was lost 
because the pre-mission engine oil check was ignored. 
Findings 
Stryker is performing well in the field. The system is exceeding expectations of Army 
management and soldiers. In spite of a changing threat environment (improved IEDs and 
excessive operations in the urban environment) and major configuration changes (5,000 
pounds of add-on armor), Stryker is accomplishing its mission. The Operational Readiness 
Rate has consistently been over 90%. 
Due to the increased threat of RPGs and IEDs, Stryker was outfitted with an add-on 
armor package. The additional 5,000 pounds of armor has been generally effective at 
mitigating the threat but has resulted in some negative operational/support consequences. 
The extra weight requires increased tire pressure, which causes operational problems and 
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more structural stresses. Additionally, the armor limits crew visibility during operations and 
restricts airlift transportability on a C-130 aircraft. 
Army decisions regarding contractor logistics support may remain with the Stryker 
program for years. When Stryker was first deployed to Iraq in 2003, the Army faced an 
immediate need for contractor maintenance personnel to support operations (45 vehicle 
maintenance personnel per brigade). The Army plans to eventually replace the 45 contractor 
maintenance personnel with soldiers, but it will take approximately 71 soldiers per brigade to 
perform the same level of vehicle maintenance as the 45 contractors because of other 
duties and responsibilities of active duty personnel. The current plan is to begin the 
transition to soldier maintenance in 2008, but the transition will probably be very difficult to 
implement due to the poor recruiting/retention outlook in general and to the shortage of 
appropriate active duty maintenance personnel.  
Stryker program development was accelerated to meet the Army’s combat needs in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to the compressed developmental schedule, Stryker DT/OT 
was unable to fully test all configuration changes. DT revealed relevant problem areas, but 
there was insufficient time or priority to correct all problems before OT and fielding. 
For many DoD acquisition programs, the maturity of suitability parameters lags the 
maturity of effectiveness parameters during program development. Suitability determinants 
(such as reliability and maintainability) are not addressed early enough and are not 
prioritized with the same vigor and discipline as performance parameters like speed, 
accuracy, and lethality. 
The general issue of suitability shortfalls in DoD acquisition programs is recognized 
at high levels of management and is being addressed. JROC, DOT&E, and USD(AT&L) 
have each called for increased attention to suitability improvements. For example, a new 
requirement exists for a Materiel Availability KPP. 
The operational tempo of Stryker vehicles in Iraq far exceeds original usage 
estimates by at least 500%. Also, the mission profile of Stryker is much different than 
expected (80% on paved roads). This, in combination with the added weight of slat armor, 
has resulted in excessive stresses to the suspension, wheels, and tire assemblies, which 
causes increased failure rates of these items. 
Since Stryker was fielded in 2003 in Iraq, the operational situation has been 
dynamic, unpredictable, and volatile. Four factors have made it very difficult to obtain 
complete and reliable data for trend analyses. The first factor is the rapidly evolving adaptive 
nature of the threat in an asymmetric combat environment. The second factor is that the 
operational environment for deployed Stryker vehicles is more severe than anticipated 
during design/development. The third factor is that, in response to the first two factors, 
configuration changes have precluded a stable baseline. The fourth factor is that in a 
dangerous combat scenario, recording and reporting data is not a high priority for 
operational crews.  
Conclusions 
In response to Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was an urgent operational need to 
deploy the Stryker system. Therefore, the development and test programs were greatly 
accelerated to get Stryker units into the field as quickly as possible. At the same time, the 
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mission was changing as the threat quickly adapted and evolved in this asymmetric combat 
environment. The continually changing configuration baseline and changing tactical 
conditions made it very difficult to evaluate or predict reliability and suitability performance 
across all mission scenarios. The operational situation has been dynamic, as well as 
unpredictable and volatile, because Stryker was deployed in operational combat conditions 
that were different from, and much more complex than, those originally anticipated. In many 
ways, the system was not adequately designed for the actual threat it currently faces. 
However, this is certainly not the first time nor the last time this type of situation will occur. 
As a result, this case is a good example of how incomplete or incorrect maintenance/support 
planning can significantly add to the logistics burden. Due to the adaptive nature of the 
threat in the asymmetric warfare environment of Iraq and Afghanistan, our acquisition 
managers and operational planners are challenged to consider more complex and dynamic 
combat scenarios and contingencies than ever before. 
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a growing emphasis in recent years 
on the pursuit of agile capabilities via net-centric operations. Dramatic technological 
advancements in communications and sensing have generated opportunities for battlefield 
systems to exploit collaboration for multiple effects. In this setting, systems are expected 
and often required to interoperate along several dimensions. Yet, the manner in which these 
“system-of-systems” are acquired (designed, developed, tested and fielded) has not kept 
pace with the shifts in operational doctrine. Systems acquisition remains largely focused on 
requirements for individual operation, paying insufficient attention to the ability of systems to 
influence the variety of future ecosystems in which they may subsist. Further, acquisition 
programs have struggled with complexities in both program management and engineering 
design. This paper establishes an understanding and classification of underlying 
complexities in the acquisition of system-of-systems. It also provides a conceptual model 
that exposes the connectivity between systems and the impact of system heterogeneity and 
externalities on that connectivity throughout the acquisition lifecycle. Implementation of this 
model in an exploratory simulation is in progress. Its objective is to allow acquisition 
professionals to develop intuition for procuring and deploying system-of-systems, providing 
a venue for experimentation and exploration to develop insights that underpin successful 
acquisition of SoS-oriented defense capabilities.  
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A system-of-systems (SoS) consists of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems 
that can (and do) operate independently but can also assemble in networks and collaborate 
to achieve a goal. According to Maier (1998),  component systems of the SoS typically 
demonstrate traits of operational and managerial independence, emergent behavior, 
evolutionary development and geographic distribution. Networks of component systems 
often form among a hierarchy of levels and evolve over time as systems are added to or 
removed from the SoS. However, these component systems are often developed out of 
context of their interactions with the future SoS. As a result, the systems may be unable to 
interact with the future SoS, adapt to any emergent behavior, or be robust in the face of 
external disturbances. The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) 
is an example of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition process for an SoS, 
“patterned after the successful Department of Defense (DoD) model of contracting to 
competing industry teams” (Anderson, Burton, Palmquist, & Watson. 1999). IDS has faced 
technical and management challenges similar to those that are historically prevalent in 
acquisitions in SoS environments. 
In the 1990s, the USCG Acquisition Directorate recognized the need to “deliver and 
support new generations of platform and mission systems” (1998). The 25-year, $24 billion 
IDS is aimed at “delivering new aircraft and cutters, modernizing legacy assets, and 
providing a new generation of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) mission systems for forces 
deployed and ashore” (1998).  In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded this contract to Integrated 
Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), an industry consortium of Northrop Grumman, Lockheed 
Martin and several other defense contractors. ICGS was contracted to act as the Lead 
System Integrator responsible for acquiring assets and integrating them into the IDS. The 
USCG recently dismissed its Lead System Integrator after a series of technical and 
managerial failures (Allen, 2007). In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reported that the collaboration among the subcontractors continues to be problematic and 
that the system integrator wields little influence to compel decisions among them (Caldwell, 
2006). 
The DHS and the DoD are not the only organizations struggling with systems 
integration of a collection of complex system. The Air Transportation System and the NASA 
Constellation program are also facing similar challenges in attempting to apply generic 
system engineering processes for acquisition in an SoS environment. Integration challenges 
faced by the Constellation Program are documented in a recent NRC report (Committee on 
Systems Integration for Project Constellation, 2004). Both DoD and non-DoD examples are 
the key drivers motivating the research described in this paper. 
The overarching goal of this research is to understand which types of acquisition 
management, policy insights and approaches can increase the success of an acquisition 
process in the SoS setting. The three research questions being explored are as follows: 
1. Is there a taxonomy by which one can detect classes of complexities in particular 
SoS applications? 
2. What are the underlying systems engineering (SE) and program management 
functions that are affected? 
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3. How can exploratory modeling generate SE and acquisition management insights 
and approaches to improve the probability of success?  
In order to answer some of the questions posed, we aim to 
1. Identify the complexities in the acquisition of SoS based on historical trends of 
“failures,” especially in the context of the DoD and DHS.  
2. Develop a conceptual model of a generic acquisition process that can then be 
customized to different SoS applications. 
3. Develop and simulate a computational model using an existing acquisition process 
for an SoS as a case-study; for example, the USCG Integrated Deepwater System 
could be used as an example of a DHS acquisition process set in an SoS 
environment. Interpretations of the results obtained would be used to field the 
research questions posed. 
Since the project is presently at its midway point, in this paper we only focus on the 
first two research questions, specifically, on the mappings between SoS acquisition 
difficulties and complexities with a view toward model development. A general framework for 
and an outline of the computational model are provided. 
2. Mapping Failure Modes to Underlying Complexities 
Simon (1996) and Bar-Yam (2003) define complexity as the amount of information 
necessary to describe a system effectively. In the context of a system-of-systems, the 
necessary information encompasses both the systems that comprise the SoS and their time-
varying interactions with each other and the “externalities.” Rouse  suggested that the 
complexity of a system (or model of a system) is related to 
 The intentions with which one addresses the systems. 
 The characteristics of the representation that appropriately accounts for the system’s 
boundaries, architecture, interconnections and information flows. 
 The multiple representations of a system, all of which are simplifications; hence, 
complexity is inevitably underestimated. 
 The context, multiple stakeholders, and objectives associated with the system’s 
development, deployment and operation. (2007)  
 (Polzer, DeLaurentis and Fry (2007) explored the issue of multiplicity of perspectives, 
in which perspective was defined as a system’s version of operational context.) 
 The learning and adaptation exhibited during the system’s evolution (Rouse, 2007). 
Historical data from previous unsuccessful defense acquisition programs show a 
distinct correlation with the causes for complexity identified by Rouse (2007). Fowler (1994) 
points out some of the causes for the failure of the Defense Acquisition Process to be “over 
specification and an overly rigid approach on development”: unreasonably detailed cost 
estimates of development and production, impractical schedules and extremely large 
bureaucratic overhead. Dr. Pedro Rustan, director of advanced systems and technology at 
the National Reconnaissance Office, identified four specific shortcomings in the acquisition 
process for defense space systems: “initial weapons performance requirements that are too 
detailed and lacking flexibility,” “insufficient flexibility in the budget process,” “a propensity to 
increase performance requirements in the middle of the acquisition cycle” and demands to 
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field entirely new spacecraft to meet new requirement” (Spring, 2005). Riccioni (2005) used 
the United State Air Force (USAF) F-22 Raptor Program to illustrate shortcomings of the 
existing Defense Acquisition Process. Some of the recognized reasons for the failure of the 
F-22 Raptor Program were the ambitious nature of the set requirements, the “gross 
underestimation” and continual misrepresentation of cost in order to “seduce the Congress 
and the Public” to believe that the aircraft was affordable. However, the major failing of this 
program lies in that the enormous delay in the development process (spanning over two 
decades) resulted in an aircraft that was no longer needed since the “existing and future 
enemies changed natures.” Riccioni also points out that “terrorists are the only extant and 
foreseeable threats” but they do not threaten the West with fighter aircrafts. In another 
example, the US Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) has found difficulties in developing 
and fielding equipment that meet the program objective (Capaccio, 2006). 
Using the above examples in conjunction with other acquisition programs, such as 
USCG Integrated Deepwater System and Future Combat System, we summarize the 
common causes of failure within acquisition processes as: a) misalignment of objectives 
among the systems, b) limited span of control of the SoS engineer on the component 
systems of the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) inflexibility of the component system 
designs, e) emergent behavior revealing hidden dependencies within systems, f) perceived 
complexity of systems and g) the challenges in system representation.  
Sage and Biemer (2007) examined the existing systems engineering process models 
in the context of their applicability to SoS and concluded that none of them “could be tailored 
to systems family development.” Sage and Biemer also developed the System-of-systems 
Engineering (SoSE) Process Model designed specifically for SoS applications. The 
complexities discussed above were mapped onto a section of the SoSE Process Model 
based on the trends observed in past acquisition processes within the DoD Acquisition 
Process. Figure 1 depicts the mapping of some of these complexities to a section of the 
SoSE Process Model, representing from where complexities might arise and how they may 
affect the acquisition process. For example, SoS operations could demonstrate emergent 
behavior and result in a change in the CONOPs for the SoS. Evolution of the SoS changes 
the CONOPS of the SoS may result in a subsequent change in the Acquisition Strategy. 
Misalignment of objectives of the component systems in an SoS can arise from both the 
CONOPs as well as the SoS Project Control. System inflexibility, perceived complexities and 
challenges in representing systems occur mostly between or within systems. Accurate 
representation of component systems is complicated by the presence of hidden and visible 
dependencies between systems, fuzzy boundaries, unknown architectures, etc.  
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Figure 1. Complexities Mapped to a Section of the SoSE Process Model 
(Sage & Biemer, 2007) 
 
3. Towards Development of an Exploratory Model for SoS 
Acquisition 
3.1  Pre-Acquisition Model 
The purpose of the pre-acquisition model is to better understand the external 
stakeholders that affect the acquisition process. The model we developed is depicted in 
Figure 2 and is based loosely on Sage and Biemer (2007) SoSE Process Model. External 
inputs to the SoS acquisition process are sorted into three categories: “Capabilities & 
Possibilities” (CAP), “Technology Assessment, Development, Investment and Affordability 
Plan” (ADIA) and the funding received. The CAP and ADIA are our own creation. Though 
they are similar to the Concepts of Operation (CONOPs) and Technology Investment and 
Development Plan (TDIP) in the SoSE Process Model, there are some key differences.   
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model for Pre-Acquisition Activities 
The need, objective, and vision for an SoS feed the CAP. The CAP is a high-level 
requirements document that provides the following information: 
1. The capabilities that the SoS is required to possess and services it must provide 
2. The system types that are needed to provide these capabilities 
3. The relative roles and responsibilities of the constituent systems 
4. Milestones in the development of the SoS and the number of increments needed 
5. Baseline SoS capability at its first deployment  
6. Future possibilities for the SoS in terms of capabilities it may possess and services it 
may provide  
7. Pre-planned product improvement (P3I) for each system type to support future 
capabilities of the SoS 
The main differences between the CONOPS and CAP stem from the last two entries 
(6 and 7). The evolutionary nature of the SoS requires the dynamic addition and removal of 
component systems and functionalities. While the capabilities required for the SoS at the 
time of first deployment may be basic, the future capabilities of the SoS allow the systems of 
the SoS to be developed keeping in mind the future capabilities the SoS will provide. This 
prevents individual systems from becoming obsolete or being drastically re-designed. 
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The CAP feeds the Technology ADIA Plan, which is needed to 
1. Assess the capabilities of the legacy systems and their current maturities 
2. Provide a cost estimate for upgrading/ developing systems  
3. Provide an estimate of the investment that will be needed per increment  
4. Assess the affordability of the investment 
The differences in the Technology ADIA Plan and the TDIP stem from entries 2 and 
3 in the list above. In addition to the functions of the TDIP, the Technology ADIA Plan 
provides cost estimates for all new development needed, including a cost breakdown per 
increment in the development process.  
Both the CAP and the Technology ADIA Plan are required to determine the amount 
of funding required for the project. While there are numerous factors that are used to 
determine funding (such as political affiliation, unexpected crisis, regulations etc), CAP and 
the Technology ADIA Plan are the inputs to the acquisition process that translate into 
technical requirements for the SoS. Provision of a computational model of the pre-
acquisition activities is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on realizing a 
model for the acquisition strategy, which is described next. 
3.2  Acquisition Strategy Model 
Development of a “brand new” SoS has been and will remain a rare occurrence. The 
United States Air Force (USAF) Scientific Advisory Board (Saunders et al., 2005) states that 
one of the challenges in building an SoS is that legacy systems are contributors that affect 
the performance of other systems. These legacy systems, may be used “as-is” or may need 
some re-engineering to feed the needs of the new SoS. In addition, new systems are 
incorporated to develop the capabilities of the SoS. Again, the new systems can range from 
off-the-shelf, plug-and-play products to custom-built systems dependent of the working of a 
legacy system. The breadth of the heterogeneity of the components can be broadly 
categorized under legacy systems, new systems and improvements. Sub-categories arise 
when two or more categories overlap.  
 
Figure 3. Heterogeneity of Component Systems in an SoS 
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The different components that comprise the acquisition process in an SoS 
environment are depicted in Figure 3. For example, improvements can be non-system 
related, such as improvements in business practices for the SoS, or they can be system-
related such as re-engineering legacy systems or customizing/developing new systems to 
meet the needs of the SoS. Similarly, legacy and new systems can be independent “as-is” 
systems, dependent “as-is” systems, independent systems in need of “re-engineering,” or 
dependent systems that need customization. Another subcategory is based on the 
interoperability of the systems in the SoS. While some dependent systems have existing 
interfaces that allow them to be interoperable (plug-and-play), others need to develop 
interfaces that allow them to interact with other systems.  
Implementing and integrating these different kinds of systems and processes into the 
SoS is made more complex by the evolutionary nature of an SoS. Thus, it must be made 
possible for component systems to re-designed or upgraded dynamically without having to 
re-design the entire SoS. Also, though most systems depend on others during the 
implementation or integration phases, they are not centrally controlled. This requires that the 
systems have an incentive to collaborate with each other without being forced to do so. 
These issues are merely a sub-set of the challenges for an acquisition process (as 
discussed in Section 2) in an SoS environment.   
The conceptual model for acquisition strategy proposed in this section is based on 
the 16 basic technical management and technical system-engineering processes outlined in 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2006), often referred to as the 5000-series guide. 
However, an SoS environment changes the way these processes are applied. The 2007 
System-of-Systems System Engineering (SoS-SE) Guide (Systems and Software 
Engineering, 2006) addresses these considerations by modifying (or in some cases 
revamping) some of the 16 processes in accord with an SoS environment. These new 
processes and their functions are described in Table 1. Our conceptual model for acquisition 
in an SoS environment is illustrated in Figure 4. It is centered on the revised processes and 
depicted in a hierarchy to show the flow of control between the processes throughout the 
acquisition lifecycle. 
Table 1. Modified Technical Management and Technical Processes  
as described in the DoD SoS-SE Guidebook 
(Systems and Software Engineering, 2006) 
Requirements 
Development 
Takes all inputs from relevant stakeholders and translates the inputs into technical 
requirements 
Logical Analysis Is the process of obtaining sets of logical solutions to improve the understanding 
of the defined requirements and the relationships among the requirements (e.g., 
functional, behavioral, temporal) 
Design Solution Process that translates the outputs of the Requirements Development and Logical 




Provides the basis for evaluating and selecting alternatives when decisions need 
to be made. 
Implementation The process that actually yields the lowest level system elements in the system 
hierarchy. The system element is made, bought or reused. 
Integration The process of incorporating the lower-level system elements into a high-level 
system element in the physical architecture. 
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Verification Confirms that the system element meets the design-to or build-to specifications. It 
answers the question, “Did you build it right?” 
Validation Answers the question “Did you build the right thing?” 
Transition The process applied to move the end-item system to the user. 
Technical 
Planning 








Provides traceability back to user-defined capabilities 
Risk 
Management 
To help ensure program cost, schedule and performance objectives are achieved 
at every stage in the lifecycle and to communicate to all stakeholders the process 
for uncovering, determining the scope of, and managing program uncertainties. 
Configuration 
Management 
The application of sound business practices to establish and maintain consistency 




Address the handling of information necessary for or associated with product 
development and sustainment. 
Interface 
Management 
Ensures interface definition and compliance among the elements that compose 
the system, as well as with other systems with which the system or systems 
elements must interoperate.  
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Figure 4. Conceptual Model for Acquisition Strategy  
Based on SoS SE Processes of Table 1 
As can be seen in Figure 4, Requirements Development provides the technical 
requirements of the SoS, based on the relevant external inputs. The pre-acquisition model 
as discussed in Section 3.1 provides details about the external inputs: CAP, Technology 
ADIA Plan and funding. The technical requirements are then sent to Logical Analysis to 
check for relationships among the requirements. This also helps to check for inconsistencies 
among requirements for different systems and how that might affect the functioning and 
behavior of the future SoS.  
Design Solution development and Decision Analysis are the next processes that 
come up with the optimal design solution from the set of feasible solutions to meet the given 
requirements. The optimal design solution is not only based on the current set of 
requirements and solution alternatives but it also takes into account all previous information 
and data available through requirements, risk, configuration, interface and data 
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management processes.  Since most SoS acquisitions are multi-year projects involving 
many different parties, the overlap between the management processes, Design Solution 
and Decision Analysis processes, allows for greater traceability for decisions made. The 
optimal design solution obtained from this phase is then sent to the next stage: Technology 
Planning and Technology Assessment. In the event that there is not an optimal or sub-
optimal design solution to successfully implement the given requirements, the feedback loop 
to Requirement Development translates into a change in the technical requirements for the 
SoS.  
Technology Planning and Technology Assessment are essentially scheduling 
processes that help oversee the implementation, integration, validation and verification for 
all the α-level systems in the SoS. Systems in the SoS are often dependent on other 
systems for either implementation or integration, or both. These dependencies correspond 
to time-lags in the acquisition process. For example, if system A is a legacy system and 
system B is being built, the integration of A with B will not occur until B has been completely 
implemented. This generates a time lag, especially if another system C is waiting to be 
implemented based on the integration of A with B. As more systems are added to the SoS, it 
becomes necessary to generate a schedule that can help coordinate the process. This 
schedule also needs to be continually updated to reflect unexpected delays, clearly identify 
bottle-necks, etc.  
Due to the heterogeneity of the systems that comprise the SoS and the interactions 
between then, Validation and Verification processes need to not only check for suitable 
implementation of the “optimal design solution” on a system-level but also need to be on the 
lookout for any misaligned objectives between systems, hidden dependencies among the 
systems, and any emergent behavior that may affect the functioning and/or behavior of the 
future SoS. In most situations, early detection of an emergent behavior will prevent the re-
designing of major system components and ensure that the SoS functions satisfactorily. 
Even though Validation and Verification processes oversee Implementation and Integration, 
they occur after Implementation and Integration have begun.  
While Implementation and Integration are the lowest levels of the acquisition model 
shown, much of the feedback from this level translates into developing different design 
solutions and sometimes changing the technical requirements. This level deals with 
acquiring the systems in the SoS and integrating them based on their dependencies with 
other systems. These processes consume the bulk of the financial and other resources as 
well as consume the most time. Therefore, it is understandable why system engineers are 
often reluctant to re-design functional systems on a whim and why they want to make sure 
that once the system has been developed, integrated and tested, it does not go back into 
the Implementation phase.  
4. Developing a Computational Exploratory Model for 
Acquisition Strategy 
4.1  Overview 
Our purpose in constructing a computational exploratory model is to allow acquisition 
professionals to develop intuition for procuring and deploying system-of-systems. Thus, the 
objective is not to provide a model validated and ready for deployment in real acquisition 
programs but to expose the complexities in SoS acquisition. The specific complexities 
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targeted are related to evolutionary development of the SoS and the span-of-control 
possessed by the SoS managers and engineers. The conceptual model displayed in Figure 
4 is implemented using the USCG Integrated Deepwater System as a case study. Given the 
possibility of emergent behavior during evolutionary development and the heterogeneity of 
the components and their interactions, we decided to use the agent based modeling (ABM) 
approach.  
Several challenges arise in transforming the acquisition model to a computational 
model for purposes of simulation and learning. One challenge lies in converting all the 
qualitative concepts into quantitative measures to support the computational model for SoS 
acquisition. We started by building an ideal model devoid of disruptors that historically 
plague the acquisition process. We will add non-linear behavior to the ideal model to test 
different scenarios in the process.  
A second challenge is building a model that can accommodate the dynamic addition 
and removal of components in the SoS. In addition, these component systems need to 
reflect the heterogeneity of the systems in a real acquisition process. We included 
parameters such as level of completeness to demonstrate the difference between legacy 
systems, new systems and the partially implemented/ integrated systems. Level of 
completeness for both integration and implementation processes vary between 0 and 1, 
where 1 means that the system is 100% complete. For example, system A representing a 
fully implemented legacy system has an implementation completeness set to “1,” while its 
integration with system B might only be 20% complete. In this case, the completeness of the 
integration phase is initialized to 0.20. 
A third challenge arises from the numerous methodologies that can be applied to 
reflect the integration and implementation processes. In a simplified model, it is much easier 
to begin integration once all the systems have been implemented. However, this method is 
neither cost nor time efficient, especially in multi-year projects involving numerous systems. 
On the other hand, dynamically implementing and integrating systems is time efficient but 
often not possible when dependent systems are outside the span of control of the systems 
engineers. For example, a cutter and helicopter may be dependent systems being 
developed by different contractors or different groups that cannot be forced to collaborate. 
This gives rise to questions: How do we group the systems for integration to achieve 
maximum efficiency with regard to time and cost incurred? Would it be beneficial to group 
systems based on the span of control or influence of the systems engineers or on the direct 
dependencies of the system?  
However, developing an acquisition model that studies the effects of all the factors 
that add to the complexity of the acquisition process for SoS in a short span of time is 
impossible. Our coarse-scale engineering model will specifically target challenges related to 
the evolution of the SoS and the span-of-control of the SoS engineer(s).  
4.2  Model Inputs  
The exploratory computational model developed has a top-down flow with feedback 
at two junctures. The flow of control begins from Requirement Development (Level t0(0), 
Figure 4) to Design Solution (Level t3(0), Figure 4) through Logical Analysis(Level t2(0), 
Figure 4). This linkage is shown in the Figure 5.  
The primary inputs fed into the Requirement Development and Logical Analysis 
processes (e.g., number of requirements, the relationships between these requirements, the 
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systems affected and the dependencies between these systems) are user-defined. The 
inputs are used to develop a schedule of when each requirement will be implemented, 
depending on the relationships between the requirements. An example of such user-defined 
data for these steps is shown in Table 2.  
 
Figure 5. Flow of Control and Parallel Processing of Requirements 
As shown in Table 2, there are 3 requirements (1, 2 and 3) and each has a 
dependency vector associated with it. The vectors are concatenated to form the 
dependency matrix for requirements. An “X” is placed for all diagonal elements of the 
dependency matrix because a requirement cannot be dependent on itself. The vector for 
requirement 1 ([X 1 0]), shows that requirement “1” is dependent on requirement “2.” This 
means that requirement 1 cannot be realized until requirement 2 is implemented. A lack of 
dependency between requirements means that the requirements can be simultaneously 
realized. In real world applications, communication upgrade to the North-Atlantic fleet may 
be independent of the weaponry upgrade for the same group of systems. In such a case, 
both the requirements on the same group of systems may be implemented simultaneously. 
Each requirement affects a subset of the systems present in the SoS, and the systems in 
each subset share a unique dependency matrix with other systems in that subset (shown in 
Table 2). 
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Table 2. User-defined Data Used for the Computational Model 
Requirements Dependency Systems Affected System-level Dependency  































All component systems of the SoS have user-defined and calculated parameters that 
expose their heterogeneity and help track their progress through the acquisition process.  
Some of the parameters used to describe each system in the SoS are described in Table 3. 
While the parameters “Name,” “Imp.completeness,” “Imp.time,” “Imp.dependencies,” 
“Int.completeness,” “Int.time” and “Int.dependencies” are user-defined, ID and Mode are 
calculated by the model.  
Level of completeness for both integration and implementation processes vary 
between 0 and 1, where 1 means that the system is a 100% complete. A partially complete 
system may start with a fractional level of completeness. Though the level of completeness 
for implementation and integration are mutually exclusive, a system can not have “0” 
implementation completeness and a non-zero integration completeness. This qualitatively 
means that a system that has not yet been implemented cannot be partially integrated with 
another system. Times to complete implementation and integration are discrete.  
Table 3. Parameters Used to Describe Any System in the SoS 
Parameter Description 
Name Name of the system 
ID Unique ID assigned to the system 
Imp.completeness[] An array that gives the completeness of the implementation of the 
system at any given time.  
Imp.dependencies[] Dependency vector that shows if system implementation is 
dependant on any other system
Imp.time Maximum time needed to complete implementation 
Int.completeness[] An array that gives the completeness of the integration of the 
system with respect to another system at any given time.  
Int.dependencies[] Dependency vector that shows if system integration is dependant 
on any other system 
Int.time Maximum Time needed to complete integration of system x with 
any other system
Mode[x;y] Provides the phase of development the system is currently in and 
its status
 
Each system has a pre-defined dependency vector associated with implementation 
and integration processes. These vectors are concatenated to form a dependency matrix for 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 185 - 
=
=
the systems affected by each requirement. Elements along the diagonal of the dependency 
matrix (denoted with an “X”) are assigned a value of “0” since a system cannot be 
dependent or independent of itself. Otherwise, element (i,j) in the system-level dependency 
matrix can be 0 or 1. A value of 0 signifies that the system (i) is independent of system(j) 
and a value of 1 signifies that system(i) is dependent on system(j). The dependency matrix 
can be directed. This occurs when system (i) is dependent on system (j) but not vice-versa. 
In Table 3, the system-level dependency matrix for requirement 3 is directed.  
As previously mentioned, parameters of ID and Mode are assigned by the model. 
When the system is added to the SoS, it is assigned an ID to uniquely identify it throughout 
the lifecycle of the SoS. The mode of each system contains two elements: the phase (first 
element) and the status (second element). Depending on the level of completeness of the 
system in the integration and implementation phases, the phase of the mode is set to values 
of {0,1,2,3}. When the system is added into the SoS, 0 is the Mode assigned; 1 and 2 refer 
to implementation and integration states respectively, and 3 refers to in-operation state.  
Status of the Mode can be set to 0 or 1, depending on if the system is available for 
implementation/integration or not. Thus, a Mode of [2; 1] means that the system is in the 
integration phase and is currently being integrated with another system. 
4.3  Model Dynamics 
As seen in Figure 5, the flow of control in the model starts from the Requirement 
Development (Level t0(0), Figure 4) to Validation and Verification (Levelt6(0), Figure 4). 
When the model is first deployed, this stage initializes all processes by supplying 
requirements to be implemented, systems affected, etc. Each requirement also has a 
“change” status flag that shows when a particular requirement is unchanged (status=0), 
being changed (status=-1) or has been changed (status=1). When a requirement is changed 
after the acquisition process has begun, it affects all subsequent processes.  
 Using the user-defined parameters and inputs from Requirement Development 
(similar to the data shown in Table 2), Logical Analysis (Level t2(0), Figure 4) generates a 
schedule to realize the given requirements. Depending on the dependencies between the 
requirements, they get implemented in series or in parallel with other requirements. As 
shown in Figure 5, every requirement being implemented is fed into its own Design Solution 
and Decision Analysis (Level t3(0), Figure 4) process. This process can change the 
implementation or integration times required by each system affected by the requirement. If 
a requirement is changed, the design solution and implementation processes for the 
component systems are affected. The set of systems with their modified implementation and 
integration times are then sent through the Technology Planning and Technology 
Assessment (Level t4(0), Figure 4) processes.  
Technology Planning takes in the array of systems being affected by the given 
requirement and divides them into “to-be-implemented” and “read-for-integration” queues 
depending on the implementation/integration times needed for each system. Since the 
component systems in the acquisition process can be at varying levels of completeness 
during the implementation and integration cycles, they are dynamically added to the queues. 
For each queue, a synchronization matrix (sync_mat) is generated to keep track of the 
number of systems in the queue, their expected times of completion and their “iteration-
rate.” Given the maximum time allotted and the existing level of completeness, Iteration rate 
is defined as the average rate at which the process needs to be completed for a system. For 
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example, if system “A,” which is 25% completed needs to be fully implemented in 5 time-
steps, using Equation 1, the iteration rate of system “A” is calculated to be 0.15. 




)0(1_ −=  
The systems in the synchronization matrix for the implementation/integration queues 
are sorted on the basis of 1) number of systems dependent on that system and, 2) 
maximum time required by the system to complete the process. Thus, systems with larger 
number of systems dependent on them are higher on the synchronization queue than those 
with a fewer number of dependent systems. Similarly, systems with the same number of 
dependent systems—those requiring less time for implementation/integration—get higher 
priority. Since this is a basic model, we only have two criteria to determine an appropriate 
schedule. In future models, more conditions can be added to simulate different 
methodologies. For example, priority of the systems in the queue may be a factor that 
determines their position in the process queues.  
Technology Assessment uses the synchronization matrix developed by Technology 
Planning to track the progress of the systems in the implementation/ integration queues. In a 
non-ideal acquisition model, the iteration rates for the systems will be subject to external 
perturbations. A drastically reduced iteration-rate will stall the development of a system mid-
process and affect other systems dependent on the stalled system. Technology Assessment 
recognizes the stalled systems and activates “enablers” to re-adjust their iteration-rate.  
Implementation (Level t5(0), Figure 4) of systems can also occur in series or parallel 
configurations depending on the system dependencies. The level of completeness for an 
implementation process increases by the iteration rate at every time-step, until it reaches a 
completeness value of 1. The incremental increase in the level of completeness of two 
independent systems with different iteration rates occurs simultaneously, as shown in Figure 
6a. If system “B” were dependent on system “A,” then implementation of B would commence 
when A was fully implemented, as shown in Figure 6b. When a system achieves the 
implementation completeness value of 1, it is added onto the integration queue. Since the 
integration and implementation process queues are dynamically generated, the 
synchronization matrix for the systems in the queues also changes dynamically.  
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Figure 6. Incremental Increase in Implementation Completeness for a) Independent 
Systems b) Dependent Systems. 
The Integration (Level t5(0), Figure 4) process also uses a synchronization matrix for 
coordination. While parallel processing of dynamically changing process queues greatly 
improves the time efficiency for independent systems, they also increase the probability of 
dependent systems trying to integrate with each other at the same time. For example, 
system “A” might be waiting to be integrated with system “B” while system “B” is being 
integrated with system “C.” The current implementation algorithm solves this problem by 
using the Mode parameter for each system. As described in Table 3, Mode is a 2x1 array 
structure. The first element gives the phase the system is currently in and the second 
element gives the status. When a system in the integration queue (phase 2) starts getting 
integrated with another system its status changes from 0 to 1. In the previous example, 
when “B” begins integration with system “C,” the mode status of “B” changes to 1. System 
“A” cannot integrate with system “B,” unless the mode status for “B” changes back to 0. This 
process is better illustrated in Figure 7.  
a) Independent Systems b) Dependent Systems 
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Figure 7. Use of Mode in the Integration Process Queue 
When both the Implementation and Integration processes for all the systems affected 
are complete, the Validation and Verification (Level t6(0), Figure 4) processes check to see 
that all the systems were implemented and integrated within constraints of time and budget. 
They check for a completeness level of 1 for all the component systems affected, and then 
they compare the actual time needed and cost incurred by each system to the time and cost 
allotted to them by Design Solution and Decision Analysis.  
5. Work in Progress: Implementation and Success Metrics 
As discussed in Section 4, the modeling approach for acquisition allows for a great 
deal of flexibility in terms of parameters, methodologies, etc. While we have generated a 
successful “small-scale” ideal model to depict the basic methodology of the defense 
acquisition process, we have yet to implement different scenarios using disruptors and 
enablers.   
Also, while the feedback system within the system-level has been implemented 
between processes like integration and technology planning, the feedback system between 
Design Solution and Requirements Development has yet to be implemented. The high-level 
feedback loops to Requirements Development and Logical Analysis will allow us to model 
scenarios in which requirements change at different times through out the lifecycle of the 
SoS. As mentioned in Section 2, historical trends in defense and non-defense related 
acquisition processes show that requirement changes occurring during the later phases of 
the acquisition lifecycle have been major contributors to the failure of the SoS acquisition 
program.    
We are also currently working on developing the soft parameters that allow for fuzzy 
boundaries depicting varying spans of control of the SoS engineers and managers over the 
different component systems This may be reflected in the system-dependency matrix by 
using values between 0 and 1. Fractional values of dependency then need to be mapped to 
a time-delay parameter in each process, in order to show the relationship (if any) between 
the span of authority of a systems or system-of-systems engineer and the time required for 
the completion of an acquisition process.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 189 - 
=
=
The success of the developed ABM Model will be measured by the ability of the 
model to provide insights into the types of acquisition management insights and approaches 
that can increase the success of an acquisition process in the SoS setting. The model will 
enable us to answer the three research questions posed in Section 1, specifically targeting 
complexities related to span of control/influence of the SoS engineers and managers and 
the evolutionary development of an SoS. A successful model will allow for the study of 
various scenarios generated by implementing different acquisition management strategies 
and approaches in an SoS environment. For example, scenarios could be generated by 
adjusting the “levels” of collaboration between individual system engineers at varying 
hierarchical levels or the span of control of the SoS engineer throughout the lifecycle of the 
SoS. The model may even be used as a comparative tool to study the effect of 
implementing different methodologies for individual processes on SoS parameters, such as 
time needed to acquire, test and deploy specific capabilities. The greatest benefit of such 
modeling lies in its ability to act as a decision-making tool for SoS engineers, program 
managers and systems engineers to improve the probability of success of the SoS 
acquisition process by simulating different scenarios and implementing different strategies.  
6. Conclusions 
From historical data related to past SoS-oriented defense acquisition programs 
(discussed in Section 2), we summarize the common causes of failure as a) misalignment of 
objectives among the systems, b) limited span of control of the SoS engineer on the 
component systems of the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) inflexibility of the component 
system designs, e) emergent behavior revealing hidden dependencies within systems, f) 
perceived complexity of systems, and g) the challenges in accurately representing them. 
These sources of complexity were mapped to a section of the SoSE Process Model recently 
introduced by Sage and Biemer (2007) in order to identify where manifestations of these 
complexities might arise and how to begin assessment of how they may impact the 
acquisition process.  
This mapping in conjunction with the 16 technical and technical management SE 
processes identified by the DoD SoS-SE Guide (Systems and Software Engineering, 2006) 
was used to develop a conceptual model for pre-acquisition and acquisition strategy 
activities. The acquisition strategy model takes an incremental approach to the evolutionary 
development of an SoS and allows processes lower in the hierarchy to affect change in the 
processes above them. Thus, the model exposes the interconnections among levels and 
uses these to implement evolving requirements and design solutions in the component 
systems of the SoS. 
These mappings and conceptual models are directed toward providing a basis for a 
computational exploratory model for acquisition strategy in an SoS environment. Based on 
user-defined inputs for the requirements and their dependencies on each other, the model 
uses series and parallel processing to implement these requirements in the component 
systems. This exploratory model allows evolving requirements and design solutions to trickle 
through the lower processes and uses disruptors to affect specific component systems, 
which in-turn affects change in processes higher in the hierarchy.  
The uniqueness of the models lie in their ability to provide a better understanding of 
the acquisition process in an SoS environment, along with computational tools for better 
decision-making for the higher levels of SoS management. We hope the insights gained 
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from this research will significantly improve the probability of success with future acquisition 
programs within and without the DoD.  
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Data sharing is the information technology watchword of our time. Revolutions in 
information exchange and interoperability are underway in government and industry through 
policies on the strategic end to data standards on the implementation end.  The revolution is 
transforming acquisition systems and processes through specification of open architectures, 
which enables construction of new complex systems from crafted components.  In August 
2006, Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS), established the 
Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository to enable the reuse of 
combat system software and related assets.  The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is 
tasked to develop a component specification and ontology for the SHARE repository 
framework.  This paper summarizes the work completed to date in support of the PEO IWS 
7-sponsored NPS research project “Software Component Specification Framework and 
Ontology for the SHARE Repository.”  We describe SHARE and the vision for the repository 
framework.  We present related technologies and the next steps for the framework 
development.  Finally, we provide ideas for future research. 
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Typical challenges for reuse repositories include the lack of motivation for reusable 
component developers and those wishing to reuse the components, the difficulty of 
component retrieval and selection, and the amount of work necessary to integrate a 
selected component.  Often, a developer seeking reusable assets from a repository has 
difficulty finding the desired items due to the inability of the repository designers to foresee 
what will constitute valuable criteria to guide the search.  As a result, the metadata in the 
repository search tool does not provide adequate information to enable efficient decisions 
about which assets to pursue.  Additionally, most common searches are conducted based 
on key words and phrases; this requires that the searcher knows how to express desired 
component features in the terminology employed by the submitter of the asset or the 
repository manager and its developers.   
To further complicate the matter, the goals of reuse depend on the activity being 
performed within the software lifecycle.  To enable reuse during each activity, the desired 
assets will differ as well as the information required about those assets.  For example, 
during the requirements activities, the sought-after reusable assets may be requirements for 
similar systems or design artifacts; while at implementation time, developers searching a 
database may be seeking bits of code or interface specification information.  In order for a 
single repository to support these different searches, the repository builders must 
incorporate sufficient metadata information to support each type of search.  With this 
perspective, it is clear that the provision of inclusive metadata for components in a database 
is difficult at best.   
In August 2006, the Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO 
IWS) established the Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE), a library of 
combat system software and related assets for use by eligible contractors (both prime 
contractors and subcontractors) for developing or suggesting improvements to Navy Surface 
Warfare Systems.  SHARE is one piece of the Navy’s Open Architecture (OA) approach to 
developing modular, open systems (PEO IWS, 2007), which includes reusable software 
applications as a core principle.  PEO IWS is currently seeking ways to improve and mature 
the capability provided by SHARE.  Among other initiatives, two related research projects 
are in progress at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  The first, and the topic of this 
paper, will produce a component specification and ontology for use in SHARE.  The second 
will develop a prototype of a semantically based requirements search engine (ReSEARCH) 
with the tools necessary to convert documents into semantically based formal 
representations of requirements (Martel, 2007). 
The component specification will describe the artifacts contained in the repository in 
sufficient detail to aid a repository user in determining whether the artifact is worth retrieving.  
The ontology will provide contextual semantics describing relationships among items in the 
repository to aid in associating artifacts with user needs.  The component specification and 
ontology will comprise a rich structural and semantic framework for SHARE that will enable 
multiple kinds of search and discovery techniques.  The goal is to enable the development 
of different types of tools to improve the usefulness of SHARE. 
In this paper, we present the work completed to date on the SHARE ontology and 
component specification project.  We describe the SHARE repository, present our 
conceptual vision for the repository framework, and describe the technologies that will be 
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used in its development.  We also summarize related work and our plans for completion of 
the framework. 
SHARE Repository 
SHARE provides a capability for discovering, accessing, sharing, managing, and 
sustaining reusable assets for the Navy Surface Domain’s programs (Belcher, 2007) 1.  It 
consists of an asset library and a card catalog.  The asset library is a collection of combat 
systems software and supporting artifacts.  As of January 2008, 62 assets containing 18,017 
artifacts from the Aegis, Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), 
DDG-1000, and Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) programs were available in the SHARE 
library.  The card catalog is a Web-based interface that facilitates user insight into the 
contents of SHARE and supports user functions—including account registry, asset search 
and discovery, asset submission assistance, and asset retrieval requests.   
The SHARE asset library is separate from the card catalog for two primary reasons.  
First, the majority of the contents of SHARE is classified material and, therefore, must be 
kept in a SECRET or higher container.  Second, the process for retrieving assets from 
SHARE includes necessary steps for addressing the data rights associated with each 
component.  For most of the components, a license agreement and Non-Disclosure 
Agreement are required before an asset can be issued (these forms are also available on 
the website).  Due to these restrictions, the Web interface and the actual assets are 
physically separated. 
The search and discovery process in SHARE is conducted either through individual 
navigation of the list of assets in the catalog or by a keyword search of the metadata 
contained in the catalog.  From the catalog list, a user can select an asset to obtain a more 
detailed description, consisting of identity, description and usage information if available.   
Assets are requested from SHARE using an online interactive questionnaire.  The 
tool then prepares the necessary documents (including non-disclosure and license 
agreements) and provides them, along with instructions for printing and submission, to the 
user.  Once the documents have been mailed to the SHARE administrators, the user can 
track the status of the request online through the SHARE interface.  When approved for 
distribution, library materials are provided either online through access to the appropriate 
portion of the SHARE website (classified or unclassified) or via delivery of physical media.  
A more complete description of SHARE is available in Johnson (2007). 
Conceptual Vision for the Software Repository Framework 
Popular software repositories, such as SourceForge (2007) and CPAN (2007), tend 
to be organized to support keyword searches over broad categories of software types.  
Essentially two types of search are enabled.  Items in the repository are grouped by type or 
function and are then browsable within those categories.  A keyword search over metadata 
                                                
1 Organizations interested in registering for access to the library should visit and complete an online 
registration form at https://viewnet.nswc.navy.mil. 
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is also possible.  Repository entries vary greatly in the amount of information (metadata) 
available for each registered artifact. 
The Goal: Improved Search Capability 
Current repositories do not support all the types of search we would like to enable.  
In addition to typical types of search, we envision a graphical user interface that enables 
navigation of repository assets depending on user’s interests.  This requires an interface 
that allows users to project their context on the search mechanisms.  In other words, users 
bring particular information needs and goals based on the problem they are trying to solve.  
The interface needs to have natural mechanisms to enable users to pose inquiries that fit 
readily with their views of the problem space.  For example, users may be seeking particular 
functionality best obtained through a functional view or by sorting the information in the 
repository. Or, users may be seeking particular artifacts best obtained through a document 
resource organization of the information. Or, users may be seeking information on certain 
testing methodologies that have been applied so that organization of the information by work 
activity would best apply. The challenge in designing the framework for the software 
repository is devising initial sets of such taxonomic descriptions of the assets while creating 
flexibility for future introduction of additional and diverse organizational views (profiles or 
templates) of the information as user needs and repository utility grow. 
Fish-eye Graph 
One example of the type of tool that could be supported by the framework is a fish-
eye graph (Sarkar & Brown, 1993). This is a visualization tool that has not, to date, been 
used to aid in navigation of repository contents.  Fish-eye graphs, depicted in Figure 1. 
display to the user objects of interest in addition to the relationships that the objects have 
with other items.  As the relationships of interest to the user are explored, the graph 
highlights the item and brings it to the front of the display.  The user can then weed out 
uninteresting items by removing from view the relationships that are not important.  This type 
of search results in a single or small grouping of items that the user has found interesting, 
with supporting information available by mouse-click. 
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Figure 1. Example Fish-eye Graph  
(Sarkar & Brown, 1993) 
Semantic Search 
Current repository metadata schemas do not address issues of language ambiguity.  
Rather, they assume that the keywords provided by the metadata will match identically to 
the words inserted by the user.  By providing a framework of related concepts in which to 
place the artifacts, a search tool can be designed to navigate for artifacts in such a way that 
users do not need to know the initial set of exact words used to describe the artifacts. 
A related ongoing NPS research project titled ReSEARCH is focused on solving 
these types of issues for SHARE.  This work intends to enhance current search 
mechanisms, principally Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI), by employing word-sense 
relationships provided in the extensive WordNet lexical database (Princeton, 2006).  
However, this body of work lacks the domain-specific lexicon found in focused endeavors, 
such as Navy combat systems. Formalized semantic descriptions in the SHARE component 
specification and ontology will further enhance ReSEARCH capabilities to produce highly 
relevant search findings for users of the SHARE repository. 
Model-based Search 
A third type of search we have envisioned is based on a user-constructed model of 
the problem the user is trying to solve.  The user interface for the repository can provide the 
capability to assist the user in building the model of a desired system architecture using a 
standardized representation scheme (e.g., Unified Modeling Language), and the search can 
then return possible existing solutions for portions of the system and demonstrate potential 
gaps. Model-based search has similarities to the semantic search concept described 
above—taxonomic and ontological descriptions of systems, system components, lifecycle 
phases, development artifacts, usage, and other concepts prominent in the software-
hardware domain of SHARE provide structural information that can greatly facilitate search 
of available assets. 
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The metadata collected in current repositories do not support these types of 
advanced discovery tools.  Here we provide an overview of our approach for developing a 
repository that will enable these types of search capabilities. 
The Solution: The SHARE Framework 
To enable the types of tools we envision, we must create a richer semantic 
framework for the repository.  The framework will be composed of two parts: the component 
specification and the ontology. 
Component Specification 
The component specification is a description or model of the items in the repository.  
For our efforts, we will focus on two aspects of the component specification: “typical” 
metadata and software behavior. 
Metadata—The metadata for each artifact should incorporate all necessary data for 
discovery and implementation.  The metadata will both aid repository users in determining if 
the item is suited for their use, and provide information about how to use the retrieved asset.  
We refer to this as “standard” or “typical” metadata since there are many existing examples 
of metadata that we can use to develop such metadata for SHARE.   
Software Behavior—The metadata for many current repositories, such as those described 
earlier, fail to capture a searchable representation of the functionality of the items outside 
general categories of functionality (e.g., Archiving Compression Conversion, Control Flow 
Utilities, Graphics, Security) and text-based search.  Unlike current practice, the SHARE 
component specification will consist of both typical metadata and a behavioral model of the 
component.  Since this piece of the component specification is not commonly incorporated 
into repositories in a standardized manner, we feel it is a specific focus area to identify the 
appropriate representation mechanisms for software behavior in the repository context.   
Ontology 
The second part of the framework is description of the relationships of the 
components. These form a contextual model of the repository items to represent a particular 
perspective that can more closely match a user’s problem context.  These relationships may 
include the component’s use/role in existing systems, its mapping to reference or domain 
architectures, its utility in various software development lifecycle phases, and other types of 
relationships we expect to discover during the research.  Consider the example relationships 
among artifacts shown in Figure 2.  Suppose we insert a requirements document for a 
particular component into the repository.  This artifact may have been originally developed 
for System A in the figure.  The item’s relation to the rest of the original system provides the 
context for one dimension of the repository framework.  If this item was then reused to fulfill 
some requirements of System B, its location in that model provides a second dimension.  
Additionally, the requirements document will map to some taxonomy of artifacts that are 
relevant for particular phases of the product lifecycle.  Finally, the component it describes 
may also have a place in some domain-specific reference architecture.  All these 
relationships provide contextual information about the artifact that can be exploited to enable 
sophisticated search and discovery methods described above.   For this project, an 
appropriate representation of component context will be identified and the relationships 
defined.  This will enable navigation of the repository based on the contextual information 
provided in the ontology.   
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Figure 2. Artifact Relationships 
 
Based on this vision then, the project team has identified three focus areas for 
developing the framework for the SHARE repository: 
1. “Typical” metadata for artifacts  
2. A suitable representation of software behavior  
3. Framework relationships (ontology)  
The current research project will focus on building each of these items for the 
SHARE repository.  Follow-on work will be required to implement the framework in a tool 
suite that will enable the search capabilities described above.  This and other suggested 
follow-on work is described in the future work section of this report. 
Related Technologies 
There have been concerted efforts in recent years to add semantics to stored 
information in order to promote a greater ability to support automated search and sharing of 
information. The following subsections highlight a number of efforts that can inform our 
design of the SHARE repository framework.  
Metadata Initiatives 
There has been much work done on specification of metadata to describe assets and 
resources in various repositories.  For the SHARE framework, we do not expect to create 
any unique approaches to developing metadata, nor will we develop any fundamentally 
different metadata set.  However, we intend to use the metadata descriptions to support 
navigation-by-context search, in addition to performing more traditional types of searches 
based on keywords, text-analysis, and popularity. 
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World Wide Web 
The World Wide Web has experienced unprecedented growth over the past 20 
years. This growth was largely fueled by the use of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) as simplistic 
mechanisms for putting information into document files, posting and accessing those files, 
and linking across those files, respectively. However, HTML primarily describes how the 
information should be displayed in browser software, rather than providing clear descriptions 
of the information content of the document. To address this shortcoming, the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) created the Extensible Markup Language (XML) as a standard way 
to create and apply markup to the content of Web documents to make the content more 
readily accessible by software. While initial application of XML made description of Web 
content much more precise, it largely described content in a structured, syntactic manner. 
As the demand for greater automation in accessing and processing Web content continued 
to rise, principal designers and researchers on the Web created a new vision called the 
Semantic Web.  
The Semantic Web is Tim Berners-Lee’s vision of the World Wide Web (Berners-
Lee, Hendler & Lassila, 2001) in which vast stores of information become meaningful to 
computers and where “the explicit representation of the semantics underlying data, 
programs, pages, and other Web resources will enable a knowledge-based Web that 
provides a qualitatively new level of service” (Daconta, Obrst & Smith, 2003, p. xxi). The 
Semantic Web is an extension of the World Wide Web in which information is given 
semantically rich descriptions that enable automated processing by software. The W3C has 
created additional layers of markup, building on the base of XML, to provide description of 
the semantics of the information. The Semantic Web is an evolution of the current Web, built 
from the foundation of open standards on which the Web is built. Building blocks of the 
Semantic Web are shown in  Figure 3.  Below, we provide a brief description of the base 
layers of the Semantic Web stack (URI/IRI and XML) and highlight their relevance to the 
SHARE metadata development. Applicability of other components of the Semantic Web 
stack to the SHARE framework will be discussed later in this paper. 
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Figure 3. Principal building blocks of the Semantic Web Stack  
(W3C, 1994) 
 
Data Sharing Policies in the US Government 
In the US Department of Defense, including DoD intelligence agencies and functions, 
the guiding document for information sharing is the Net-Centric Data Sharing Strategy (DoD 
Chief Information Officer, 2003).  The document defines net-centricity as “the realization of a 
networked environment, including infrastructure, systems, processes, and people that 
enables a completely different approach to warfighting and business operations” (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2003, p. 1).  The network foundation is the Global Information Grid, “the 
globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, 
and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information 
on demand to warfighters, defense policymakers, and support personnel” (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2003, p. 1).  Data assets addressed by the strategy include system files, 
databases, documents, official electronic records, images, audio files, websites, and data 
access services. Users and applications can search for and “pull” data as needed, or they 
can receive alerts when their subscribed data is updated or changed (publish/subscribe). 
The goals of the strategy are to make data 
 visible—users and applications can discovery the data assets  
 accessible—users and applications can obtain the data assets  
 institutionalized—data approaches are incorporated into DoD process and practices  
 understandable—users and applications can comprehend the data, both structurally 
and semantically to address specific needs  
 trusted—users and applications can determine the authority of the source of the data 
assets  
 interoperable—metadata is available to allow mediation or translation of data to 
support many-to-many exchanges of data  
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 responsive to user needs—mechanisms for improvement through continual feedback 
are supported to address particular perspectives of data users. (DoD Chief 
Information Officer, 2003, p. 10) 
The design of the repository framework should provide or support mechanisms that 
address each of these goals. In this respect, the data sharing goals help to guide the design 
and development efforts. A guiding document is the DoD Discovery Metadata Specification 
(DDMS) (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2007), which provides a standard set of 
metadata for discovering distributed resources. The SHARE repository, as with other 
repository efforts, can readily address the DDMS by ensuring that sufficient metadata are 
provided in descriptions of assets to allow generation of at least the minimum required set of 
metadata specified in the DDMS.  
Existing Repository Metadata 
Outside the DoD, there are additional metadata practices from which we can learn.  
All existing repositories have some sort of metadata schema, whether well defined or not.  
Also, there are some specific efforts that focus on the development of metadata standards 
for use in software repositories.  Some examples of each of these are discussed here. 
As introduced earlier, open source repositories such as SourceForge and CPAN 
have a metadata set for describing their contained assets.  Unfortunately, these schemas 
are not often published.  However, they can be somewhat derived simply by looking at the 
available information for each of the items in the repository.   
Another approach is the Object Management Group (OMG) Reusable Asset 
Specification (RAS) standard for the packaging of software assets.  The RAS describes 
required and optional classes, as well as required and optional attributes, for packaging 
software assets.  The specification is depicted as Universal Modeling Language (UML) 
models, which are translated into XML Schema and Meta-Object Facility (MOF) / Extensible 
Metadata Interchange (XMI) XML Schema.  In the RAS, artifacts are defined as “any work 
products from the software development lifecycle,” and assets are a grouping of artifacts 
that “provide a solution to a problem for a given context” (Object Management Group, 2005, 
p. 7).  Accordingly, the RAS describes an approach for packaging artifacts into an asset 
using a manifest file. 
For SHARE metadata development, we will use these existing examples of metadata 
as references when the metadata schema is developed.  Existing metadata sets will be 
used to trigger the evaluation of items that could be included but were not originally 
considered.  The goal is not to merge all existing sets of metadata but to assess the 
relevance of existing data sets for SHARE and include any appropriate items. 
Software Behavior Representation 
Repositories today tend to capture software behavior as key words describing a 
general functional area or as a free text description field in the metadata.  This type of 
description can be helpful to users in determining whether the item will be useful in meeting 
their needs.  However, if the desired end-goal is more sophisticated than today’s repository 
capabilities, a more formal description of behavior is required.  For example, one of the 
loftier goals of a software repository may be to automatically compose systems from 
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reusable components.  This is a difficult problem, which many have tried to solve2.  It is 
especially difficult if the components were not originally designed for reuse.  As a necessary 
first step towards more sophisticated uses of a repository, behavioral descriptions must be 
machine-readable in order to support automated search and discovery.  Furthermore, the 
behavior descriptions must be formalized and consistently applied to each item in the 
repository if the intent is to automatically compose them into a larger functioning system. 
A formalized description of software behavior typically means one of two things.  We 
either (1) define the inputs and outputs (interfaces) of the components, or we (2) describe 
the operations that take place within the component.  Many people view the latter as a 
decomposition of the former.  In other words, they describe the inner workings of a 
component by defining the inputs and outputs of a more granular subset of components.  
Therefore, here we summarize the current approaches for documenting both software 
interfaces as well as behavior. 
Interface Descriptions 
Interface descriptions focus on the inputs and outputs of a component and not the 
inner workings of that component.  Interfaces are represented using various methods, which 
vary from specific concentration on the connect points between two pieces of software and 
the types of information passed across them, to representations of the services that a 
component provides. 
One often-employed method for representing interfaces in component software 
technologies is as a contract between the client and the provider of the implementation 
(Szyperski, 2002, p. 53). The contract defines the services promised by the interface and 
the requirements of the client for using the interface.  It could simply consist of a set of 
named operations that can be invoked by clients.  It may also include pre- and post-
conditions necessary for the successful use of the interface.  A drawback for using this type 
of interface description as a basis for search and discovery in SHARE is the dependency on 
the component’s originating software language for determining the syntax and semantics 
used to describe the operations and conditions.  In SHARE’s heterogeneous environment, 
these types of standardized descriptions may not be practical. 
Component technology developers have developed Interface Definition Languages 
(IDLs) to specify interfaces independently of the programming language used for source 
code development (Clements et al., 2002, p. 554).  Examples include OMG IDL and 
Microsoft’s COM IDL. The same drawback discussed for the programming language-
dependent contracts for our heterogeneous SHARE environment exists for these 
intermediate languages.  Rather than a dependency on the programming language, 
however, the dependence here lies in the chosen component technology.  Since we do not 
intend to force a specific component technology for all SHARE contributors, it does not 
make sense to insist on interface definitions based on these IDLs. 
                                                
2 The proceedings from the International Symposium on Software Composition, an annual event, 
provide examples of research into the breadth of research topics currently being pursued in the area 
of software composition.  The website for the 2008 conference is located at 
http://www.2008.software-composition.org/.   
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Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) are primarily used to formally represent 
system architectures for use during development and typically describe system elements, 
their interactions, and their composition rules.  While there are many different viewpoints 
about what constitutes an ADL (Medvidovic & Taylor, 2000, pp. 71-72), they always include 
a formal description of interfaces. ADL interface descriptions typically define the required 
and provided services (messages, operations, and variables) of a component.  Some ADLs 
also allow for parameterization of interfaces; others provide additional information.   
The advantage of using ADLs in a component specification is that the benefits of 
ADL-based tools may be realized for the components.  ADL tools assist the developer by 
supporting architecture creation, visualization, validation, refinement, simulation, and 
analysis, in addition to features that enable systematic transformation of architectures into 
the implementation of a system.  Many support generation of “glue code” for components 
once their implementations are developed.  Additionally, ADLs are likely the appropriate 
level of abstraction for a heterogeneous collection of assets, such as those found in SHARE, 
since they do not depend on any decisions made about the implementation of the 
components.   
Unfortunately, the use of ADL-type descriptions does come with a cost.  Because of 
the robust descriptive capabilities of many ADLs, there is considerable effort required in 
learning how to use them.  This would present a learning curve for both asset submitters 
and retrievers.  To minimize this problem, tools could be developed to aid the user in 
producing the required ADL descriptions.  As an alternate solution, we are investigating the 
possibility of incorporating some ADL-like descriptions into the XML-defined metadata for 
the components.  This will enable us to incorporate only those aspects that are relevant to 
the SHARE repository.  Several new XML-based ADLs such as XML-based Architecture 
Description Language (XADL) (Zhang, Ding & Li, 2001, pp. 561-566) and Service Oriented 
Architecture Description Language (SOADL) (Jia, Ying, Zhang, Cao & Xie, 2007, pp. 96-
103) may form the basis for this development. 
Interfaces can also be represented using UML or other graphical notations.  Typical 
graphical notations of interfaces include the “lollipop” depiction or the expression of an 
interface as a UML stereotype.  Often, these pictorial depictions of interfaces are further 
defined using a formalized language such as the OMG IDL described earlier (Clements et 
al., 2002, p. 241).  In addition to the visual aid provided by the diagrams, the value of using 
UML for interface descriptions is that many tools have been developed to read UML and 
translate the models into XML depictions (XMI) and into executable code.  Model-driven 
Architecture products are available that enable the automatic development of “glue code” 
between components from the architecture specification (Frankel, 2003).  
On the downside, an object-oriented programming development paradigm is 
assumed.  While some generality can by achieved by using packages and subsystems as 
the main UML building blocks instead of classes and subclasses, some argue that 
attempting to use UML outside the arena for which it was designed is more trouble than it is 
worth (Shaw & Clements, 2006, p. 34).  This realization, as well as our understanding that 
whichever description method is chosen must be applied across multiple development 
cultures, compels us to assert that UML may not be the best way to represent interfaces for 
SHARE.   
Future deployment of the SHARE repository is likely to evolve toward the Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA) of the GIG. SOA has been described as “an ideal vision of a 
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world in which resources are cleanly partitioned and consistently represented” (Erl, 2005, p. 
3) and “automation logic is decomposed into smaller distinct units of logic […] known as 
services” (pp. 23-33). Elements of a service architecture are similar to SHARE concerns—
the architecture typically includes a registry of services containing descriptions of services 
and access information. Mechanisms are provided for service discovery, passing sufficient 
information about the service back to the caller so that the service can be employed. 
Advanced concepts include service orchestration for composing higher-order services from 
component services. The focus, of course, is service reuse, which potentially reduces 
development and maintenance while improving software reliability and evolution agility.   
SOA realization may employ several Web Services standards: Universal Description, 
Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) for creating service registries; Web Services Description 
Language (WSDL) for identifying operations offered by services and describing input/output 
interfaces for those operations; the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) for accessing 
services and passing data to/from the services; Web Services Business Process Execution 
Language (WS-BPEL) for describing workflow logic for orchestration of services; OWL for 
Services (OWL-S), for an ontology of services supporting service advertisement and 
discovery, description of service operation, service interoperation; Web Services 
Interoperability (WS-I) profiles for describing collections of Web services specifications at 
specific version levels; and others.  It is interesting to note that the problem of describing 
Web services in sufficient semantic detail to enable automatic composition of services is 
similar to the problem of describing software components for reuse.  
In Web Service implementations, XML is generally used to hold the information 
passed across an interface.  XML schemas are extensible and easily modified if there is a 
need to change the standardized format of the data. The above standards for describing and 
implementing Web Services are XML-based specifications. Additionally, XML is readily 
digestible by many existing tools and is well enough understood universally to be 
implemented into new ones.  These advantages motivate us to propose XML as the primary 
notation for documenting metadata, including the interfaces, for the SHARE component 
specification and ontology project.  The flexibility of XML will enable us to incorporate the 
necessary information to enable capabilities similar to those enabled by ADLs without the 
high overhead cost of training the end users. Although SOA and Web Services are in a high 
state of flux as industry standards mature, they present opportunity to create software 
component specifications in SHARE that can be employed for a number of purposes. 
Modeling Software Behavior  
In addition to understanding the interfaces for a component, a repository user is 
interested in the functionality of the software components.  In this section, we discuss a 
number of notations currently used to describe the activities that take place within a 
component.   
In addition to the structural diagramming capabilities provided by the UML, several 
types of diagrams are used to model dynamic aspects of the system.  Methods for formal 
documentation of behavior provided by UML include sequence diagrams, which may be 
further amplified using a constraint language such as UML’s Object Constraint Language 
(OCL), collaboration diagrams, and statecharts.  Sequence diagrams, or message sequence 
charts, show the interactions of objects within a component in a time-ordered sequence 
(Larman, 2005, pp. 222-225).  Collaboration, or communication, diagrams also show objects 
and their interactions but in a more condensed format that tends to lose the visibility of the 
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time-ordered sequencing. State Machine Diagrams, or statecharts, illustrate events and 
states of objects (Larman, 2005, pp. 485-492).  Amplifying information, such as actions 
triggered by transitions, and activities that take place during particular state conditions is 
often included.  
Each of these UML diagrams sheds light on particular aspects of a component’s 
behavior and could be used to formalize the behavioral descriptions of artifacts incorporated 
into SHARE.  There are a few drawbacks to this approach, however.  First, as discussed 
previously, the use of UML diagrams often assumes an object-oriented development 
paradigm, which may not be relevant for all SHARE submitters.  Second, the UML tools 
presented are primarily to assist in system development and may not be best suited for 
asset discovery and retrieval.  Repository users are likely to be more interested in a more 
abstract view of the system than this implementation level information provides.  Finally, 
each of the diagrams only captures a particular “slice,” or view, of the software’s behavior.  
For a complete behavioral description, it would be necessary to require each type of 
diagram plus additional information.  This would result in a steep overhead to develop this 
information for each item contained in SHARE.  For these reasons, we do not anticipate 
incorporating UML activity/state diagrams as the standard representation method for 
software behavior.  However, if these depictions are generated as part of the software 
engineering development process, they should be included as artifacts in the repository. 
In formal specification, system behavior is described using mathematical structures.  
Formal notations that enable this type of specification include the Vienna Development 
Method (VDM), Z (pronounced zed), and Alloy.  Since the languages are mathematically 
based, developers can use logic to reason about a formally specified system and sometimes 
prove its correctness. Application of such techniques generally requires a solid 
understanding of set theory, logic and other mathematical foundations when learning how to 
construct specifications in the language.  This is one of the complaints about formal 
languages as well as one of the reasons that the use of formal specification is mostly a topic 
of research and limited in practical applications to systems or portions of systems with 
safety-critical reliability demands.    
MIT’s Alloy project is one of the more successful attempts at making formal methods 
more user-friendly (Jackson, 2006).  Alloy helps users develop the specification by providing 
a visual simulation of the model.  This enables users to recognize when the model is 
incorrect, and they can then iteratively develop the model in more detail.  Alloy also includes 
an analyzer that automatically checks invariants for inconsistencies in the model.  Even with 
these advances, however, the amount of effort required to specify systems in these formal 
notations is well above the desired level of effort threshold for the SHARE repository.  
Therefore, we do not intend to use formal languages to represent software behavior of 
assets in SHARE.   
For SHARE, we do not hope to solve the software composition problem in the near 
term.  Mandating formal descriptions of software behavior for repository items does not 
seem worthwhile when the composition problem remains unsolved.  However, intermediate 
steps towards formalized behavior descriptions will prove useful in the near term and helpful 
in advancing towards far-term goals.  To this end, we are currently planning to extend the 
XML-defined metadata to incorporate interface information as well as existing reference 
architecture information to standardize behavioral descriptions for each artifact entered into 
the repository. Ongoing advances in service composition in SOAs will also be examined for 
application to the framework. 
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Relationships Framework (Ontology) 
Rich ontologies capturing the relationships of entities from multiple views have not 
been applied to software repositories.  However, there are many examples of ontology use 
in the organization of data for different applications. One example is intelligence community 
synthesis of disparate pieces of information from widespread sources into logical 
connections in order to form coherent pieces of knowledge.  There are currently several 
applications designed to collect the data and assist the analyst in drawing relationships 
among the data. For example, Palantir Technologies has created one such software 
application to support the DoD intelligence community by providing robust capabilities for 
managing data from various sources.  The Palantir tool is based on user-defined ontologies 
and supports multiple representation and analysis tools.  Graphical representations depict 
the data items and their relationships with each other, based on the underlying ontology.  
The analysis tools can be used to form logical links between entities in the database and to 
detect patterns and irregularities in the data.  This rich environment enables multiple search 
techniques: using keywords, browsing through data tables, and browsing graphical views of 
the database content based on the relationships of the entities described in the ontology. 
For the SHARE research project, these capabilities serve as examples of potential 
utility of the repository framework by demonstrating the power of formalized semantics.  
When the framework is in place, technologies such as these can be exploited to gain 
flexibility in the search options described previously. Similar examples of the use of 
ontologies to support data analysis exist in other domains, particularly in the medical field.  
Some background on current and emerging standards for describing rich semantics in data 
relevant to the SHARE framework is provided in this section. 
Semantic Web Techniques 
The Semantic Web stack was shown in  Figure 3.  Several of the components 
pictured there contribute to stronger semantic description of Web-based resources and are 
discussed briefly here.  
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a language for stating assertions in 
the form of subject-predicate-object triplets. Each of the elements in an RDF statement is an 
abstract Web resource identified by a URI. RDF and RDF Schema (RDFS) will be 
investigated for applicability to the SHARE framework to describe taxonomies (class 
hierarchies) supporting inference and search (Alesso & Smith, 2006). We will also explore 
the possible benefits of creating RDF expressions for storing SHARE repository data 
content.  
The lower layers of the Semantic Web stack provide the ability to describe 
information (metadata and schemas) and to express knowledge (assertions). Query 
languages provide a means to access information.  The XML Query language is used to 
search XML documents by exploiting the hierarchical tree structure of the documents (XPath 
expressions). The SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language provide a means to search 
RDF expressions by exploiting the subject-predicate-object graph structure of the 
expressions (pattern matching).  If RDF structures prove valuable for describing information 
in the SHARE repository, the use of SPARQL and other query techniques will be explored. 
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) extends RDF/RDFS constructs to provide more 
precise description of classes, subclasses, and relationships among classes (properties). 
OWL adds the capability to define local scope of properties, disjointness of classes, Boolean 
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combinations of classes, cardinality restrictions, special characteristics of properties (e.g., 
functional, transitive, symmetric), and other aspects not expressible with RDF/RDFS (Alesso 
& Smith, 2006). We will investigate the use of OWL for ontology development for the 
SHARE framework. Use of OWL will maximize utility by software applications, including use 
of openly available reasoning engines that can be used to check for ontology consistency 
and to make inferences about instances in the asset knowledge base.  
Rules and rule-based systems provide additional expressiveness in describing the 
logic of a system. Rules permit software to infer a conclusion from a premise (Alesso & 
Smith, 2006).  Rules may be used in the formalized specification of software assets in the 
repository to enrich their description, particularly if there is a need to encode business rules, 
policies, and processes appropriate to the repository (e.g., role-based access).  The use of 
the well-established, Web-based conventions in the information technology community 
provides a basis for application of a variety of common logical computations. We will be able 
to employ existing products that can operate on the semantic descriptions using provably 
correct methods.  Cryptologic aspects of the Semantic Web stack cut across all the layers 
and support such functionality as authentication, encryption, and digital signature (Eastlake 
& Niles, 2003). We will not address this area directly in the work, but will be creating the 
semantic basis for implementation of methods such as role-based access and other controls 
on information content in the repository. Trust is obtained when we can anticipate the 
actions of a system and have a reasonable expectation that the system will act correctly 
(i.e., as intended) (Michael, 2008). Trust is often established and maintained through 
transparency.  One of the advantages of the use of the Semantic Web practices is visibility 
of the information through its description in metadata, semantic descriptions, rules, and 
computationally sound logic. Clearly, users of the repository will rely on the trustworthiness 
of the content when obtaining information or artifacts supporting new developments. While 
we will not address this aspect of the problem directly in the component specification and 
ontology development, our goal is to make the information as explicit and accessible as 
possible to humans and machines in order to promote this level of the Semantic Web stack. 
Well-defined syntax and semantics for description of metadata, taxonomies, and 
ontology for the SHARE framework will facilitate development of software applications and 
user interfaces for working with the repository. By expressing the SHARE component 
specification and ontology using common Semantic Web elements, the products of our 
current research will readily support development of various applications including Web 
Services in an SOA while also providing a basis for future applications employing emerging 
Semantic Web Services technologies. 
Semantic Search 
Semantic search methods “augment and improve traditional search results by using 
not just words, but meaningful concepts” (Alesso & Smith, 2006, p. 201). A prominent 
approach is Latent Semantic Indexing, which considers documents that share many words 
in common to be semantically close, without any understanding of the “meaning” of the 
words. As introduced earlier in this report, other researchers at NPS are developing 
semantic search capabilities (ReSEARCH) for the SHARE repository that will use the 
WordNet database to extend this approach to include related words (synonyms, part-of 
relationships, etc.). For even greater formulation of context, the metadata, taxonomy, and 
ontology specifications for the SHARE framework discussed above will provide domain-
specific semantics that should enable more precise discernment of relevance in the 
searches. As the formalized semantics of the component specification and ontology are 
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developed, the formalisms will be provided to the ReSEARCH developers to determine if 
improvements in search precision can be achieved. 
Enriched semantic specification of the assets in the SHARE repository will enable 
users to more readily find resources that meet their need in their context. Extensive work in 
the Web community is providing tools and techniques that can be applied to the SHARE 
framework. We will select and apply appropriate techniques to meet the goals of the 
framework development. 
Next Steps 
Based on our vision for the framework and the related existing technologies we have 
summarized, this section lays out our intended path for completing development of the 
SHARE repository framework. 
SHARE Metadata 
An initial list of required asset information has been developed by the SHARE 
Program Office at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA.  We have developed an 
XML schema based on this initial list and will complement the metadata fields with the 
necessary information for filling out the framework.  To fill out the data set, we will evaluate 
known good metadata examples and pull relevant information into the SHARE metadata.  
We will then ensure that the metadata includes all the information necessary to place the 
artifact in the appropriate context based on the ontology.  In order to promote maximum 
exposure of SHARE contents, we will also ensure that minimum requirements of the DDMS 
are satisfied.  Based on these considerations, we will develop a practical metadata schema.  
This will most likely include a core data set and variations for different types of artifacts. 
In order to evaluate the completeness of the metadata, we intend to investigate case 
studies for each phase of the software development cycle.  As stated previously, repository 
users’ needs vary greatly depending on their purpose at the time of search.  Therefore, we 
are constructing case studies that capture the potential needs based on users’ current 
development activities.  For each of these case studies, the metadata will be evaluated to 
ensure inclusion of appropriate information for enabling retrieval decisions. 
SHARE Software Behavior Representation 
For the SHARE software behavior representation, we suspect that the overall goal of 
implementing formalized representations of standardized software behavior is not feasible in 
the short term.  While we intend to keep the loftier goal in mind, it is likely that an interim 
step towards standardization of formal software behavior representation will be required. 
One near-term solution may be to use available domain information that 
standardizes descriptions of software functionality.  For example, the Common Systems 
Function List (CSFL), Common Operational Activities List (COAL), and Common Information 
Element List (CIEL) are leadership-endorsed listings of combat system functionality that can 
be utilized as an initial characterization of software behavior.  We will investigate the use of 
a subset of these listings in the development of taxonomies for the SHARE repository 
framework.  If we require asset submitters to state the functionality of the components in 
these terms, we can then build the tools to guide the user in selecting desired behavior in 
the same terms. We will also explore characterization of software assets based on current 
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and emerging Web Services (e.g., WSDL) and Semantic Web Services (e.g., WS-BPEL, 
OWL-S) approaches. 
SHARE Relationship Framework (Ontology) 
The ontology for SHARE will be based on several relationships among the items in 
the repository, as well as relevant domain architectural descriptions and other information.  
The types of relationships we are currently exploring are the artifact’s place in the software 
engineering lifecycle, its architectural fit in its original system, its architectural fit in any 
systems in which it was subsequently used, identification of the component’s fit in the 
Surface Navy Open Architecture reference architecture, and the semantic relationships of 
various documents in the repository (based on the ReSEARCH work).  Each type of 
relationship will be examined to determine its appropriate representation form (RDF, OWL, 
etc.).  The goal is to determine representation forms that will best enable tool development, 
which will in turn support the types of search described in the previous chapters based on 
the ontology provided. 
Future Work 
The current research will describe the component specification and ontology desired 
for the SHARE repository.  Further work will be necessary to implement the framework and 
develop a tool suite that enables the described search capabilities.  In the SHARE 
implementation, additional repository features can be added, such as an Amazon-like 
“similar results” feature that points people with similar problems to the retrieval of the same 
files (and other similar recommendations found in Johnson (2007)).  In the long term, further 
work will be required if the intent is to eventually enable automated composition of a system 
based on reusable components.  As mentioned previously, a starting point to accomplish 
this goal may be to standardize a formal behavior representation of the repository contents. 
List of References  
Alesso, H.P., & Smith, C.F. (2006). Thinking on the web: Berners-Lee, Gödel, and Turing. Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Belcher, M. (2007). PEO IWS software hardware asset reuse enterprise (SHARE). Information brief.  
Berners-Lee, T., Hendler, J., & Lassila, O. (2001, May 17). The semantic web. Scientific American, 
284(5), 34-43. 
Clements, P., Bachmann, F., Bass, L., Garlan, D., Ivers, J., Little, R., et al. (2003). Documenting 
software architectures: Views and beyond. Boston: Addison-Wesley. 
Comprehensive PERL Archive Network (CPAN). (2007). CPAN. Retrieved January 16, 2007, from 
http://www.cpan.org 
Daconta, M.C., Obrst, L.J., & Smith, K.T. (2003). The semantic web: A guide to the future of XML, 
web services, and knowledge management. Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing. 
DoD Chief Information Officer. (2003, May 9). Net-centric data sharing strategy. Washington, DC: 
Author.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (2007, August 10). Department of Defense discovery 
metadata specification (DDMS) (Ver. 1.4.1). Washington, DC: Deputy Chief Information 
Officer. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 212 - 
=
=
Eastlake, D.E,. III, & Niles, K. (2003). Secure XML: The new syntax for signatures and encryption. 
Boston: Addison-Wesley. 
Erl, T. (2005). Service-oriented architecture: Concepts, technology, and design. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Pearson Education. 
Frankel, D.S. (2003). Model driven architecture: Applying MDA to ENTERPRISE COMPUTING. 
Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing. 
Jackson, D. (2006). Software Abstractions. Boston: MIT Press.  
Jia, X., Ying, S., Zhang, T., Cao, H., & Xie, D. (2007). A new architecture description language for 
service-oriented architecture. In Proceedings from the 6th International Conference on Grid 
and Cooperative Computing (pp. 96-103). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. 
Johnson, J. (2007, October). SHARE repository component specification: Needs assessment. 
Technical Report. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Larman, C. (2005). Applying UML and patterns: An introduction to object-oriented analysis and 
design and iterative development (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Martel, C. (2007). ReSEARCH: A requirements search engine. Proposal for Future Combat Systems 
Open Architecture for Naval Sea Command PEO IWS-7. 
Medvidovic, N., & Taylor, R.. (2000). A classification and comparison framework for software 
architecture description languages. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 26(1), 70-
93. 
Michael, B. (2008, March 19). Perspectives, practices, and the future of building highly dependable 
and trustworthy systems. Software Engineering Presentation delivered at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Object Management Group. (2005). Reusable Asset Specification (Ver. 2.2). Retrieved January 29, 
2008, from http://www.omg.org/technology/documents/formal/ras.htm  
Sarkar, M., & Brown, H. (1993). Graphical fisheye views. Communications of the ACM, 37, 73-83.   
Shaw, M., & Clements, P. (2006). The golden age of software architecture. IEEE Software, 23(2), 31-
39. 
SourceForge. (2007). SourceForge.net: Welcome to SourceForge.net. Retrieved October 8, 2007, 
from www.sourceforge.net 
Szyperski, C. (2002). Component software: Beyond object-oriented programming (2nd ed.). New 
York: Addison-Wesley. 
Princeton University. (2006) WordNet—Princeton University Cognitive Science Laboratory.  Retrieved 
March 20, 2008, from wordnet.princeton.edu    
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). (1994).  Semantic web stack.  Retrieved February 26, 2008, 
from www.w3.org/2007/03/layerCake.png  
Zhang, B., Ding, K., & Li, J. (2001). An XML-message based architecture description language and 
architectural mismatch checking. In Proceedings from the 25th Annual International 
Computer Software and Applications Conference (pp. 561-566). Washington, DC: IEEE 
Computer Society. 
Acknowledgements 
The work described in this paper is sponsored by PEO IWS.  The authors would also 
like to thank Dr. Mikhail Auguston for his contribution to the preparation of this paper by 
providing leadership in developing the concept for the repository framework.  The opinions 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily the position of their 
respective parent organizations or the sponsor of the work described.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 213 - 
=
=
ReSEARCH: A Requirements Search Engine 
Presenter: Craig Martell holds a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania and is an Associate 
Professor in Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School. He specializes in natural-language 
processing applied to on-line chat, weblogs and semantic search.  
Dr. Craig Martell  
Associate Professor 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: cmartell@nps.edu 
Author: Paige H. Adams, Lieutenant, is a US Navy Information Warfare Officer. He has served as a 
Russian and Burmese linguist aboard a variety of surface, subsurface, and airborne platforms in the 
Atlantic, Pacific, and Arabian Gulf, as well as at joint field sites and on flag staff. Most recently, he 
served as Operations Officer and Joint Operations Department Head at the Misawa Security 
Operations Center in Japan. He is a 2000 graduate (summa cum laude) of Hawaii Pacific University 
with a BS/BA in Computer Information Systems. 
 
LT Paige Adams, USN  
Graduate Student 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: phadams@nps.edu 
Author: Dr. Pranav Anand is an Assistant Professor of Linguistics at UC Santa Cruz. He specializes 
in theoretical syntax and semantics, with an emphasis on how contextual factors affect the form and 
meaning of linguistic expressions. He received his AB from Harvard in 2001 and his PhD from MIT in 
2006. 
Dr. Pranav Anand  
Assistant Research Professor 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: panand@nps.edu 
Author: Grant Gehrke, Ensign, is a native of Louisville, Kentucky. He graduated in 2007 from the 
Naval Academy with a degree in Computer Science. His current research focuses on using NLP 
approaches for authorship attribution in blogs. He will be graduating from the Naval Postgraduate 
School in June and reporting to Forrest Sherman, a destroyer homeported in Norfolk, Virginia. 
 
ENS Grant Gehrke, USN 
Graduate Student 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 





==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 214 - 
=
=
Author: Dr. Ralucca Gera received her BS (2000), MA (2002), and PhD (2005) in Mathematics, all 
from Western Michigan University. She has been an Assistant Professor in the Applied Mathematics 
Department at NPS since 2005. Gera’s research interests are in combinatorics and graph theory, 
particularly domination and alliances in graphs. 
Dr. Ralucca Gera 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: rgera@nps.edu 
Author: Marco Draeger is a Captain in the German Army and studied Computer Science at the 
University of the Federal Armed Forces from 2000 to 2004. From 2004 to 2005, he was assigned to 
the Modeling and Simulation Department of the Center for Transformation of the Federal Armed 
Forces. Following this, he served at the German Command Support School until 2007. Since June 
2007, Draeger has been a student in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Marco Draeger  
Graduate Student 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: mdraeger@nps.edu 
Author: Dr. Kevin Squire received his PhD degree from the Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Urbana, in 2004. He is currently an 
Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. His 
research focuses on developing and applying machine-learning algorithms and models to many 
different domains—including natural language processing, autonomous language acquisition, 
scheduling, robotics, computer vision, and remote sensing. 
Dr. Kevin Squire 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
E-mail: kmsquire@nps.edu 
Abstract 
This research address three closely related problems. (1) Most current search 
technology is based on a popularity metric (e.g., PageRank or ExpertRank), but not on the 
semantic content of the document. (2) When building components in a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA), developers must investigate whether components that meet certain 
requirements already exist. (3) There is no easy way for writers of requirements documents 
to formally specify the meaning and domain of their requirements.  Our goal in the research 
presented here is to address these concerns by designing a search-engine that searches 
over the “meanings” of requirements documents. In this paper, we present the current state 
of the ReSEARCH project. 
Keywords: Semantic Search, Requirements, Open Architecture, Information 
Systems Technology 
 =












































































































==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 229 - 
=
=
List of References 
Apache Lucene. (2008). Lucene-java wiki. Retrieved March 23, 2008, from 
http://wiki.apache.org/lucene-java 
Ask.com. (2008). Ask search technology. Retrieved March 28, 2008, from 
http://about.ask.com/en/docs/about/ask technology.shtml 
Brin, S., & Page, L. (1998, April). The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual web search engine. In 
Proceedings of the seventh international world wide web conference (pp. 107-117). 
Published in Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, 30(1-7).  
Harman, D. (1991). How effective is suffixing? Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science, 42(1), 7-15. 
Harris, Z.S. (1954). Distributional structure. Word, 10, 146-162.  
Hearst, M.A. (1992). Automatic acquisition of hyponyms from large text corpora. In Proceedings of 
the 14th conference on computational linguistics (pp. 539-545). Morristown, NJ: Association 
for Computational Linguistics. 
Hersh, W.R. (2003). Information retrieval: A health and biomedical perspective. New York: Springer. 
Johnson, J., & Blais, C. (2008). Share repository framework: Component specific and ontology. In 
Proceedings of the fifth annual acquisition research symposium. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Langville, A.N., & Meyer, C.D. (2006, July). Google's PageRank and beyond: The science of search 
engine rankings. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lin, D. (1998). Extracting collocations from text corpora. In Workshop on computational terminology 
(pp. 57-63). Montreal, Canada. 
Lin, D. (2008). MINIPAR. Retrieved March 28, 2008, from 
http://www.cs.ualberta.ca/~lindek/minipar.htm 
Lin, D., & Pantel, P. (2001). DIRT—Discovery of inference from text. In KDD '01: Proceedings of the 
seventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining 
(pp. 323-328). New York: ACM. 
Notess, G.R. (n.d.). Review of altavista. Retrieved March 23, 2008, from 
http://www.searchengineshowdown.com/features/av/review.html  
Sapp, G. (2000). Altavista proffers updated search technology to online businesses. Retrieved March 
23, 2008, from http://www.infoworld.com/articles/ic/xml/00/03/21/000321icalta.html  
Schmidt, M. (2005). Lucene wikipedia indexer. Retrieved March 23, 2008, from 
http://schmidt.devlib.org/software/lucene-wikipedia.html  
Schwartz, C. (1998, September). Web search engines. Journal of the American Society of 
Information Science, 49(11): 973-982. 
Snow, R., Jurafsky, D., & Ng, A.Y. (2005). Learning syntactic patterns for automatic hypernym 
discovery. In L.K. Saul, Y. Weiss & L. Bottou (Eds.), Advances in neural information 
processing systems 17 (pp. 1297-1304). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Vajda, A. (2005). Pulling java lucene into python: Pylucene. Retrieved March 23, 2008, from 
http://chandlerproject.org/PyLucene/Paper 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 230 - 
=
=
Emerging Issues in the Acquisition of Open Source 
Software within the US Department of Defense 
Presenter: Walt Scacchi is a senior research scientist and research faculty member at the Institute 
for Software Research, University of California, Irvine. He received a PhD in Information and 
Computer Science from UC Irvine in 1981. From 1981-1998, he was on the faculty at the University of 
Southern California. In 1999, he joined the Institute for Software Research at UC Irvine. He has 
published more than 150 research papers and has directed 45 externally funded research projects. In 
2007, he served as General Chair of the 3rd IFIP International Conference on Open Source Systems 
(OSS2007), Limerick, IE. 
Walt Scacchi 
Institute for Software Research 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92697-34 55 USA 
Phone: 1-949-824-4130 
Fax: 1-949-824-1715 
E-mail: wscacchi@ics.uci.edu  
Author: Thomas Alspaugh is an Assistant Professor of Informatics in the Donald Bren School of 
Information and Computer Sciences, University of California, Irvine. He received his PhD in Computer 
Science from North Carolina State University in 2002. His research interests are in software 
engineering and focus on informal and narrative models of software at the requirements level. Before 
completing his PhD, he worked as a software developer, team lead, and manager at several 
companies (including IBM and Data General) and as a computer scientist at the Naval Research 
Laboratory on the Software Cost Reduction project, also known as the A-7E project.  
Thomas A. Alspaugh 
Institute for Software Research 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92697-34 55 USA 
Phone: 1-949-824-4130 
Fax: 1-949-824-1715 
E-mail: alspaugh@ics.uci.edu  
Abstract 
In the past five or so years, it has become clear that the US Air Force, Army, and 
Navy have all committed to a strategy of acquiring software-intensive systems that require or 
utilize an “open architecture” (OA) and “open technology” (OT) that may incorporate OSS 
technology or OSS development processes. There are many perceived benefits and 
anticipated cost savings associated with an OA strategy. However, the challenge for 
acquisition program managers is how to realize the savings and benefits through 
requirements that can be brought into system development practice. As such, the central 
problem we examine in this paper is to identify principles of software architecture and OSS 
copyright licenses that facilitate or inhibit the success of an OA strategy when OSS and 
open APIs are required or otherwise employed. By examining and analyzing this problem, 
we can begin to identify additional requirements that may be needed to fulfill an OA strategy 
during program acquisition. 
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Interest within the US Department of Defense (DoD) and military services in free and 
open source software (OSS) first appeared in the past five or so years (Bollinger, 2003). 
More recently, it has become clear that the US Air Force, Army, and Navy have committed 
to a strategy of acquiring software-intensive systems across the board that require or utilize 
an “open architecture” (OA) and “open technology” (OT), which may incorporate OSS 
technology or OSS development processes (Herz & Scott, 2007). Why?   
According to Riechers (2007), the Air Force sees several factors within its software-
intensive systems: there is increasing complexity of the software (code) itself; the Air Force 
may be “held hostage” by proprietary legacy components; it seeks more timely delivery of 
new solutions, and it is aware that acquisitions and requirements take too long. So, the Air 
Force is moving towards an OT development approach that embraces open standards, 
open data, open program interfaces, best-of-breed OSS, and OSS development practices.  
According to Brig. Gen. Justice (2007, March; 2007, December), the Army seeks to 
move away from closed source software, expensive software upgrades, vendor lock-in, and 
broadly exploited security weaknesses. Subsequently, the Army seeks to adopt OSS 
because it may realize direct cost savings (compared to proprietary closed source software), 
gain access to source code in order to better develop domain and IT expertise, enable the 
transition to Web 2.0 technologies, and enable rapid injection of innovative concepts from 
diverse R&D/IT communities into systems for tactical command and control (C3T), future 
combat systems, enterprise information systems, and others (Starett, 2007).  
Last, according to Guertin (2007), the Navy seeks to mitigate the spiraling costs of 
weapon systems through adoption of OA (US Navy, 2006), as well as the adoption of open 
business models for the acquisition and spiral development of new systems. This may, 
therefore, necessitate better alignment of the system requirements and program acquisition 
communities, as well as better alignment of industry and academic partners who engage in 
software-focused research and development activities with DoD support.  
The central problem we examine and explain in this paper is the identification of 
principles of software architecture and OSS copyright licenses that facilitate or inhibit the 
success of the OA strategy when OSS and open APIs are required or otherwise employed. 
This is the knowledge we seek to develop and deliver. Without such knowledge, program 
acquisition managers and Program Executive Offices are unlikely to acquire software-
intensive systems that result in an OA that is clean, robust, transparent and extensible. This 
may frustrate the ability of program managers or program offices to realize faster, better, 
and less expensive software system acquisition, development, and post-deployment 
support.   
On a broader scale, this paper seeks to explore and answer the following kinds of 
research questions: How does the use of OSS components and open APIs (a) facilitate or 
(b) inhibit the ability to develop and deliver an OA software system? How do the 
requirements for OA affect system acquisition? How do alternative OSS licenses facilitate or 
inhibit the development of OA systems? How does the use of OSS components and open 
APIs manifest requirements that (a) facilitate, or (b) inhibit program acquisition?  
Last, this paper may help establish a foundation for how to analyze and evaluate 
dependencies that might arise when PMs seek to develop software systems that should 
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embody an OA—especially when different types of OSS components or OSS component 
licenses are being considered for integration. Finally, we believe there are new ways for 
determining requirements for how best to develop software systems with OSS (Scacchi, 
2002) that can interact with acquisition processes (Choi & Scacchi, 2001) in ways that are 
not apparent within current public perspectives for OA, based on OSS (Guertin, 2007; 
Justice, 2007, March; 2007, December; Riechers, 2007). 
In the remainder of this paper, we examine what makes achieving OA and OT 
difficult from a technical and program management/acquisition perspective, with respect to 
understanding what OA incorporating modern OSS entails from a software architecture 
standpoint, software licensing regimes, and how/where they interact. We start by providing 
additional background on “openness.” We then add a description and analysis of open 
software architecture concepts and of open source software licenses. This gives rise to a 
discussion that identifies new requirements that must be addressed by program managers 
in acquisitions that are intended to realize an OA software system. We then close with a 
review of the conclusions that follow. 
Background 
Across the three military services within the DoD, OA means different things and is 
seen as the basis for realizing different kinds of outcomes. Thus, it is unclear whether the 
acquisition of a software system that is required to incorporate an OA as well as utilize OSS 
technology and development processes for one military service will realize the same kinds of 
benefits anticipated for OA-based systems by another service (Wheeler, 2007). Somehow, 
DoD acquisition program managers must make sense of or reconcile such differences in 
expectations and outcomes from OA strategies across the DoD. Yet, there is little explicit 
guidance or reliance on systematic empirical studies for how best to develop, deploy, and 
sustain complex software-intensive military systems in the different OA and OSS 
presentations and documents that have been disseminated (Weathersby, 2007). Instead, 
what mostly exists are narratives that serve to provide and promise the potential of OA and 
OSS without consideration of what socio-technical challenges may lie ahead in realizing OT, 
OA, and OSS strategies. 
In characterizing the challenges facing acquisition of OA and OSS systems, we have 
found it helpful to compare the new property of “Openness” with the familiar property 
“Correctness”; we summarize this with the maxim “open is the new correct.”   
Acquisition officers are familiar with the challenges of acquiring systems that meet 
the necessary requirements with regard to correct behavior. The correctness of the overall 
system depends on the correctness of its components and how they are interconnected; 
correctness is a relative quality, in that a system may meet its behavioral requirements to a 
greater or lesser degree, but almost by definition, a system is never completely correct, and 
its degree of correctness cannot be definitely established in a finite time. A lack of 
correctness has an effect when that part of the system is executed (and the correctness of a 
system in meeting its requirements is determined) by engineers and the system’s users 
through testing it and using it.  Openness is both similar to and different from correctness, 
however.  We argue that the openness of a system depends, like correctness, on the 
system’s components: how they are interconnected and how they are configured into an 
overall software system architecture.  Unlike correctness, however, a system may be 
completely open, or may fail to be open in various ways. Because the software elements 
that define a system are finite and enumerable, its openness can, in principle, be 
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determined.  Also unlike correctness, a system is either open or not open even when it is not 
operating, and DoD may pay the consequences of a lack of openness (in the form of license 
fees) before the system is ever used or even if it is never used.  Finally, unlike correctness, 
openness may—ultimately—be the province of lawyers and policy makers, not engineers or 
users. 
We believe that a primary challenge is how to determine whether a system, 
composed of sub-systems and components—each with specific OSS or proprietary licenses 
and integrated in the system’s planned configuration—is or is not open, and what license(s) 
apply to the configured system as a whole. This challenge comprises not only evaluating an 
existing system, but also planning for a proposed system to ensure that the result is “open” 
under the desired definition, with only the acceptable licenses applying.  It is also important 
to understand which licenses are acceptable in this context.  Because there are a range of 
licenses (each of which may affect a system in a different way), and due to the number of 
various kinds of OSS-related components and ways of combining them (which have an 
effect on the licensing issue), the first step in this process is to understand types of software 
elements that constitute a software architecture, and the types of licenses that may 
encumber these elements or their overall configuration.  
OA seems to simply suggest software system architectures incorporating OSS 
components and open application program interfaces (APIs). But not all software system 
architectures incorporating OSS components and open APIs will produce OA, since OA 
depends on: (a) how/why OSS and open APIs are located within the system architecture, (b) 
how OSS and open APIs are implemented, embedded, or interconnected, (c) whether the 
copyright (Intellectual Property) licenses assigned to different OSS components encumber 
all/part of a software system's architecture into which they are integrated, and (d) whether 
many alternative architectural configurations and APIs may or may not produce an OA 
(Alspaugh & Antón, 2007; Diallo, Sim, & Alspaugh, 2007; Scacchi, 2007). Subsequently, we 
believe this can lead to complex situations: if program acquisition stipulates a software-
intensive system with an OA and OSS, then the resulting software system may or may not 
embody an OA. This can occur when the architectural design of a system constrains system 
requirements—that is, which requirements can be satisfied by a given system architecture 
when requirements stipulate specific types or instances of OSS (e.g., Web browsers and 
content management servers) to be employed, or what architecture style (Bass, Clements & 
Kazman, 2003) is implied by given system requirements.  
Thus, given the goal of realizing an OA and open technology strategy (Herz & Scott, 
2007), together with the use of OSS components and open APIs, it is unclear how to best 
align program acquisition, system requirements, software architectures, and OSS license 
regimes. 
Understanding Open Software Architecture Concepts 
A system intended to embody an open architecture using open software 
technologies like OSS and APIs does not clearly indicate which possible mix of software 
elements may be configured into it. To help explain this, we first identify the types of 
software elements included in common software architectures, whether they are open or 
closed (Bass et al., 2003). 
z Software source code components—These include the computer programs that 
direct the intended computation, calculation, control flow, and data manipulation. 
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These are programs for which the source code is open for access, review, 
modification, and possible redistribution by their developers. However, there are 
currently at least four forms of computer programs. 
■ standalone programs—These are the computer programs that we have long 
understood, often as isolated systems or monolithic applications that accept 
data inputs, manipulate and transform this data, and produce outputs 
(calculated results, information displays, emit control signals to devices, etc.) 
under user or system administered control. 
■ libraries, frameworks, or middleware—These are collections of software 
functions, no one of which is typically a standalone program. Such software is 
often expected to be routinely reused in many different systems or 
applications. This software may also be used to provide a layer of abstraction 
that hides source code implementation details so as to improve subsequent 
software portability, or to hide alternative software implementations. 
■ inter-application script code—This software is used to combine independent 
programs by associating their respective inputs, outputs, and control 
variables. This software is sometimes called “glue code,” which suggests its 
primary use is to connect programs through the use of “pipes” and/or “filters” 
that control or modulate the directed flow of information between the 
associated programs. Such scripts may be as short as a single line of code, 
but on the other hand, they can be as large as thousands (even hundreds of 
thousands) of source lines of code. 
■ intra-application script code—This software is similar in spirit to inter-
application script code, except the focus is on organizing, controlling, and 
manipulating input and output data/presentations from remote Web 
services/repositories for view and end-user interaction at the human-
computer interface. Popular Web application systems like the Firefox Web 
browser may be scripted to provide animated user interfaces coded in 
languages like Javascript, ActionScript, or PhP to create Rich Internet 
Applications (Feldt, 2007) or “mashups” (Nelson & Churchill, 2006). Such 
scripts may be as short as a single line of code, but on the other hand, they 
can be as large as thousands (even tens of thousands) of source lines of 
code. However, custom intra-application software languages may also be 
designed to create domain-specific languages (e.g., XUL for Firefox Web 
browser (Feldt, 2007)) for rapid construction of persistent/disposable software 
functions (or macros), which enable increased software development 
productivity or end-user programming. 
z Executable components—These are programs for which the software is in binary 
form, and its source code may not be open for access, review, modification, and 
possible redistribution. Executable binaries are rarely treated as open since they 
may also be viewed as “derived works” (Rosen, 2005) that result from the 
compilation or interpretation of software source code that may not be available, 
or may be proprietary. Executable components are widespread and common in 
every computing system, even in OSS systems. However, executable 
components may also only become part of a system during its execution through 
dynamic (or run-time) linking. Finally, though their binary form makes them 
available for execution through external linkage to some other program, such 
form also makes figuring out what they do very difficult, if they have little/no 
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z Application program interfaces/APIs—These software interfaces are generally 
not programs that can be executed, but they enable software system developers 
to access their functionality without direct access to their source code. The 
availability of externally visible and accessible APIs to which independently 
developed components can be connected is the minimum required to form an 
“open system” (Meyers & Obendorf, 2001). Often, the APIs are treated as if they 
enable direct access to the otherwise hidden software, but a closed software 
system may employ a layer of abstract APIs as “shims” that better align multiple 
program interfaces or security barriers that seek to protect disclosure of private or 
proprietary information. Such information may include the details of actual 
software function interfaces (which may be designated as “trade secrets”) or 
hidden software functions that may only be known to software developers with 
secure, restricted code access. 
z Software connectors—These may be software either from libraries, frameworks, 
or application script code whose intended purpose is to provide a standard or 
reusable way of associating programs, data repositories, or remote services 
through common interfaces. These may include software technologies that 
constitute a “software bus” for plugging in independent software modules 
(programs or functions), network protocols that enable and control the flow of 
data between remote programs across a LAN or Internet, or even a database 
management system (DBMS) that is used to enable data sharing and storage 
among programs connected to the DBMS. The High Level Architecture (HLA) is 
an example of a software connector scheme (Kuhl, Weatherly & Dahmann, 
2000), as are CORBA, Microsoft's .NET, and Enterprise Java Beans. 
z Configured system or sub-system—These are software systems built to conform 
to an explicit architectural specification. They include software source 
code/binary components, APIs, and connectors that are organized in a way that 
may conform to a known “architectural style” such as the Representational State 
Transfer (Fielding & Taylor, 2002) for Web-based client-server applications or 
may represent an original or ad hoc architectural pattern (Bass et al., 2003). All 
the software elements, and how they are arranged and interlinked, can all be 
specified, analyzed, and documented using an Architecture Description 
Language (Bass et al., 2003) and ADL-based support tools. Beyond this, any or 
all of the software elements in a configured system or sub-system may or may 
not be OSS. In contrast to a derived work, a configured system or sub-system is 
considered as a “collective work” and as such is subject to its own copyright and 
license protection as intellectual property, whether open or closed (Rosen, 2005; 
St. Laurent, 2004). However, such intellectual property declaration cannot 
employ a license regime on the overall system that supercedes or controverts the 
license protections/obligations of the individual software elements that constitute 
the configured system or sub-system. 
Figure 1 provides an overall view of a hypothetical software architecture for a 
configured system that includes and identifies each of the software elements above. It also 
includes open source (e.g., Gnome Evolution) and closed source software (WordPerfect) 
components. In simple terms, the configured system consists of software components (grey 
boxes in the figure) that include a Mozilla Web browser, Gnome Evolution e-mail client, and 
WordPerfect word processor that run on a Linux operating system that can access file, print, 
and other remote networked servers (e.g., Apache Web server). These components are 
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interrelated through a set of software connectors (ellipses in the figure) that connect the 
interfaces of software components (small white boxes attached to a component) that are 
linked together. Modern enterprise systems or command and control systems will generally 
have more complex architectures and a more diverse mix of software components than 
shown in the figure here. As we examine next, this simple architecture raises a number of 
OSS licensing issues that mitigate the extent of openness that is realized in a configured 
OA. 
Understanding Open Software Licenses  
A particularly knotty challenge is the problem of licenses in OSS and OA.  There are 
a number of different OSS licenses, each with different rights and obligations attached to 
software components that bear it. External sources are available that describe and explain 
the many different licenses now in use with OSS (OSI, 2008; Rosen, 2005; St. Laurent, 
2004). Thus, we will not delve into the details or variations among the many licenses, except 
to note a few key properties that should be recognized as potentially impacting the 
openness of a configured software system, and therefore, whether it can realize an OA.   
The GNU General Public License (GPL), the most widely used OSS license, 
implements a strong copyleft, requiring that the software source code be distributed and 
that any modified versions also be licensed under GPL (Rosen, 2005; St. Laurent, 2004). 
The GPL, along with some other OSS licenses like the Mozilla Public License (MPL), 
and others (CPL, OSL (OSI, 2008; Rosen, 2005)), are identified as “reciprocal” licenses 
that in some way transfer license obligations to derivative software systems. A software 
system component or connector based on existing OSS inherits the obligations or 
restrictions of the originating OSS. In contrast, an academic freedom license such as the 
BSD, MIT, or Apache license permits derivative software works to be incorporated into a 
proprietary, closed-source product (Rosen, 2005; St. Laurent, 2004).  Academic licenses 
are identified as “unrestrictive” so that software components or connectors derived from 
OSS covered by an academic freedom license need not adhere to the obligations of the 
originating OSS.  
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Note: Components, connectors, and overall system configuration may be subject to different 
software licenses.  
Figure 1. Software Components, Connectors, Interfaces Arranged in an Overall  
Software System Configuration 
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What license applies to an OA system containing some GPL components with a 
reciprocal license and some BSD components with unrestrictive license, or perhaps even 
some proprietary software license? In Figure 1, we see at least three software components 
that have different software licenses: the Mozilla Web browser (subject to the MPL), Gnome 
Evolution e-mail client (subject to the GPL), and WordPerfect word processor (subject to a 
proprietary software license). The license problem is further complicated by components 
designed to operate on license requirements.  For example, a software shim may be a 
library function, abstract interface, or script code designed to serve as a connector between 
two applications that have different licenses, so that neither application’s license is violated, 
and neither application is “infected” by the restrictions or obligations of the other’s license. In 
this regard, a software connector is a configured system (or OA) element specifically 
designed to modulate the license requirements imposed on the components it connects.  
Figure 1 follows the links between the Mozilla Web browser, Gnome Evolution, and 
WordPerfect. The requirements imposed by a component’s license are affected by the 
architectural structure of the system containing it and vice versa.  Figures 2a and 2b provide 
suggested mappings of license obligations that can constrain a configured software system 
derived from OSS components and connectors covered by a specific OSS license. 
The question of what license covers a specific configured system is difficult to 
answer, especially if the system or sub-system is already in operation (Kazman & Carrière, 
1999). We offer the following considerations to clarify this. For example, a Mozilla/Firefox 
Web browser covered by the MPL may download and run intra-application script code that is 
covered by a different license. If this script code is only invoked via dynamic run-time linking 
(or invocation), then there is no transfer of license restrictions or obligations. However, if the 
script code is integrated into the source code of the Web browser as persistent part of an 
application, then it could be viewed as a configured sub-system that may need to be 
accessed for license transfer implications. Another kind of example can be anticipated with 
application programs (like Web browsers, e-mail clients, and word processors) that employ 
Rich Internet Applications or mashups that entail the use of content (e.g., textual character 
fonts or geographic maps) that is subject to copyright protection—if the content is embedded 
in and bundled with the scripted application sub-system.  
Next, as software system configuration (or OA) is intended to be adapted to 
incorporate new innovative software technologies that are not yet at hand, we recognize that 
these OSS-based system configurations will evolve over time at ever-increasing rates 
(Scacchi, 2007); components will be replaced, and inter-component connections will be 
rewired or remediated with new connector types. As such, the sustaining the openness of a 
configured software system will become part of ongoing system support, analysis, and 
validation. This, in turn, may require ADLs to include OSS licensing properties on 
components, connectors, and overall system configuration, as well as in appropriate 
analysis tools (Bass et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2a. Mapping Reciprocal OSS Licenses to Derivative Works  
(Rosen, 2005) 
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Note: Footnotes in original (Rosen, 2005, p. 251). 
Figure 2b. Mapping Unrestrictive Academic to Reciprocal OSS Licenses  
Moving forward, analyses of OSS licenses by intellectual property lawyers may 
suggest a way out of the current OSS licensing/relicensing mess. Note, we are not lawyers, 
so we are not offering any legal advice. Feel free to consult legal counsel if or when 
appropriate for guidance on license interpretation or enforcement conditions. However, we 
offer some encouraging words. Rosen (2005, p. 252) observes OSS license incompatibilities 
can prevent OSS from being freely used and combined. The multiplicity of such licenses 
only makes the problem worse (review the tables in Figure 2a and 2b). Copyright law and 
contract law which cover the interpretation and enforcement of OSS licenses is such that 
OSS developers or distributors (e.g., Defense contractors) cannot simply relicense copyright 
protected OSS unless they have permission to do so. This, in turn, may mitigate some 
requirements shaping the development and deployment of military software applications that 
are suppose to embody an OA.  
Terms and conditions for reciprocity obligations in licenses like the GPL and others 
apply to OSS that are modified and redistributed and not to software that may be modified 
but not distributed outside of the organization. Also, this raises the questions of what 
constitutes “distribution” or “redistribution” for a government organization that acquires 
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access rights to all software and data developed under contract. Similarly, for government 
employees whose work is not protected by copyright (and thus may enter into the public 
domain), this may pose new opportunities for adhering to or working around OSS license 
restrictions or obligations.  
Finally, as Rosen (2005, p. 253) observes, by merely aggregating (or configuring) 
software from different sources and treating such software as black boxes (e.g., no intra-
application scripting allowed and/or employ dynamic run-time linkage), it is possible to 
technically avoid creation of derivative works that inherit the license restrictions or 
obligations of the involved software elements. Subsequently, Rosen finds that OSS license 
incompatibilities are inconveniences rather than barriers, and ultimately, one can get around 
almost all licensing restrictions by being sufficiently creative and inventive. Thus, there is a 
need to providing guidance to program acquisition officers, Program Executive Offices, and 
Defense contractors for how to specify requirements for military software applications that 
best achieve a cost-effective level of openness, which can enable the maximum possible 
benefits anticipated. But, without explicit guidance or guidelines, we cannot assume that OA 
will just happen because of the use of OSS elements and open systems APIs.  
With this in mind, we outline some initial guidelines for such requirements. 
Discussion  
The relationships among open technology, open architecture, open source software 
requirements, and program acquisition is poorly understood. We can call such a view of 
OSS: (a) product oriented. Alternatively, we can view OSS as: (b) primarily a set of 
development processes, work practices, project community activities (code sharing, review, 
modification, redistribution), and multi-project software ecosystem that produce OSS 
systems and components. This view of OSS as an integrated web of people, processes, and 
organizations (including project teams operating as virtual organizations (Noll & Scacchi, 
1999; Crowston & Scozzi, 2002)) is production oriented (including production processes, 
production organizations, production people, and governance over software production 
(Scacchi, 2007; Scacchi, Feller, et al., 2006; Scacchi & Jensen, 2008)). The requirements 
for (a) are not the same as for (b), and program acquisition targeting (a) may fail to realize 
the benefits, capabilities, or constraints engendered by (b), and vice versa. As such, there is 
need to understand how to identify an optimal mix of OSS within OA as both products and 
production processes, practices, community activities, and multi-project (or multi-
organization) software ecosystems. 
The success of the DoD’s OA and OSS programs in achieving the positive qualities 
associated with OSS depends on the socio-technical context in which a system is developed 
and used.  The stakeholders and users of an OSS system typically include the developers of 
that system; they know its goals and requirements implicitly and can adapt and evolve the 
system to follow their understanding of the context in which it is used.  If the DoD is to 
achieve quick response, rapid adaptation, and context-appropriate use of OSS, it may 
require a representative group of the personnel who use and adapt it to their needs be OSS 
developers for that system. 
Following our analysis above, it appears there are a new set of requirements are 
emerging that will need to be addressed in any acquisition of a software-intensive system 
that is stipulated to employ an OA that accommodates OSS components or connectors. 
PMs that identify specific requirements for a given program acquisition or system 
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development contract can benefit from consideration of the following guidelines for how best 
to realize an OA: 
 Determining how much openness is required or desired. 
 Identifying guidelines and incentives for software development contractors that 
encourage them to develop, provide, and distribute/deploy OA systems with OSS 
components, connectors, and configuration that minimize conflicting OSS license 
obligations. 
 Determining the restrictions, if any, that apply to the OSS licenses used by 
different software system components, connectors, or configurations within an 
OA system. 
 Identifying alternative OSS component, connector, or configuration candidates 
that may satisfy a specified, overall system architecture.  
 Determining scenarios that help reveal whether there are OSS licensing conflicts 
for a given set of OSS components, connectors, or configuration. 
 Identifying and analyzing any OSS licensing obligations that must be satisfied for 
the resulting system to be available for redistribution. 
 Identifying and validating OSS license conformance criteria for configured 
systems intended for redistribution. 
Further elaboration on these guidelines is subject to additional research, application, 
and refinement. However, they do provide a useful starting point for discussion, debate, and 
action in program acquisition. 
Conclusions 
The relationships among open technology, open architecture, open source software 
requirements, and program acquisition is poorly understood. In recent OA presentations, 
OSS is viewed as primarily a source for low-cost/free software systems or software 
components. Thus, given the goal of realizing an OA and open technology strategy (Herz & 
Scott, 2007), together with the use of OSS components and open APIs, it is unclear how to 
best align program acquisition, system requirements, software architectures, and OSS 
license regimes. Subsequently, the central problem we examined in this paper was how to 
identify principles of software architecture and OSS copyright licenses that facilitate or inhibit 
the success of an OA strategy when OSS and open APIs are required or otherwise 
employed. 
Consideration of emerging issues in the acquisition of OSS within the US 
Department of Defense is currently an important problem for acquisition research. The goal 
of this paper is to help establish a foundation for how to analyze and evaluate dependencies 
that might arise when one is seeking to develop software systems that should embody an 
OA and when different types of OSS components or OSS component licenses are being 
considered for integration. 
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